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“Effective medicine could only begin when doctors began to count and to compare.” 
 
David Wooton, Bad Medicine 
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Abstract 
Patient safety measurement methods are dominated by outcome measurement, reducing them to counts 
of harm or adverse events. Performance measurement recognises the limitations of the sole use of 
outcome indicators and proposes the use of measures throughout the system, in particular the 
determinants of the desired outcomes. Furthermore, it promotes stakeholder engagement in the design of 
measures in order to understand their expectations and how they contribute. This is particularly important 
in healthcare services, such as the NHS case management programme, where patient contribution is 
growing. This programme is a response to the ageing population and the subsequent increase in complex 
long term conditions, aiming to deliver care in the home to empower patients so they are able to care for 
themselves to a greater extent. In comparison to the institutionalised setting, the home setting is relatively 
unexplored. Therefore, this research has provided an opportunity to examine the concept of safety in a 
care service with an increasing demand from a vulnerable population.  The research aimed to develop a 
conceptual framework for safety measurement that was: 1) reflective of key stakeholders; 2) able to 
incorporate the system; and 3) representative of the home-delivered healthcare of the case management 
programme.  
An exploratory, sequential mixed method design within the critical realist philosophy, which was guided 
by the principles of performance measurement, was adopted. A case study utilising 13 interviews with 
nine patients and six carers (two interviews were held jointly) and three focus groups with 17 case 
management nurses was deployed. This enabled in-depth exploration of their perspectives regarding 
safety, including: their definitions of safety, who was involved, the contributing factors, and which 
outcomes were most important. Intriguing, important or contradictory findings were further examined 
using a survey (patient n=35, carer n=19 and case management nurse n=26), which aimed to determine 
the level of agreement with these qualitative findings and identify any statistically significant differences 
between the stakeholder groups. 
Through engagement with stakeholders, this research has established a definition of safety that 
represents the type of care provided by the case management programme. In particular, it recognises 
the importance of meeting the care needs of this patient population, acknowledging that the alternative 
would facilitate disease progression, exposing patients to unnecessary harm. Understanding the patient 
perspective has proven to be particularly important because of the level of control asserted by patients 
on the structure, processes and outcomes of care. This level of control is an integral component of the 
proposed conceptual framework. Of greatest significance is the incorporation of the patients' living 
environments and their resources into the structure of care, as well as the involvement of their daily 
self-care activities in the processes of care. Consequently, the framework is inclusive of non-traditional 
safety outcomes, such as functional health status, because they help sustain patient controlled structures 
and processes, which in turn influence traditional measures of harm. The conceptual framework is a 
guide to the assessment of safety in case management that specifies a range of factors that facilitate the 
condition of safety, providing a holistic overview of the complex, nested system of care required to 
manage long term conditions.   
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A Performance 
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Exploratory, sequential 
mixed method design 
A research methodology in which a qualitative study is conducted first 
to explore a phenomenon, followed by a quantitative study. 
xx 
Harm Impairment of structure or function of the body and/or any deleterious 
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  Chapter 1
Introduction 
1.1: Introduction 
Safety in healthcare is a priority for policy makers, healthcare organisations, patients and other service 
users worldwide. Methods to quantify harm have been available for over two decades (1, 2). However, 
these methods are subject to the limitations of isolated outcome measurements, meaning that they are 
incapable of predicting error, mitigating against it and defining a level of safety. This could be attributed to 
the level of understanding required to develop such measurement systems. In addition, the design and 
implementation of safety measurement systems is often done with little contribution from patients and 
other service users. However, the patient perspective of safety is becoming increasingly important as the 
care model shifts to one that not only puts patients at the centre of their own care, but also demands 
greater contributions from them and places the onus on them to generate better health outcomes.  
This thesis presents the development of a conceptual safety assessment framework for the case 
management (CM) programme in the National Health Service (NHS). The conceptual framework is a 
guide to the assessment of safety performance that is predicated upon the structure, process and outcome 
model of quality care (3). It has been devised to address some of the issues of the current approach to 
safety measurement and contribute to the progress of safety measurement. In particular, it identifies 
contributory factors to safety throughout the system and incorporates the perspectives of patients, carers 
and CM nurses through the exploration, examination and interpretation of their perspectives using a case 
study approach. Furthermore, it incorporates the literature perspective. Subsequently, as part of a 
2 
sequential, exploratory mixed method design, a survey study has attempted to further enhance the 
reliability and validity of the findings by engaging with a larger sample size using a survey method. This 
chapter provides an overview of the thesis: the gap in the literature, the premise upon which the research 
is designed, an overview of the work and the structure in which it is presented.  
1.2: Safety and safety measurement 
Patient safety can be defined as ‘the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with healthcare to an acceptable 
minimum’ (4)pg19, as well as ‘the use of best practice shown to lead to optimal outcomes’ (5)pg221. The first large-scale 
studies to measure safety used retrospective record review (RRR) and highlighted the extent of medical 
error in America, implicating error in the deaths of as many as 98,000 people per year, 43.5% of which 
were perceived to be preventable (1, 2, 6). The use of this measurement method around the world, 
including in Britain (7), Australia (8) and Canada (9), has indicated a median overall incidence of adverse 
events of 9.2% (10). However, despite an awareness of the issues and high profile reports proposing 
recommendations to address them (6, 11), reports of lives lost still frequently appear in the media. Reports 
such as the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (12) indicate signs of long-term 
institutional abuse, suggesting that the needs of the organisation were put above the needs of the patients, 
resulting in between 400 and 1,200 more deaths than expected between January 2005 and March 2009. 
The counting of harms using RRR is unreliable and unrepeatable (13-16). The subjective nature of the 
method means that there are issues with inter-rater reliability. Moreover, its time and resource 
requirements often render it single use, meaning that the RRR is unable to reliably and longitudinally 
measure harm. Ergo, it is unable to identify a reduction in harm over time or calculate a reduction in the 
risk of harm. Essentially, RRR is an epidemiological tool to study the occurrence of adverse events. 
3 
Since the application of RRR, other methods have been devised. These include: global trigger tools 
(GTTs) (17), incident reporting systems (IRSs) (18), patient safety incidents (PSIs) (19), safety culture 
assessment (20) and the NHS safety thermometer (21). However, with the exception of safety culture 
assessment, all remain focused on the outcome of harm and suffer the same limitations as RRR.  
Systems theory (22, 23) is a recognised theory of patient safety and other high-risk industries (24). Systems 
theory dictates that error is caused by the alignment of multiple faults or flaws in the system (latent 
conditions) that enable an individual to commit an error or omit an essential action (active failures). It is 
accepting of human fallibility and advocates that appropriately designed systems reduce the opportunity 
for error and improve safety. In order for this to be achieved, the system needs to be understood, and 
contributing factors to error need to be identified. In this environment, errors are openly acknowledged, 
and efforts are made to understand the systemic cause and rectify any underlying issues. However, despite 
knowledge of the importance of the system and the conditions that contribute to safety, measurement is 
still focused at the sharp end, on outcomes (adverse events). Consequently, these methods are also unable 
to monitor the system upstream of the error to prevent it from occurring and reduce risk. 
The field of performance measurement no longer supports the isolated use of outcome indicators (see 
Chapter 3.2: Lessons from other industries: the case for performance measurement). Outcomes are 
lagging indicators that give information only on what has been achieved in the past. Used in isolation, they 
are unable to promote improvement because they lack information on their determinants; consequently, 
they cannot predict future performance. In addressing the issues of lagging indicators, performance 
measurement has sought to overcome these limitations. Essentially, indicators of performance should 
utilise leading indicators capable of predicting outcomes, lagging indicators to ensure outcomes are being 
met and process indicators to control consistency. These indicators should reflect the organisation’s 
strategy at the ‘business operating system’ or ‘work unit’ level and should be devised with stakeholder 
engagement, including consumer engagement, to understand demands and contributions (25-32).  
Conceptual frameworks, such as performance measurement frameworks (for example, the balanced 
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scorecard (28)), provide a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon by identifying a network of 
linked concepts and relationships (33). For performance measurement, in particular, they also seek to 
provide guidance on the design and implementation of measurement systems. The fundamental principles 
of performance measurement provide an opportunity for learning and development in safety 
measurement. By adopting this approach, progress in safety measurement could be achieved.  
1.3: Case management as a case study 
Healthcare organisations worldwide, including the NHS, face a growing burden with the increasing 
prevalence of long term conditions (LTCs), which are strongly associated with the ageing demographic 
(34). This burden stretches resources and places patients at greater risk. The NHS and Social Care long 
term conditions model was introduced in 2005 to tackle the growing burden of LTCs, spearheaded by the 
implementation of the CM programme (35). The CM programme aims to reduce the burden, 
predominantly by reducing the number of hospital admissions experienced by the most complex and 
severe cases of LTCs. Using a proactive and personalised care plan, the CM programme aims to empower 
patients to take better care of themselves. In parallel, care is integrated by an advanced nurse practitioner, 
through the coordination of the multiple health and social care services required by the patient group, in 
order to deliver a single holistic service (35).  
In comparison to institutionalised settings, little research has been conducted into safety in community 
services where healthcare is delivered in the home, such as the CM programme (36). The evidence base 
on safety in home healthcare is limited. However, studies have recently been published examining the 
formal carer perspective of home care in Canada (37); the types of adverse events occurring (38, 39); and 
the comparative perspectives of the service users, their families and healthcare professionals (40, 41). The 
studies concluded that there was a large contrast between safety in the hospital setting and in the home 
setting. This contrast was reflected most notably in the lack of control and regulation, the extended 
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network of caregivers and stakeholders, the isolation of the patients and the healthcare professionals and 
the greater role the patient plays in achieving health. A corollary to which is a need for a different 
approach to safety measurement in this setting. However, these studies are relatively recent and have been 
focused on home care in Canada. The equivalent research has yet to be conducted in the UK. 
1.4: Research Problem 
The initial exploration of the literature has indicated that safety measurement in healthcare is dominated 
by outcome measures. The methods by which these measures are calculated suffer from individual 
limitations. In addition, the isolated use of outcome measures is restricted to counting past performance 
and does not facilitate an understanding of how the performance was achieved, nor does it hold any 
predicative capability. The review of the performance measurement literature suggested the use of whole 
system measures to address the limitations of isolated outcome measurement (i.e. identifying the 
determinants of outcomes). Conceptual performance frameworks inform the identification of indicators 
that represent the components of the system responsible for contributing to the desired outcomes. This 
can be achieved by a comprehensive understanding of the system, including the consumer’s contribution. 
Furthermore, the patient perspective, as a consumer of healthcare, is not well reflected in the literature but 
is being recognised as an area for improvement. This is particularly important as care services, like the CM 
programme, aim to more effectively engage patients in healthcare activities. Research to date has not yet 
led to a comprehensive understanding of safety in the home care setting.   
1.5: Research aim and objectives 
In order to address the gap in the literature, the primary aim of the research is: 
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To develop a framework for safety measurement for the NHS case management programme that is 
reflective of key stakeholder perspectives to guide the assessment of safety. 
The objectives are to: 
1. Create a model that identifies the key stakeholders of the case management programme and the 
overarching domains for measurement to inform the research design 
2. Validate the model 
3. Explore the concept of safety from the stakeholders’ perspectives, as identified in the above 
model  
4. Understand what it means to be safe in the home to the key stakeholders of this patient group 
and determine desired outcomes and influencing factors 
5. Devise a safety performance assessment framework that manifests the perspectives of the key 
stakeholders 
1.6: Research design 
The aim of this research was to devise a framework to support safety measurement to be used when care 
is delivered in the home that was reflective of both key stakeholder perspectives and the system. To 
achieve this, the researcher has adopted a critical realist philosophy to facilitate the exploration of 
unobservable mechanisms and test their acceptability amongst a large population. Therefore, the research 
has explored, examined and understood the key stakeholders’ perspectives of safety in the CM 
programme and has determined the acceptability of these perspectives. This was achieved using an 
exploratory, sequential mixed method design (42). The first phase of this design was a case study (study I) 
(43), and the second phase was a survey (study II) (44). Study I explored, through multiple methods 
within a case study design, the perspectives of safety, including its definition, contributing factors and 
desired outcomes. Methods of data collection included 13 interviews with nine patients and six carers, and 
three focus groups with 17 CM nurses. Study II deployed a survey that determined the level of agreement 
with the qualitative findings amongst a larger sample size (patient n=35, carer n=19 and CM nurse n=26).  
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1.7: Thesis outline 
This chapter has provided the background information to the research, introduced the research problem 
and its subsequent aims and objectives. The following two chapters present the literature and the critical 
evidence and argument needed for this research. In Chapter 3, the integrated safety measurement model is 
presented as a prerequisite for the research design, which is discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 specifically 
describes the research design, and the two study protocols are given in Chapter 5. The findings of each 
study are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 8 discusses the findings of the preceding chapters in 
relation to the aims of research, which enables the conceptual framework to be devised before giving 
consideration to the limitations of the research. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 9, and possible 
future work is proposed. A diagrammatic outline of the thesis can be found in Figure 1.1: Thesis outline. 
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Figure 1.1: Thesis outline 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
Chapter 9: Conclusions 
Chapter 6: Study I - A qualitative exploration of key stakeholder perspectives of 
safety in healthcare delivered in the home 
Chapter 7: Study II - Quantitative examination of key stakeholder perspectives 
of safety in healthcare delivered in the home 
Chapter 4: Research design 
Chapter 5: Study protocols 
Chapter 3: The case for an alternative approach to patient safety measurement 
Chapter 2: Safety measurement, management and performance in healthcare 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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  Chapter 2
Safety measurement, management and performance in 
healthcare 
2.1: Introduction  
Following the publication of the Institute of Medicine’s (IoM) report ‘To Err is Human: building a 
safer health system’ (6), the issue of medical error became widely acknowledged. The statistics 
published in the IoM report equated medical error to that of the 8th leading cause of death in America, 
accounting for more deaths than breast cancer, and awakening the world to the extent of harm in 
healthcare. These statistics were derived from two large scale American studies, which, when 
extrapolated, indicated that between 44,000 (2) and 98,000 (1) deaths occurred as a result of medical 
error each year. There is no single cause of error or an individual responsible, as will be explored here, 
but the severity of error could be attributed to the increasingly complex and poorly understood systems 
within which medicine is practiced (22).  
Following the revelations of harm in healthcare in the U.S.A., other healthcare organisations worldwide 
began to consider the extent of error experienced by their own patients and the cost implications of 
such error. An Australian study indicated that 16.6% of hospital admissions were associated with an 
adverse event, with 51% considered preventable (8). Another Australian study (45) determined that 
adverse events added a further $6,826 to the cost of each admission. In England, one in ten hospital 
admissions results in patient harm (7), costing a further £2 billion a year in increased hospital stays (11). 
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Furthermore, the Department of Health (DoH), in ‘An Organisation with a Memory’ (11), estimates 
that annually: 
 400 people die or are seriously injured involving medical devices 
 nearly 10,000 people are reported to have experienced serious adverse drug reactions 
 15% of hospital acquired infections are avoidable and cost an estimated £1 billion 
 the National Health Service (NHS) pays out about £400 million in the settlement of clinical 
negligence claims 
Medical error is costly and patient safety presents an area of concern for policy makers worldwide. With 
the incidence of hospital adverse events averaging 9.2% across eight large studies from around the world 
(10), the evolution of patient safety has been lagging behind other components of medicine and, in 
particular, other industries. It is difficult to cross compare industries because of differing units of 
measurement however, in aerospace, during 2009 there were 685 global fatalities (46), which is 
considerably lower than the figures calculated in healthcare. The IoM report (6) has been seminal in the 
field of patient safety and subsequently, huge efforts have been made to quantify the incidence of error 
and harm worldwide. Through the study of adverse events, there have been developments: new methods 
to quantify error, improvement strategies devised and implemented, and a wealth of information 
generated. As indicated by the number of hospital based statistics presented, efforts have been focused in 
secondary care. However, there is an emerging trend towards primary care research and improvement 
efforts. Despite these efforts, it is still unclear as to whether healthcare is now safer in either secondary or 
primary care. This is because there is no longitudinal method available to validly and reliably track error, 
harm or safety over time. 
This chapter explores safety in healthcare, its measurement and performance, and aims to identify their 
limitations. The chapter begins by introducing the current understanding of the concept of safety in 
healthcare and the systems model (22). There will be an exploration of the definition of safety and other 
key terms. As will be discussed, it is evident that patient safety revolves around the reduction of risk of 
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harm to patients through the application of evidence based processes. A critique of the current 
measurement methods will be presented in relation to how they achieve the goal of measuring safety. 
Where measurement methods fail, risk management and safety performance provide some support to fill 
the void. In concluding the chapter, attention is drawn to the aspects of the methods, which lead to the 
hypothesis that the current safety measurement methods are inappropriate for comprehensive safety 
measurement - where comprehensive safety measurement enables the measurement, monitoring and 
management of risk to promote positive outcomes. 
2.2: Overview of patient safety 
2.2.1: Systems approach to patient safety 
According to Reason (22), there are two main approaches to error and patient safety in healthcare: the 
person approach and the systems approach. The person approach focuses on the individuals who commit 
unsafe acts or violations at the sharp end, resulting in a culture of blame. Human behaviour is perceived 
as being solely responsible for error as a result of things, such as forgetfulness, poor motivation, 
recklessness and inattention. Countermeasures are directed at reducing variability in human behaviour 
through disciplinary action, retraining or naming and shaming. The systems approach however, accepts 
human fallibility and proposes that conditions within a system (latent conditions), upstream of an action, 
predispose that system to error (active failures) and ultimately adverse outcomes. Ordinarily, a system will 
have defensive layers that tolerate error; only upon alignment of holes in the defensive layers does an 
error occur. This theory is presented in the Swiss cheese model, see Figure 2.1: The Swiss cheese model. 
Conditions in the system that are risk factors for error include inadequate training, sleep deprivation, 
unclear policies and poorly designed tools (23, 24, 47). 
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Figure 2.1: The Swiss cheese model (22) 
 
 
The systems approach to safety was first implemented in other industries. Understanding the processes 
that were required for safe aviation, allowed the development of checklists and procedures that ensured 
critical steps prior to take off were commissioned (24), preventing active failures. Furthermore, 
understanding latent conditions, helped to inform policy and generate regulations that increased the safety 
of the system. For instance, the identification of pilot fatigue as a risk factor for fatal crashes and 
decreased performance in aviation, led to the creation of a pilot flight duty and rest proposal (24, 48). 
Anaesthesiology is another discipline that has successfully integrated the systems approach to safety. 
Previously, the risk of death was approximately one in 10,000 inductions (49), which has subsequently 
been reduced to one in 200,000 inductions (50, 51) following the investigation of critical incidents from 
the systems and human factors perspectives (47, 52). Successful implementation can be extremely 
rewarding, and, as indicated in anaesthesia, can result in improvements to patient safety.   
The growing interest in patient safety research has resulted in multiple definitions for terms and words 
relating to patient safety in the literature. Inconsistency of language can hinder progress towards a better 
understanding and inhibit comparisons between studies. One study found 25 definitions for error in the 
literature (53), another study identified 17 definitions for error and 14 for adverse event. (54). The latter of 
these studies provided evidence for the World Health Organisation (WHO) to pursue a project to 
comprehensively classify patient safety (4). A patient safety glossary is required for this thesis to ensure 
Latent conditions: 
dormant errors within a 
system 
Active failures: 
errors committed at 
the sharp end 
Hazard 
 
Harm 
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consistency throughout and in line with the literature. Key terms include: error, harm, adverse events, 
patient safety incident and patient safety. Their definitions will be discussed in the following sub-sections 
and conclusions drawn on the most suitable. 
2.2.2: Error 
Reason (55) originally defined an error as the ‘the failure of planned actions to achieve their desired goal’ (55)pg81. 
The IoM report expanded on this to include: ‘the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or use of a 
wrong plan to achieve an aim; the accumulation of errors results in accidents’ (6)pg4, and is the most commonly used 
definition in the literature (53). Thus, given its wide use, it seems appropriate to adopt this definition for 
the purpose of this thesis. Furthermore, there are two types of error originally described by Reason (56): 
latent errors, and active errors. These were also adopted by the IoM report (6) and republished by Reason 
(22) as latent conditions and active failures: 
1. Latent conditions – errors within the system that can lie dormant for years 
2. Active failures – errors committed at the sharp end of the service and whose effects are felt 
immediately 
Understanding latent conditions provides an opportunity to proactively manage risk, potentially 
preventing error, or mitigating against its effects. Davies et al. (5), in the Canadian Patient Safety 
Dictionary, classified latent conditions under the term structure, which, was first proposed by Donabedian 
(3) as ‘the settings in which it [care] takes place and the instrumentalities of which it is the product’  (3)pg694. Or, in other 
words, the system within which, care is delivered, such as facilities, equipment, staff and the operation of 
programmes. Davies et al. (5) describe structure to be ‘a supporting framework or essential parts. It includes all 
elements of the health-care system that exist before any actions or activities take place’ (5)pg21. Given this, active failures 
are more aligned with the process of care, also described by Donabedian (3), which referred to the 
application and conduct of medical care. The definition of error provided above, encompasses errors of 
commission (failure of a planned action to be completed as intended) and errors of omission (the use of a 
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wrong plan to achieve an aim). The use of the IoM report (6) definition of error, derived from Reason 
(55), is supported here as it focuses on the structure and process of safety as described by Davies et al. (5), 
rather than on an outcome and doesn’t claim that an error always results in a negative outcome or harm. 
Other terms are available to describe errors that result in harm. Therefore, harm, adverse events and 
patient safety indicators will be discussed.  
2.2.3: Harm, adverse events and patient safety incidents 
The WHO’s (4) classification defines harm as the ‘impairment of structure or function of the body and/or any 
deleterious effect arising there from’  (4)pg21. Furthermore, it describes a harmful incident as ‘an incident that resulted 
in harm to a patient’ (4)pg21. However, in the literature, the term adverse event prevails in popularity and is 
used as the measurable indicator of the Harvard Medical Practice Study (2), which informed the IoM 
report (6). The Harvard Medical Practice Study defined an adverse event as an injury caused by medical 
mis-management that resulted in measurable disability rather than the underlying disease (2). Confusingly, 
the term adverse event can also be used in reference to the action that led to harm (5). Furthermore, 
adverse events can impose psychological trauma on patients when defined as ‘an event or omission arising 
during clinical care and causing physical or psychological injury to a patient’ (11)pgxii.  
In the homecare setting, the definition of adverse event, as proposed by Madigan (57), describes events or 
occurrences, which manifest within the process of service delivery and is inclusive of additional 
stakeholder outcomes. This latter aspect of the definition is innovative, but it could be argued that events 
or occurrences may only become apparent post-service delivery, which is not considered in this definition. 
By omitting harm that occurs in the absence of healthcare professionals, the definition potentially 
excludes the proportion of care conducted by the homecare population during self-care. 
The NHS utilises the term patient safety incident to describe the process of harm or potential for harm: 
‘any unintended or unexpected incident which could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS care’ 
(58). However, the use of the word incident evokes the notion of an identifiable moment in time that is 
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responsible for the actual or potential harmful outcome. However, as was explored previously, this is not 
aligned with the systems approach to safety. 
2.2.4: Patient safety 
The IoM report (6), defines patient safety as ‘freedom from accidental injury; ensuring patient safety involves the 
establishment of operational systems and processes that minimize the likelihood of errors and maximizes the likelihood of 
intercepting them when they occur’ (6)pg211. Davies et al. (5) defined patient safety as ‘the reduction and mitigation of 
unsafe acts within the health-care system, as well as through the use of best practices shown to lead to optimal patient 
outcomes’ (5)pg12. Similarly, Runciman et al. (4), who were commissioned by the WHO to classify patient 
safety terminology, present safety to be the ‘reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with healthcare to an 
acceptable minimum’ (4)pg19. Cooper et al. (59) also refers to patient safety as the process of avoiding, 
preventing or ameliorating adverse outcomes.  
Noticeably, these definitions, although worded differently, refer to a reduction in the risk of delivering 
negative outcomes. These definitions successfully describe the prevention of unsafe care, but only Davies 
et al. (5) provide any clarity on what safe care is, by highlighting the use of best practices. Although, one 
might consider them symbiotic, the avoidance of negative outcomes does not guarantee optimal 
outcomes. The emphasis of most definitions is on the organisational practices to prevent error, rather 
than promote safety. This may be due, in part, to the relative infancy of patient safety research and 
practices in healthcare. Promotion of safety in the definition would require a level of understanding of the 
conditions that would need to be met i.e. standards. However, definable safety standards across healthcare 
have yet to materialise. Possibly because of the variability of standards required across all services, 
development of them would be resource intensive. Despite this, Davies et al. (5) have made some effort 
in recognising the use of best practices to optimise outcomes as a component of safety.  
The definition proposed by Davies et al. (5) implies a focus on individuals, rather than on the systemic 
environment. The definition is ignorant of latent conditions; only giving attention to active failures by 
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using the term ‘unsafe acts’. The IoM report  provides an in depth definition of the systemic nature of 
patient safety and the development of systems that not only reduce the risk of error, but also increase the 
opportunity to intercept should error occur. Similarly to both the IoM report (6) and Davies et al. (5), 
Cooper et al. (59) express safety as a function of the removal and prevention of process which allow 
adverse outcomes.  
Runciman et al.’s  (4) definition, without being explicit, acknowledges three factors of patient safety. 
Firstly, it makes reference to the inherent, harmful nature of medicine through its use of the term 
‘unnecessary harm’. For example, the very act of performing surgery is harmful; however, the benefits will 
have been considered and weighed against the consequences of not treating the medical problem 
surgically. Secondly, it acknowledges that healthcare, because of its inherent harmful nature and its 
dependency on human interaction, will never be free of error. Subsequently, what is required in order to 
be able to claim healthcare as safe, is to define, preferably quantifiably, what an acceptable minimum is. 
This raises questions as to whose responsibility and right it is to make that decision. Finally, it describes 
patient safety as a risk management exercise in seeking to reduce risk. This implies the on-going, active 
process of continuous assessment, review and prioritisation of risk. This definition offers the most 
comprehensive coverage of what patient safety means of the available definitions. 
2.2.5: Summary  
A summary of the key terms for use in this thesis relating to patient safety are reported in Table 2.1: Safety 
glossary. 
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Table 2.1: Safety glossary 
Term Definition Source 
Latent 
Condition 
Errors within the system, which can lie dormant for years (6, 22) 
Active Failure Errors committed at the sharp end of the service and whose effects are felt 
immediately 
(6, 22) 
Error Failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or use of a wrong 
plan to achieve an aim; the accumulation of errors results in accidents 
(6) 
Harm Impairment of structure or function of the body and/or any deleterious 
effect arising there from’. Including disease, injury, suffering and disability. 
(4) 
Adverse Event 4) An unintended and undesired incident directly associated with the 
care or services provided to the patient 
5) An incident that occurs during the process of providing health care 
and results in patient injury or death 
6) An adverse outcome for a patient, including injury or complication 
(5) 
Patient Safety 
Incident 
A patient safety incident is any unintended or unexpected incident which 
could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving [NHS] 
care.   
(58) 
Patient Safety The reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with healthcare to an 
acceptable minimum, as well as the use of best practice shown to lead to 
optimal outcomes. 
(4, 5) 
2.3: Safety measurement methods 
To measure is ‘to ascertain the size, amount or degree (of something) by using an instrument or device marked in standard 
units’ (60).   
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2.3.1: Retrospective record review 
Since retrospective record review (RRR) was first described as a methodology (61), the process has 
changed very little, except to add greater validity to the findings. Originally a two stage process (1, 2, 7-9), 
a third phase was added to clarify records for which consensus could not been achieved (62, 63). The 
process of RRR has been summarised in Figure 2.2: Process of retrospective record review. In addition to 
calculating the number of adverse events as a rate of hospital admissions, reviewers were able to 
determine the impact in bed days, level of disability, likely cause and preventability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Process of retrospective record review 
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RRR was the first real attempt to determine the incidence of adverse events in healthcare. However, since 
its implementation, further investigation has uncovered some drawbacks. Neale et al. (13) report that 
through comparing prompted incident reporting (14) and checking risk management and litigation files 
(15), RRR misses up to 20% of adverse events (13). Due to the subjective nature of the process, because 
of its reliance on physician judgement to detect the presence of an adverse event, inaccuracies exist that 
generate data that seems to underreport the extent of adverse events. This is further supported by the 
work of Thomas et al. (16), who described a poor inter-rater reliability between physicians. In addition, an 
Australian study (8) demonstrated only 80% agreement on the presence of an adverse event between 
physicians, and only 58% on whether they were preventable or not. Furthermore, RRR is susceptible to 
hindsight bias i.e. knowing the severity of the outcome influences judgement (64). However, when cross 
comparing methods, Michel (65) found RRR to be an effective method for estimating rates of adverse 
events, but less effective than prospective methods for describing causes, and consequences of adverse 
events, as well as for evaluating risk reduction programmes. 
RRR has predominantly been utilised on the records of hospitalised patients but was recently adapted by 
Sears et al. (38) in the Canadian home care setting, and published in mid-2013. It was recognised that the 
screening criteria would not be wholly applicable to the home care setting and thus, using a Delphi 
technique, the screening criteria used in phase 1 of the standard RRR process were modified and validated 
by an expert panel. Sears et al. (38) determined a 13% incidence of adverse events amongst patients 
receiving home healthcare with approximately one-third perceived to be preventable.  
Although RRR has proven valuable in illuminating the extent of harm and error, it is not a method for 
measuring safety but rather, is an epidemiological tool to study the distribution, patterns and causes of 
adverse events. What RRR does not do, is determine a level of safety. Neither does it pursue a line of 
improvement activity, although its findings could help shape the direction of improvement efforts by 
detecting high incidence locations and/or types of events. RRR also relies on the use of outcome 
measures, which are subject to a time lag and the true consequence of an adverse event might not be 
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realised for some time. In addition, by definition, a patient must experience harm in order for it to be 
detected. The criteria and subsequently identified adverse events are also clinically focused, giving no 
consideration to outcomes that are psychological or social in nature. This is possibly related to the care 
setting of its origin: the hospital. The hospital care setting is heavily focused on clinical processes, which 
are controllable and thus cause and effect relationships have been established with respect to clinical 
outcomes. The time consuming and resource intensive nature of RRR reduces its use, more often than 
not, to one time use in any organisation. This is evidenced by the lack of repeat use in any one 
organisation published in the literature. Consequently, it lacks the capacity to make comparisons from 
baseline over time to determine evidence of improvement.  
The advancement of health informatics, through the deployment of electronic medical records, has seen 
the development of an electronic equivalent of RRR using trigger tools, which are discussed in the next 
section. 
2.3.2: Global trigger tools 
Global trigger tools (GTTs) are available to replace the preliminary screening phase of a RRR. The use of 
triggers aims to facilitate a more focused and standardised review of patient records. Triggers are ‘easily 
identifiable flags, occurrences and prompts in patient records’ (17)pg176, which are associated with the potential 
presence of an adverse event. The Health Foundation in the U.K. promotes the use of trigger tools within 
the NHS (66). They claim that trigger tools provide an opportunity to overcome the underreporting 
nature of incident reporting, which is discussed in the next section. The focus of the GTT is to detect, 
quantify and track adverse events by scanning a small sample of patient records regularly to direct 
improvement efforts to where they are most needed. 
The GTT has been able to identify up to 10 times more serious adverse events compared to other 
methods, including RRR and self-reporting (67, 68) However, conflictingly, other studies have found it to 
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identify fewer adverse events than prospective review and RRR (69, 70). Therefore, some authors 
consider that this may limit its wider use (71), whilst others argue that good inter-rater reliability between 
review teams and at different sites could prove useful in both individual organisations and nationally (70). 
In 2010, the Health Foundation published ‘Evidence Scan: global trigger tools’ (66), in which it 
highlighted that there was a ‘relatively small amount of published evidence about the use and benefits of global trigger 
tools’ (66)pg7. They recognised the literature to be descriptive of how it is used and the data generated, yet 
the Health Foundation advocates its wide scale use throughout the U.K., arguing that a lack of evidence 
supporting its effectiveness is not indicative of lack of effectiveness. However, this approach is 
contradictory to the evidence based medicine approach adopted by the NHS. 
The retrospective nature of the trigger tool approach means that the limitations of the RRR endure. When 
testing inter-rater reliability, Mattsson et al. (72) found only 31% of adverse events were identified by two 
teams and suggested limiting their use until further evaluation was conducted. However, other studies 
contradict this (71). The lagging outcome indicators are limited in their effectiveness to directly improve 
safety and rely on an adverse event (harm or potential harm to patients) occurring and thus does not 
intuitively reduce risk to patients. Reliance on clinical judgement post trigger tool use (phase 2 of Figure 
2.2) incorporates subjectivity into the method as with RRR. Although GTTs show promise in 
repeatability, they are unsuitable as benchmarking tools (73). Progress is also being made in adapting the 
GTT to different settings, but this is yet to be achieved for the community setting. 
2.3.3: Incident reporting systems  
The use of incident reporting systems (IRSs) in safety management is common place in other high risk 
industries, such as aviation (74). Their core purpose is to support continuous process improvement (55) as 
well as to aid local incident management (75).This method of safety management has been embraced by 
healthcare organisations worldwide following recommendations by the IoM (6), which have since been 
endorsed by the WHO (18). IRSs were expected to identify vulnerabilities and contribute to efforts to 
22 
prevent reoccurrence (6), by learning from past failures to improve patient safety, which is aligned with 
the systems approach (22). The use of IRSs promotes ‘quadruple loop learning’, providing opportunities 
for learning at personal, local, national and international levels (76). The IoM (6) promoted the use of two 
types of reporting system: mandatory and voluntary, where mandatory systems aim to achieve 
accountability for more severe incidents and voluntary systems provide opportunities to learn and 
generate improvements from less serious incidents and near misses (prevented patient safety incidents). 
The NHS is one organisation that has adopted the advice of the IoM and implemented a voluntary 
reporting system. Following a recommendation in the 2000 DoH white paper, ‘An Organisation with a 
Memory’ (11), the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was set up in 2001. It sought to establish a 
National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), which was the first of its kind in healthcare worldwide 
and is an example of a high level, national reporting system into which subsidiaries of the NHS are 
encouraged to report. It has been hailed as “the most mature, country-level PSRS [Patient Safety Reporting System] 
in existence...that could be emulated in the United States” (77) pg5. The NRLS is a mechanism for collecting data 
on patient safety incidents, inclusive of near misses across the whole of England and Wales and enables 
emerging trends and patterns to be detected nationwide that would otherwise be insignificant in low 
numbers at the local level (78). 
NHS organisations are strongly encouraged to submit all patient incidents to its online database. Between 
July and September 2011, 77% of all organisations submitted at least one incident to the NRLS. Between 
October 2010 and September 2011, the care group setting: community nursing, medical and therapy 
service (incl. community hospital) accounted for 11% of the incidents, with the total of all other non-
acute care settings, accounting for less than 1% (0.913%). Examples of the types of incidents reported are 
available in Table 2.2: Examples of incident reports submitted to the NRLS by incident type. 
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Table 2.2: Examples of incident reports submitted to the NRLS by incident type  
(adapted from (73)) 
Incident type Description 
Patient Accident Patient usually only mobile with assistance but walked to the toilet opposite their 
bed unaided. Was found behind toilet door on the floor trying to get up 
Infrastructure Temperature within dialysis unit particularly by the window reached 35c, Patient 
and the parents feeling unwell due to heat. Staff finding it very difficult to work in 
these conditions. Parent wrote complaint letter 
Clinical Assessment PT arrived for scan. The wrong form was given, as there were 2 pt with the same 
name for the same scan on the same day. The clinical details were similar. Images 
were taken on the wrong pt as a result. 
There is little published evidence to support a meaningful change in the rate of improvement following 
the implementation of an IRS, despite large volumes of reports being published (79). However, it cannot 
be concluded that meaningful change isn’t occurring; it could either be unmeasured or unpublished. There 
is limited data to support the effectiveness of reporting system, however; studies are available on their 
ineffectiveness. Predominantly, they relate to the under-reporting nature of systems (80), which can 
ultimately be attributed to the voluntary nature of many reporting systems. The disposition to report is 
dictated by culturally systemic factors such as: severity of the outcome, rank of staff member and lack of 
feedback (81-83). 
The severity of the outcome can influence whether an incident is reported or not, with more serious 
incidents more likely to be reported (83). Furthermore, it has been determined that organisations only take 
action on more serious reports (84). This devalues the use of near-miss reporting or less severe but 
potentially more frequent events, which would otherwise offer an opportunity to prevent sharp end 
failures and severe outcomes. A study by Thomas et al. (75) identified incident reports as inadequate at 
meeting the primary objective of continuous improvement because sophisticated and effective analysis 
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was not achievable. This was echoed by the IoM (85). However it is recognised that some of the 
information collected through incident reporting would not be obtainable by other methods (84). 
Research has provided evidence on factors that influence whether an incident is reported: 
 lack of feedback to the reporting physician from management (83)  
 excessive length of required report forms (82) 
 triviality of  the incident (82) 
 the level of harm experienced by the patient (81)  
 the clear violation of protocol and job role (82) 
 rank of staff member – lower ranked members more likely to report than higher 
midwives/nurses most likely, then junior doctors than senior doctors (82) 
Another concern of IRSs, in relation to other methods, is the inconsistencies that occur. A study (14), 
which examined the incidents detected in both incident reporting and medical record review identified the 
same number of adverse events, however, different adverse events were detected i.e. the overlap was 
small. This has implications on the sensitivity of both of the methods and their ability to accurately 
measure what they are designed to measure. The different perspectives between individuals and what each 
individual considers to constitute an adverse event may account for some of the insensitivity, as both 
methods subjectively detect adverse events. Studies have been able to conclude differences in the 
reporting habits between nurse and doctors, with nurses and midwives being more likely to report using 
IRSs (81, 83). It is conceivable that, since RRR is conducted by physicians, who are least likely to report, 
that RRR is merely a reflection of the physician perspective of adverse events and similarly, that incident 
reporting is more reflective of nurse perspectives. The voluntary nature of reporting systems renders them 
inappropriate for use as an index of rate or a measure of safety (82, 86). 
2.3.4: Patient safety indicators 
Patient safety indicators (PSIs) were first developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ) and were designed to take advantage of readily available hospital data, generated by the 
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Healthcare Cost Utilisation Project (HCUP) (87). PSIs screen for surgical complications that are a result 
of exposure to the healthcare system that were potentially preventable (87). The AHRQ (87) described 
indicators at two functional levels: provider level and area level. Provider level indicators are a measure of 
the adverse events experienced by patients who received their care and suffered the complication within 
the same hospital. Area level indicators provide an assessment across a geographical area and can be 
within the same hospital (as for provider indicators), but will also detect adverse events that present in one 
hospital but resulted from care in another. However, geographical assessment of adverse events using 
PSIs from the AHRQ, where data has had to be aggregated, might not be accurate. Rivard et al. (88) 
demonstrated the sensitivity of PSI rates to both the data file structure, and definitions and sources of 
data elements, when translated to a non-HCUP data source. This resulted in an inaccurate rate of PSIs. 
Table 2.3: AHRQ patient safety indicators, contains the most recent version of the 26 PSIs published by 
the AHRQ in 2007.  
Two things are evident from Table 2.3: 
1. All the PISs are clinical outcomes to the exclusion of psychological or social outcomes 
2. There are clusters of service specific indicators – 11/26 are surgical and 4/26 are obstetrics & 
gynaecology and the remaining 11/26 are generic hospital indicators 
An implication of PSIs being solely clinical in nature, is that outcomes that are more important to patients 
(89), are not measured, therefore, it cannot be determined if these outcomes are being achieved. In 
addition, having PSIs that place focus on particular services distracts improvement efforts away from 
other areas of potential risk, which remain unidentified.  
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Table 2.3: AHRQ Patient safety indicators  
(adapted from (87)) 
Patient Safety Indicator 
Number 
Definition 
PROVIDER LEVEL  
1 Complication of anesthesia 
2 Death in low mortality diagnosis related group (DRG) 
3 Decubitus ulcer 
4 Failure to rescue 
5 Foreign body left during procedure 
6 Iatrogenic pneumothorax 
7 Selected infections due to medical care 
8 Postoperative hip fracture 
9 Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma 
10 Postoperative physiologic metabolic derangement 
11 Postoperative respiratory failure 
12 Postoperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein thrombosis 
13 Postoperative sepsis 
14 Postoperative wound dehiscence 
15 Accidental puncture of laceration 
16 Transfuaion reaction 
17 Birth trauma – injury to neonate 
18 Obstetric trauma – vaginal delivery with instrument 
19 Obstetric trauma – vaginal delivery without instrument 
20 Obstetric trauma – cesarean delivery 
  
AREA LEVEL  
22 Iatrogenic pneumothorax 
23 Selected infections due to medical care 
24 Postoperative wound dehiscence 
25 Accidental puncture of laceration 
26 Transfusion reaction 
27 Postoperative hemorrhage or hematoma 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has also developed a set of 21 
indicators (90). These were selected by an expert panel of government officials and academic experts from 
indicators currently in use by member states. Recommendations by the IoM (91) on indicator evaluation 
were followed, and indicators that were scientifically sound, potentially feasible and contained an 
important performance aspect, were selected. Table 2.4: Criteria and dimensions for OECD PSI selection, 
provides a breakdown of the selection criteria by dimension. The selection criteria could explain why the 
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indicators are clinically focussed and relevant to only a narrow range of services. The indicators might: be 
of greatest policy importance, be most susceptible to healthcare influence, represent the greatest gap 
between actual and potential outcomes, have demonstrated the best validity, or represent the indicators 
with available and comparable data.  
Table 2.4: Criteria and dimensions for OECD PSI selection  
(adapted from McLoughlin (90)) 
Criteria Dimension Description 
Importance Impact on health Does it address an area in which there is a gap between 
actual health and potential health? 
Policy importance Is this area of concern to policy makers? 
Susceptibility to influence 
by healthcare system 
Can the healthcare system influence the outcomes? 
Scientific 
Soundness 
Face validity Is the measure logical and clinically rational? 
Content validity Does it capture meaningful aspects of care quality? 
Feasibility Data availability Are comparable international data available? 
Reporting burden Are the benefits of collecting data greater than the 
burden? 
Similarly to AHRQ PSIs, the OECD PSIs are hospital specific. Furthermore, McLoughlin, et al. (90) 
presented several inadequacies of OECD PSIs. Their criticisms included: their inability to detect near 
misses, their inability to identify adherence to safe care processes, and issues relating to the under-
represented adverse events associated with under-reporting of safety issues. Although these issues are 
presented in relation to OECD PSIs, they are applicable to the PSI procedure in general. 
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Despite the OECD indicators being available, research efforts in England have resulted in the translation 
of the AHRQ PSIs for English hospitals, utilising hospital episode statistics (HES) (92). However, the 
AHRQ data source differs to that used for HES, thus translation to suit the data was required.  Bottle and 
Aylin (92) described issues in the translation relating to a range of things, including: the absence of codes 
in International Classification of Disease-10 (ICD) that existed in ICD-9, the conversion of ICD-9 
procedure codes into Office of Population Consensus Surveys-4 (OPSC) was ‘not an exact science’, there 
was no mapping between major diagnostic categories of ICD-9 and Healthcare Resources Groups, and 
linkage was required of the provider code when transferring to an acute facility. The issues relating to PSI 
translation reduce the comparability of data from different data sources. 
Despite the translation issues, evidence exists to support the use of PSIs to identify adverse events. In 
English hospitals, PSIs demonstrated little variation in rates over a three year period, indicating 
consistency in coding (93). Raleigh et al. (93), were also able to associate excess length of stay with PSIs in 
comparison to matched controls. Furthermore, an association has been correlated between PSIs, higher 
mortality and a greater rate of unplanned readmissions (92). Finally, it has been proposed that PSIs 
provide greater value when used in conjunction with other indicators, namely short term admissions (94) 
and temporal trends (95).  
Whilst there is evidence to support the use of PSIs, there is further evidence to the contrary. Whilst 
specificity has been shown to be high (low rate of false positives), sensitivity is low (high rate of false 
negatives (96), i.e. it is unable to accurately detect all adverse events. The implications of this could include 
an inaccurate ‘map’ of adverse events; when, where and to whom they are occurring?   
The nature of coding in electronic databases means that the accuracy of the coding for each complication 
or adverse event is pivotal in the representativeness of the incidence rate subsequently calculated using 
PSIs. A higher rate of events is not necessarily indicative of poor quality and unsafe care. In fact, it might 
be argued that the opposite is true; a hospital with a more positive safety culture might be more inclined 
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to accurately record events because of greater vigilance and attention given to patient safety (92). When 
NHS hospitals were invited to give their opinion on the PSIs, which had been translated from AHRQ and 
used to rank NHS hospitals, they raised concerns on their ability to draw valid comparisons between 
different organisations, questioning the sufficiency of case-mix adjustment (92). Grobman et al. (97) 
believed that ICD-9 was not sufficiently able to detect preventable obstetric adverse events and thus does 
not adequately reflect patient safety. They argue that non-hospital characteristics strongly influence the 
risk of obstetric trauma. This raises questions on the selection of obstetric indicators and the 
consideration of their susceptibility to healthcare system influence. A summary of issues can be found in 
Table 2.5: Summary of issues associated with patient safety indicators. 
Table 2.5: Summary of issues associated with patient safety indicators 
Issue 
Sensitive to data aggregation when applied to non-HCOP data sources 
Do not detect near misses 
Do not detect adherence to safe processes 
Hospital and particular services specific 
Clinically oriented 
Data issues because underreporting of safety issues 
Not wholly susceptible to healthcare system influence 
 
2.3.5: Prospective methods 
Prospective studies observe the occurrence of outcomes as they happen during the study period, rather 
than examining them after they have occurred (98). Bellomo et al. (99) studied all surgical inpatients in a 4 
30 
month period who remained in hospital for 48 hours or more after surgery. They used a set of specific 
criteria to define postoperative serious adverse events and determined that one in six surgical patients 
experienced one or more, with higher risk associated with being over 75 and having unscheduled surgery. 
Cravero et al. (100) prospectively studied patients who were being sedated or anaesthetised. They 
collected multiple data in addition to adverse events including: primary illness, coexisting illnesses, 
procedures performed, medications used, outcomes and airway interventions. These studies involve the 
detection of complications as they occur and the counting of them.  
Prospective observational studies such as Andrews et al.’s (101) observe the process of care as it occurs 
generating ‘a description of the adverse event, who identified it, what was said to be the cause, what the effect on the 
patient was, whether any one was blamed, and whether any response to the event was mentioned’ (101)pg310. They 
calculated that 17.7% of patients experienced at least one or more serious event. Another observation 
study (102) had a two pronged approach. In phase 1 they collected error reports from physicians and 
nurses immediately after their discovery. Additionally, they conducted activity profiles over a 
consecutive 24 hour period by an observer. They calculated there was an average of 178 activities per 
patient day with an estimated 1.7 errors per patient per day, with physicians and nurses contributing 
equally to the number of errors (although nurses had more activities per day so not on a ratio basis). 
These sorts of studies have not been subjected to reliability testing, but it would seem fair to conclude 
that this method would be subject to bias and different reporter perspectives of error as seen in 
incident reporting. 
Michel et al. (65) conducted a comparative study to compare the effectiveness of preventable adverse 
event detection between a cross sectional method (data collected on day 1), a prospective method (data 
collected across a 30 follow up period), and RRR (data collected after discharge). The uniqueness of 
this study was that it collected data from the same patient sample, in order to be truly able to compare 
across the three methods. The prospective method was best at identifying preventable adverse events, 
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which was preferred because of their pedagogical and communicative virtues with good staff 
involvement. However, it was also perceived to be the most expensive with the heaviest work load. 
Thomas and Peterson (103) believe prospective methods offer the best opportunity for detecting active 
errors (active failures). They also criticise them because they have practical and methodological issues 
including: 
 Lack of confidentially, which could lead to punitive action on staff 
 Time intensive training of observers 
 If observers cannot be blinded to patient outcome, then they might be subject to hindsight bias 
 Focus is on sharp end and ignorant of latent conditions because they are not necessarily 
observable 
 The Hawthorne Effect – altered behaviour because of being observed 
Although these are prospective studies, the primary data being collected is that of lagging indicators: 
adverse events, which still require the patient to come to harm. This method still does not enable the easy 
detection of unsafe conditions prior to the effect of the outcome, to prevent the outcome. Because of 
their time intensiveness, particularly in the case of prospective observational studies, they have not been 
implemented on a large scale, unlike other methods. 
2.3.6: Safety culture 
The dominance of adverse event measurement is indicated by the multiple methods of measurement, to 
which, arguments have been presented for their inadequacy at generating meaningful data that is capable 
of determining whether something is safe (or unsafe), and able to monitor the environment, to prevent 
adverse outcomes. Safety culture assessment is another form of safety measurement. The importance of 
having a safety culture: one that admits to and learns from error, was emphasised in the IoM report (6), 
however, a culture of blame and secrecy still persists in healthcare. Media coverage of the Mid-
Staffordshire NHS Trust unveiled details of ‘gagging orders’, which were used to silence whistle blowers. 
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In the three years up to 2011, 600 compromise agreements cost taxpayers £14.7million (104). This is not 
conducive to a safety culture, which supports staff to identify issues and work towards resolving and 
learning from them. This entrenched culture, where a fear of blame exists inhibits voluntary reporting 
(105), which reduces the opportunity to learn and improve. A change in culture is fundamental in the fight 
against poor quality and unsafe care. Despite Leape’s (106) strong conviction for the need to change 
safety culture, Cox and Flin (107) argue that the belief in the concept has ‘far out-stripped the evidence for its 
utility’ (107)pg190. 
Safety culture can be described as the shared beliefs, attitudes and values that contribute to patient safety 
changes (108, 109). Furthermore, safety culture assessments can be used as tools to identify the presence 
of conditions that support the identification of adverse events, and can be acted up on to prevent future 
adverse events (20). 
Although Cox and Flin (107) argue there is greater belief in the contribution safety culture can make to 
improve safety, than evidence suggests, there is some evidence to support a relationship between 
assessment outcomes and clinical outcomes (110). In one study (111), poor hospital patient safety climate 
was associated with higher readmission rates for heart attacks and heart failure. Another study (112) 
found, that implementation of the surgical safety checklist was associated with improved safety attitudes 
and subsequently, improved post-operative complications. Moderate relationships between patient safety 
culture and fewer patient safety incidents have also been concluded (113). Despite this, Colla et al. (114), 
express caution at the validity of nine assessments included in a review, because of a lack of psychometric 
testing. Their predictive value for other safety indicators is not clear (115) i.e. it is yet to be determined 
conclusively, if a better safety culture results in less harm. The studies presented have all been focused on 
hospital care, and little research has been conducted in other settings to determine a relationship between 
safety culture and patient outcomes. 
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The Manchester Patient Safety Framework (MaPSaF) (116) is a safety culture assessment tool, supported 
by the NHS, to help organisations assess their progress in developing a safety culture. The MaPSaF has 
been made available for a variety of care settings including: acute, ambulance, primary care and mental 
health. Furthermore, the literature supports its use in community pharmacy as a valid tool to support the 
development of a mature safety culture. However, it has yet to be transferred to the community nursing 
setting and evidence of its effectiveness at improving patient safety outcomes is inconclusive. 
The contribution of implementing safety culture assessment tools to patient safety improvements is 
currently conflicting. Safety culture assessment tools are not, as the measurement methods presented 
previously are not, comprehensive measurement systems from which a level of safety can be determined. 
However, they provide a new perspective and used in combination with other methods, might prove 
useful in the battle against healthcare error.  
2.3.7: NHS safety thermometer 
The NHS safety thermometer is a point of care instrument that enables organisations to collect data on 
four common harms: pressure ulcers, falls, urinary tract infections (in catheterised patients) and venous 
thromboembolism (21). In addition to surveying patient harms, it is supposed to enable analysis to 
measure and monitor local improvement (21). It is proposed that the safety thermometer is implemented 
in a range of care settings, including non-hospital settings such as the community, hospices and patients’ 
homes. The method by which the safety thermometer collects data makes it a measure of prevalence: the 
measure of a factor in a given point in time, rather than incidence: the occurrence of something during a 
particular time period (117).  
The NHS safety measurement thermometer is presented as an improvement tool, however, given its 
infancy, little research is available to demonstrate this. However, the pilot study conducted in 160 
organisations “showed an overall reduction in blood clots by 72%, pressure ulcers by 42% and urinary infections in 
patients with catheters by 33%” (118). In the future, as more longitudinal data becomes available, its ability to 
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act as an improvement tool could be determined more conclusively. The Department of Health Sciences 
at the University of Leicester has been tasked with the following: evaluating the data collection and use; 
understanding how frontline staff are collecting data; and, how the definitions are being interpreted and 
applied (119). More time is required for more intensive analysis to be conducted, to determine its 
effectiveness over time.  
As with the majority of measurement tools discussed previously, the NHS safety thermometer is a tool 
for measuring harm; not safety. Furthermore, it focuses on four clinical harms to the exclusion of other 
clinical harms and psychological harm. It too, is unable to determine whether care is safe; its purpose is to 
enable organisations to count particular harms. Targeting the four specific harms of the safety 
thermometer could result in improvements, but also, may result in behaviours that neglect other types of 
harm because they are not examined. 
2.3.8: Summary 
In review, the previous discussion on safety measurement methods has uncovered a fundamental flaw in 
their ability to measure safety. Despite patient safety being described as the reduction of risk of 
unnecessary harm, no method is capable of tracking risk of harm over time. Table 2.6: Comparison 
between the definition of safety and functionality of safety measurement methods, examines how each of 
the measurement methods relates to the different definitions of safety presented in 2.2.4: Patient safety.
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Table 2.6: Comparison between the definition of safety and functionality of safety measurement methods 
Source Definition Relationship with Measurement Methods 
Kohn et al. 
(6) 
Freedom from accidental injury; ensuring patient 
safety involves the establishment of operational 
systems and processes that minimize the 
likelihood of errors and maximises the likelihood 
of intercepting them when they occur. 
RRR, GTTs, IRSs identify events of accidental injury. Patient Safety culture does not. 
RRR, GTT and IRS are unable to measure the establishment of operational systems 
and process, however, patient safety culture measurement is a component of the 
system that is hypothesised to minimise the likelihood of errors although this has not 
been empirically proven. 
Davies et al. 
(5) 
The reduction and mitigation of unsafe acts 
within the health-care system, as well as through 
the use of best practices shown to lead to optimal 
patient outcomes. 
RRR, IRS safety culture are all incapable of demonstrating a reduction of unsafe acts 
because of their inappropriateness to be used as a benchmarking tool. GTT might be 
able to demonstrate reduction if used repeatedly over time. The use of measurement 
methods is designed to be part of a learning culture, particularly with IRS, however, 
there is no measurement of the feedback to evidence mitigation. 
Runciman et 
al. (4) 
Reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated 
with healthcare to an acceptable minimum. 
None of the measurement methods above are capable of calculating a reduction of risk 
of unnecessary harm and neither is an acceptable minimum level of harm defined. 
Cooper et al. 
(59) 
The process of avoiding, preventing or 
ameliorating adverse outcomes. 
Although measurement methods contribute to a culture of safety with the intent to 
learn from their data (particularly true of IRSs), none are able to quantify the process of 
avoiding, preventing or ameliorating adverse events. 
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2.4: Risk Measurement and Management 
The definition of safety, as discussed on multiple occasions previously in this chapter, focuses on a 
reduction of risk of harm, however none of the safety measurement methods discussed thus far enable 
the level of risk to be measured or tracked over time, and therefore, are insufficient to meet the demands 
of the definition of safety. Indeed, they are insufficient to accurately track the level of harm over time. 
2.4.1: Risk Measurement 
When searching the literature for research on risk measurement, it is dominated by the assessment of risk 
of clinical disease, healthcare utilisation and cost. For instance, absolute risk (the probability of developing 
a disease over a given time) can be calculated for coronary heart disease (120). Goetzel et al. (121) were 
able to calculate that patients with high risk for poor health outcomes have a higher healthcare 
expenditure. Where adverse event risk has been calculated, it has been associated with specific drug 
therapies or interventions. Etminan et al. (122) calculated the relative risk (risk of event relevant to 
exposure) of adverse events with drug therapy for Parkinson’s disease. The literature is absent of research 
that calculates the risk of adverse events during an episode of healthcare. Risk can be calculated 
retrospectively by examining the past occurrence and assume it to be a predictor. However, in order to 
calculate risk in this way, the outcome rate, in this case adverse events, is required to accurately reflect the 
true risk, and as discussed previously, this is currently unavailable. Alternatively, risk could be calculated 
prospectively, by knowing the presence of risk factors to predict outcome, however, these are not 
available in the field of patient safety. Currently, risk measurement for adverse events is undeveloped. 
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2.4.2: Risk Management 
In the absence of risk calculators for adverse events, risk management is deployed. In healthcare, risk 
management can be described as the prevention or minimisation of harm, that is identified, analysed, 
treated and evaluated (123). The WHO (124), who developed an International Classification for Patient 
Safety, describes risk management as activities, which identify, analyse and reduce risk. In 2009, the Health 
Foundation commissioned a systematic review as part of its Quest for Quality and Improved 
Performance (QIPP) initiative, to collate the evidence on detection, mitigation and action to reduce risk in 
hospitals (125). They found literature that detected risk using incident reports (discussed previously) and 
analysis techniques such as failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA). There was no published evidence on 
mitigating factors to prevent harm, and actions to reduce risks focused on: medication errors; falls; 
diagnostic errors; adverse events and simulated survival. They concluded that evidence on safety 
interventions was limited, and the methodological quality of studies identified was weak. Information on 
their reliability and accuracy is limited and thus determining the effectiveness of safety interventions was 
unachievable. Subsequently, they proposed that there are three approaches to safety and risk management 
in healthcare: 
1. Detection 
2. Mitigation 
3. Resilience 
RRR, GTTs, IRSs and prospective methods all contribute to the detection of harm to patients. Safety 
culture contributes to the detection of conditions conducive or prohibitive to patient safety. Analysis 
techniques allow the causes of harm to be detected and potentially mitigated. Root cause analysis (RCA) is 
an example of a retrospective analysis technique, and failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is an 
example of a prospective analysis technique.  
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RCA is a retrospective technique for analysing error and can help to build a positive safety culture because 
of its systems approach to safety (126). It is estimated that each RCA takes between 20-90 man hours to 
complete (127). Evidence suggests that recommendations from conducting an RCA are at least partially 
acted upon with full implementation occurring in 61.4-68.1% (128), and 20% are partially implementation 
(129). However, RCA has flaws. RCA can direct focus upon the “most fundamental reason” for error and 
ignore smaller contributory reasons (130). The quality of the conduct of the RCA is variable (131). 
Similarly to other methods, there is insufficient support in peer-review literature for the effectiveness of 
RCA in reducing harm (127). Practitioners themselves report barriers and issues in RCA including: lack of 
time and resources, lack of data and feedback, difficulty with teams and uncooperativeness, compounded 
by unsupportive management (132). 
FMEA is a proactive analysis technique to either assess the potential for process failures and their effects 
(process FMEA) or assess the potential failure of a product and its effects (design FMEA) (133). In 
healthcare, it is intended to do three things: recognise and evaluate potential failures (both process and 
design); identify actions to reduce or mitigate the occurrence of the potential failure; and document the 
process of FMEA (134). Furthermore, Woloshynowych et al. (135) suggested that all proactive analysis 
techniques enable priority setting, focus on the system and not the individual, and localise weak and risk 
areas. However, they also recognise that they can be time consuming and complex, that outcomes depend 
on the analyst’s level of expertise and cannot guarantee comprehensiveness. Two studies have 
demonstrated some effectiveness in the utilisation of FMEA. Bonnabry et al. (136) conducted a before 
and after study reducing the number of critical incidences by 59%. Robinson et al. (137) utilised FMEA 
to identify risk factors in chemotherapy, which enabled them to implement improvement strategies in 
prescribing, dispensing and administration of drugs. Despite these studies, the majority of literature on 
analysis techniques is descriptive (125). 
There lacks an evidence base of rigorous evaluations of quality and safety interventions (138), making 
their effectiveness unknown. However, the NHS does have some risk management and performance 
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standards for safety, which are top level standards deployed across the whole organisation (139). For 
example, there is a Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts that has risk management standards, which by 
adhering to, reduce the economic contributions made to the scheme that handles clinical negligence 
claims (140). Trusts are assessed against three levels (141), which can be seen in Figure 2.3: Clinical 
Negligence Scheme risk management standards. In line with the Health Foundation’s interventions to risk 
management, the activities of detection and mitigation would be achieved in level 2 and resilience in level 
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Clinical Negligence Scheme risk management standards  
(adapted from (141)) 
In some areas of health and social care, protecting from harm is referred to as safeguarding and is 
considered integral to everyday activities of nurses and midwives according to the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council (142). Safeguarding can be described as “a range of activities that organisations should have in place to 
protect people…whose circumstances make them particularly vulnerable to abuse, neglect or arm” (143)pg1. The role of the 
Care Quality Commission in safeguarding is to ensure that organisations for which it has regulation of, 
have systems in place to safeguard its service users by having the organisations comply with quality and 
Level 3 – Performance 
Level 1 is working across entire organisation and where 
deficiencies exist, are improved and risks reduced 
Level 2 – Practice 
The process described in Level 1 is in use 
Level 1 – Policy 
Risk management process described and documented 
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safety standards, particularly outcomes 7 -11 (143). Despite having a regulator to oversee the compliance 
of health and social care organisations to have safeguarding procedures, the CQC has been criticised as 
being “not fit for purpose”, following high profile episodes of poor care including the Winterbourne View 
care home and the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust  (144). 
2.4.3: Summary  
The measurement of adverse event risk per episode of care is not available. There are two potential 
reasons why. The first is that absolute risk requires that contributing factors to the outcomes be known 
and incorporated into the calculation. The second is that relative risk requires an accurate knowledge of 
the rate of outcomes, which is currently unreliable. Risk management offers an opportunity to in-still a 
culture, which supports the identification and mitigation of risk to prevent harm occurring. Unfortunately, 
the literature is lacking evidence to determine how effective risk management activities are at preventing 
harm to patients.  
2.5: NHS Performance Measurement 
Final examination will be given to NHS safety performance. The NHS Outcomes Framework supports 
the Coalition Government’s intention to drive a focus on outcomes rather than processes (145). It has a 
variety of indicators covering a broad array of NHS activities categorised into five domains (146): 
1. Preventing people from dying prematurely 
2. Enhancing quality of life for people with long term conditions 
3. Helping people to recover from episodes of ill health or following injury 
4. Ensuring that people have a positive experience of care 
5. Treating and caring for people in a safe environment and protecting them from avoidable harm 
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The purpose of the NHS Outcomes Framework is threefold: to provide a top level view of performance, 
provide accountability for the effective spend of £95b and to drive improvements in quality across the 
whole NHS. The five domains were derived from the definition of quality as outlined by Lord Darzi in 
the NHS Next stage review (147), which comprises effectiveness, patient experience and safety. 
In the first instance, it is evident that the NHS Outcomes Framework is subject to similar limitations of 
the measurement methods previously discussed, namely, that the utility of outcome measures is 
restricted to counting past performance. The first publication of the NHS Outcome Framework in 
2010 proposed that levels of ambitions (standards) were to be set, but this has since been abandoned 
because “there was criticism from some that the proposals for setting levels of ambition were too reliant upon precise 
technical assumptions for which the evidence base is not robust” (146). With regards to safety, this has been 
highlighted throughout the chapter: there lacks evidence of the effectiveness of interventions and 
insufficient knowledge on contributions to harm. 
When examining the indicators of the ‘treating and caring for people in a safe environment and protect 
them from avoidable harm’ domain seen in Table 2.7: NHS Outcomes Framework – Domain 5, it is 
clear why standards would prove difficult to devise following the arguments already set out in this 
chapter because of the inadequacies of some of the discussed measurement methods, in particular 
incident reporting. Patient safety incident reports are voluntary and thus if a target was set to reduce 
them, implying reduction in harm, they could be susceptible to underreporting to meet targets. 
Similarly, if the target was to see a rise in incident reports, implying a more positive safety culture, 
reports could be fabricated. The same arguments apply to the reporting of safety incidents involving 
severe harm or death (overarching indicator 5b). Hospital deaths (overarching indictor 5c) are more 
traceable; however, the coding for the cause of death using ICD10 might be subject to manipulation if 
it were to become targeted 
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Table 2.7: NHS Outcomes Framework – Domain 5  
(adapted from (146)) 
5 Treating and caring for people in a safe environment and protect them from avoidable harm 
Overarching indicators 
5a Patient safety incidents reported 
5b Safety incidents involving severe harm or death 
5c Hospital deaths attributable to problems in care 
Improvement areas 
Reducing the incidence of avoidable harm 
5.1 Incidence of hospital-related venous thromboembolism (VTE) 
5.1 Incidence of healthcare associate infection (HCA) 
          i. MSRA 
          ii. C.Difficile 
5.3 Incidence of newly-acquired category 2, 3 and 4 pressure ulcers 
5.4 Incidence of medication errors causing serious harm, 
 
Improving the safety of maternity services 
5.5 Admission of full-term babies to neonatal care 
 
Delivering safe care to children in acute settings 
5.6 Incidence of harm to children due to failure to monitor 
2.6: A recent proposal for progress 
The current limitations of safety measurement have been discussed. Since the inception of this research 
project, the Health Foundation commissioned a review of the academic evidence, and practical 
experiences, in order to form a framework for safety measurement and monitoring. The authors of ‘The 
measurement and monitoring of safety’; Vincent et al. (148), drew conclusions aligned with those made 
here, which led to the development of a framework that ‘provides a starting point for discussion about what ‘safety’ 
means and how it can be actively measured’ (148)pgII.  The report acknowledges a social context to safety 
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measurement, because of the ambiguity of the language and the benefits of manipulating data to improve 
performance, which ultimately leaves safety measures, open to interpretation and adaptation. 
The evidence reviewed by Vincent et al. (148) identified the need to consider safety from five 
perspectives, and they propose a five dimension framework of safety measurement and monitoring: past 
harm, reliability, sensitivity to operations, anticipation and preparedness and integration and learning. The 
measurement of past harm is something that healthcare has been conducting, but they acknowledge that 
‘past performance is not a guarantee of future safety’ (148)pg30, which has been argued throughout this chapter. 
Furthermore, the methods currently available to measure safety are not reliable and accurate. Reliability 
refers to the ‘delivery of care to agreed standards’ (148)pg30. This is relevant to processes of care as well as the 
underlying clinical systems such as correct medical equipment availability. Something that current systems 
are unable to do, is determine if care is safe today. Vincent et al. (148) conclude that there is a need to be 
able to do this, as well as incorporate the perception of stakeholders, and this relates to their dimension of 
sensitivity to operations. Anticipation and preparedness relate to the ability to anticipate issues and their 
resilience to such issues. Finally, integration and learning encompasses the ability of an organisation to 
respond to risk and make improvements on the basis of safety information. 
The framework proposed by Vincent et al. (148) could contribute to the development of more 
sophisticated measurement methods but was not available at the inception of this research and thus an 
alternative approach has been adopted. However, Vincent et al. (148) promote learning from other safety 
industries. In Chapter 3, an argument is presented for learning from the discipline of performance 
measurement. 
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2.7: Conclusions 
RRR provided the first large scale measurement of adverse events and was implemented around the 
world. In response to one of its inefficiencies, the GTT was developed and implemented to achieve RRR 
in a timelier and more cost effective manner. In addition to GTTs and RRR, IRSs afford healthcare staff 
the opportunity to report patient safety incidents, including near misses. A national reporting system in 
England provides top level monitoring, which is capable of detecting patterns across organisations that 
would seem insignificant in isolation. Its purpose: to learn from patterns of error to prevent recurrence. 
RRR and GTTs measure safety as a rate of adverse events (harm) against hospital admissions. IRSs count 
reports of patient safety incidents: ‘any unintended or unexpected incident which could have or did lead to harm’ (58). 
PSIs are rates of outcome of interest/population at risk (88). All these methods have had greatest effect in 
the hospital setting, with some transference to other settings with varied success. Prospective methods 
seem isolated to research activity with no data collected on the scale of other methods discussed. Safety 
culture has been hailed as the answer to patient safety, but research is conflicted in its effectiveness, and it 
is yet to deliver on its promise. 
Excluding safety culture assessment, all other safety measurement methods are focused on adverse events: 
the outcomes patients are subjected to as a result of unsafe care. These are lagging indicators, which only 
become apparent after an action has occurred, in this case an error. In relation to the Swiss cheese model 
(22) of safety (see Figure 2.1: The Swiss cheese model), to only count outcomes, is to be ignorant of the 
latent conditions and active failures that are present within the system, which reduces the opportunity to 
prevent harm to patients. The nature of the measurement methods presented above render them 
insensitive to the underlying latent conditions that facilitate actives failures.  
Despite the literature making statements that implicate psychological and social harm as a consequence of 
unsafe care, the adverse events that are either detected or reported in RRR, GTTs, PSIs and IRSs are 
medical in nature, exclusive of psychological and social outcomes. In addition to them being medically 
45 
focused, they are also organisationally derived; they lack patient input in identifying and detecting adverse 
events and in the derivation of criteria. These methods do not necessarily reflect the priorities of patients 
in terms of outcomes, or indeed what safety means to these patients. There is little research in the field of 
measurement of patient perceptions and perspectives. Where some research exists, differences are 
apparent, highlighting gaps between what is being measured and what is perceived by patients as safety. 
This will be discussed in greater detail in the Chapter 3. 
Finally, hospital care has been the focus of safety measurement efforts, and although some have been 
transferred to other care settings, their reliability and validity to accurately reflect the different 
environment is yet to be secured. Limited evidence exists to support the effectiveness of these efforts in 
improving patient safety by demonstrably reducing the risk of harm to patients. A more comprehensive 
approach is required that enables monitoring of contributory factors (once known) to prevent the 
occurrence of harm and produce a stable environment. 
Risk measurement is developed in fields such as clinical risk where the risk that a patient will develop a 
particular disease can be calculated. This is because it is achieved using absolute risk, which requires an 
understanding of the contributing risk factors; these have been well researched in clinical medicine. 
Alternatively, risk can be calculated using relative risk which requires an accurate understanding of the 
past prevalence. Neither of these approaches are well understood in the field of safety thus making it 
difficult to calculate. 
Safety and risk management are defined similarly: both refer to the process of reducing risk, but safety 
refers more to the conditions of the environment being one in which risk reduction is sought, risk 
management is the action of reducing risk. Research into risk management is fragmented; some areas are 
well established such as analysis techniques including RCA and FMEA. Other areas such as mitigating 
factors to prevent harm are unavailable in the literature, leading the Health Foundation (125) to concluded 
that the evidence for safety interventions is limited and insufficient.  
46 
Performance measurement in the NHS is driven by outcome measures, which are lagging indicators. The 
use of incident reporting numbers to determine if healthcare is safe is unhelpful because it cannot be 
determined from this indicator if care is safe, or if improvements are being made because they are 
susceptible to manipulation.  
The patient safety agenda has been underway for some time; the establishment of the NPSA in the NHS 
marked its start in England. There are key challenges for delivering a patient safety agenda: creating an 
environment receptive to change, and developing an effective measurement system that goes beyond 
simply counting the frequency of harm, but incorporates an understanding of contributory factors to 
adverse events. This is fundamental in the development of preventative risk reduction strategies. Finally, a 
need to integrate and embed measurement, monitoring review, and improvement into everyday activities 
is essential (149). The design of performance measurement frameworks could contribute to the design of 
a comprehensive safety measurement framework, which is the aim of this research. 
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  Chapter 3
The case for an alternative approach to patient safety 
measurement 
3.1: Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an alternative approach to safety measurement design, utilising the 
principles of performance measurement. This will be achieved by introducing the principles of 
performance measurement and applying them to the literature on patient safety in healthcare. In 
particular, the concept of patients as stakeholders will be explored alongside the possible role of the 
structure, process and outcome (SPO) model, in relation to case managed care in the NHS.  
Chapter 2 provided evidence of the state of the art of safety in healthcare. The methods by which safety is 
measured were discussed and their limitations identified. A common limitation was the isolated use of 
outcome measures such as harm or adverse events, which expose the patient to harm before being 
detected. The current understanding of safety in healthcare is mostly derived from ultra-safe industries, 
such as aviation and nuclear power, who adopted the systems theory to safety (23, 24). Other industries 
and disciplines, such as manufacturing and performance measurement, have long recognised the 
inadequacy of using lagging indicators (such as outcomes) in isolation, in the improvement of 
performance. Performance measurement originates from the manufacturing industry, but has since 
evolved and is now applied to both the manufacturing industry and the service industry, across private, 
public and tertiary sectors. Its usefulness lies heavily in its ability to quantify the effectiveness and 
efficiency of action (32). In being able to do this, it can drive continuous quality improvement by 
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influencing behaviour to meet the organisation’s objectives. Success of performance measurement is 
dependent on characteristics such as: being selective in what it measures; consisting of a mixture of past, 
present and future measures; and being relative to the organisation’s strategy - which is closely related to 
consumer requirements. Performance measurement presents an opportunity to address the limitations of 
safety measurement by being inclusive of measures of the whole system that are stakeholder sensitive. 
Healthcare systems are composed of complex entities, interacting with multiple stakeholders, striving to 
deliver on numerous aims, including: promoting public health, treating acute injury and illness, and 
managing long term disease. The NHS is one of the world’s biggest employers, delivering a large variety 
of services, each with its own specific purpose and aims. Given the complexity and variety of healthcare 
services, it is proposed that a ‘business operating system’ (the activities or sequence of processes that lead 
to the delivery of a particular service) be selected (29). Lynch and Cross (29) argue that ‘it is the day-to-day 
flow of work throughout an organisation until it reaches the customer that should be managed and measured’ (29)pg45.  The 
case management (CM) programme targets patients with complex, multiple long term conditions for 
integrated care management, to prevent hospital admissions in the English National Health Service 
(NHS). This patient population represents a growing burden on healthcare systems worldwide, resulting 
in the introduction of new care models, seeking to sustain quality of life rather than to treat and cure acute 
illness. The use of the CM programme as a case study provides an opportunity to investigate safety in a 
service with growing demand.  
3.2: Lessons from other industries: the case for performance 
measurement 
Performance measurement has been a popular topic of debate in the business management field since the 
1980's. Prior to this, accounting measures were common practice for determining the performance of an 
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organisation, but came under scrutiny and subject to heavy criticism due to their lagging nature. Lagging 
indicators, such as financial outcomes, are post-action measures that identify the results of previous 
activities, rather than current, on-going or future performance. Neither do they identify the actions, 
processes or behaviours that contribute to the results. Since the 1980's, efforts have been made to 
overcome the short-comings of financial performance measurement systems, which have resulted in a 
large literature database on the purpose, characteristics, design and implementation of performance 
measurement systems. It is important to establish terminology in relation to performance measurement. 
Neely et al. (32) provide succinct and relative definitions for a list of key words that can be found in Table 
3.1: Performance measurement glossary. 
Table 3.1: Performance measurement glossary 
(Neely et al. (32)) 
Key Word Definition  
Performance Measurement The process of quantifying efficiency and effectiveness of action 
Efficiency A measure of how economically the firms resources are utilised when 
providing a given level of customer satisfaction 
Effectiveness The extent to which customer requirements are met 
A Performance Measure A metric used to quantify the effectiveness and/or efficiency of an 
action 
A Performance Measurement 
System 
A set of metrics used to quantify both efficiency and effectiveness of 
actions 
The fundamental purpose of performance measurement is to improve performance, by being able to 
monitor, control and reward positive performance (25), thus motivating behaviours that stimulate 
continuous improvement (29). Fitzgerald (30) adds that it is essential to translate the company mission 
statement into integrated performance measures to control, monitor and reward performance. Many 
authors also agree that it should be aligned with the organisation’s strategy, in order to drive 
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performance in the direction of stakeholder satisfaction (28, 30, 31). Table 3.1 defined both efficiency 
and effectiveness in respect to the needs of the customer, enabling an organisation to pursue strategies 
that lead to the achievement of overall goals and objectives. As indicated by the NHS values laid out in 
the NHS Constitution (150) (see Table 3.2: NHS values), safety is an integral component of the mission 
and vision of the NHS and other healthcare organisations alike.  
Table 3.2: NHS values 
(Department of Health (150)) 
Values Description of values 
Working together for patients Putting patients first and engaging with in in all activities 
Respect and dignity Valuing every person 
Commitment to quality of care Ensuring the basics of quality of care: safety effectiveness and 
patient experience 
Compassion Caring with humanity and kindness 
Improving lives Improving the health and wellbeing 
Everyone counts Access for all 
Effective performance measurement provides an opportunity to make further progress in the field of 
patient safety by adapting of some of its key principles. Performance measurement should (25-32): 
 Reflect the organisation’s strategy and vision 
 Be driven by the organisation’s primary service users 
 Consider past, present and future activities – utilise indicators that are leading (predict outcomes) 
and lagging (detail outcomes) but also indicators that are process oriented to manage outcomes 
 Occur across the company, being implemented top down and results should be rolled up 
 Represent business operating systems 
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3.2.1: Emergent themes in performance measurement frameworks: input, 
process and output 
Performance measurement frameworks seek to provide guidance that can be adopted in the design and 
implementation of performance measurement systems. Following the criticisms of the traditional cost 
focused measurement systems, multidimensional frameworks that balanced financial and non-financial 
measures have been developed, such as: the process model (31) the performance prism (151), the 
performance measurement matrix (26), the balanced scorecard (28), and the results and determinants 
framework (30). When reviewing these frameworks, three common domains of measures were identified: 
input, process and output. The importance of these domains in the aforementioned frameworks is evident 
by their repeated presence. 
Brown (31) argues that controlling inputs and processes facilitates high performance and consistency 
respectively. By controlling inputs such as the quality of the component parts and understanding customer 
requirements, outputs are more likely to meet the demands of the customer. By measuring processes, the 
same results can be achieved repeatedly. Brown’s (31) macro process model, overtly categorises measures 
as: a) input; b) process; c) output and d) outcome. Process measures are of activity or behaviour, and by 
managing these, rather than relying on the inspection of outputs, a preventative approach is adopted.  
Although Brown’s (31) framework most explicitly incorporates measures of input, process and output, to 
some degree, other performance measurement frameworks use them too. For example, the performance 
prism (151) is the most recent framework and is unique in its approach to performance measurement 
because it considers its stakeholders at both ends of the performance delivery system: not only does it 
consider what stakeholders want (outputs) from the organisation, but also what they can contribute to the 
organisation (inputs). The remaining three facets of the prism represent strategies, processes and 
capabilities. Capabilities are a form of input; what is required to enter the system in order to deliver the 
outputs required. In an increasingly stretched healthcare system, organisations are seeking to reduce 
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demand by encouraging better self-care: activities which patients do to maintain or prevent ill-health. 
Understanding the contributions patients can make could assist in the delivery of more effective services. 
The performance measurement matrix is inclusive of some input measures that are cost focused e.g. 
design and material costs. However, it does not establish clear relationships between the different 
dimensions of performance and thus the measures (26). Kaplan and Norton are more successful in 
achieving this in the balanced scorecard, which examined perspectives (28). The balanced scorecard is a 
four dimensional framework including financial, internal business processes, learning and growth and 
customer perspectives. It is not prescriptive, so it does not identify indicators, but it enables organisations 
to determine their own indicators within these four perspectives, which could include input measures, 
process measures and output measures. The results and determinants framework (30) was designed for 
use in service industries, and divides measures into two categories: results and determinants (of results). 
The measures of determinants, which are leading indicators, contribute to the performance of results 
(lagging indicators). Determinants include both inputs and processes, such as competence and 
communication respectively. 
The input, process and output themes that emerge from the literature on performance measurement 
frameworks overlaps with the Swiss cheese model of safety (22). These frameworks imply that in order to 
be successful in meeting the organisations vision, the right inputs are required to perform processes to 
achieve the desired outputs, all of which can be measured in advance of failing. However, the two 
approaches use antonyms to one another, where performance measurement describes the requirements 
for success, the Swiss cheese model describes the conditions for failures, see Figure 3.1: The Swiss cheese 
model and its relationship with input, process and output. 
53 
 
Figure 3.1: The Swiss cheese model and its relationship with input, process and output 
3.2.2: Designing a measurement system 
The 1980’s saw the revolution of the theory of performance measurement from being output focussed to 
whole system considerate. Subsequently, evidence and guidance became increasingly available on the 
design of such systems. By 1989, Keegan et al. (26) had proposed a three step process for deciding what 
to measure, at a superficial level, for the performance measurement matrix. Firstly, an organisation should 
define their strategic objectives, secondly, populate the measurement matrix, and finally, instil a culture of 
performance measurement in the work force. Wisner and Fawcett (1991) expanded on this and produced 
a more detailed nine step process, but critically, concluded the process with periodic review. This 
feedback loop re-informs the strategic objectives and encourages a more dynamic system, which is more 
reflective of the business environment. In essence, the processes proposed by Keegan et al. (26) and 
Wisner and Fawcett (152) are high level objectives. They are descriptive rather prescriptive; they lack a 
recipe to follow that would successfully achieve a functional performance measurement system.  
Kaplan and Norton (153) adopted a prescriptive approach in their measurement design process for use 
with the balanced scorecard. This eight step process, which can be seen in Table 3.3: Process of designing 
and implementing the balanced scorecard, detailed the need to identify objectives, populate the balanced 
scorecard and periodically review, similarly to Wisner and Fawcett (152). In addition to this, they 
Latent condition/Input 
Active failure/Process 
Harm/Output 
(success) 
54 
proposed methods for determining the objectives (step 2), selecting the measures (step 3) and reviewing 
the measures (step 8). Furthermore, Kaplan and Norton delivered a multiphase method that seeks 
consensus between stakeholders, considers issues of implementation early on and suggests the production 
of an implementation plan.  
Table 3.3: Process of designing and implementing the balanced scorecard 
(Kaplan and Norton (153)) 
Steps Description 
1: Preparation Identify the business unit for which a top-level balanced scorecard is appropriate 
2.Interviews – first 
round 
identification the company’s strategic objectives with senior team and possible 
measures 
3.Executive workshop 
– first round 
Development of draft balanced scorecard with senior management group 
following debate of the proposed mission and strategy statements  
4. Interviews – second 
round 
Summarise the outputs from the step 3 and discusses with each senior manager. 
Also identify issues involved in implementation. 
5.Executive workshop 
– second round 
Further debate the mission and strategy statements to make comments on the 
proposed measures, linking the various change programmes under way to the 
measures, and start to develop an implementation plan.  
6 Executive workshop 
– third round 
Final consensus on vision and measures develop stretch targets. Identification of 
action programmes to achieve the targets. Plus draft implementation strategy.   
7. Implementation New implementation team formulates a detailed implementation plan.  
8. Period reviews Each quarter or month, a book of information on the balanced scorecard 
measures is prepared for both top management review and discussion with 
managers of decentralised divisions and departments. The balanced scorecard 
metrics are revisited annually as part of the strategic planning, goal setting, and 
resource allocation processes. 
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Following a literature review of the performance measurement system design process, Neely et al. (154) 
identified characteristics of the performance measurement system design process, these can be seen in 
Table 3.4: Desirable characteristics of a performance measurement system design process.  
Table 3.4: Desirable characteristics of a performance measurement system design process 
(Neely et al. (154)) 
Characteristics 
Performance measures should be derived from the company's strategy. 
The purpose of each performance measure must be made explicit. 
Data collection and methods of calculating the level of performance must be made clear. 
Everyone (customers, employees and managers) should be involved in the selection of the measures.  
The performance measures that are selected should take account of the organisation.  
The process should be easily revisable - measures should change as circumstances change.  
Understanding the characteristics of designing a performance measurement system could contribute to 
achieving the aim of this research. Due to the infancy of safety measurement and its reliance on the 
measurement of harm, greater attention is required of the initial characteristics, mostly: involving 
stakeholders to be able to understand their needs, expectations and contributions.  
3.3: Case Management: a response to the ageing demographic 
The challenges faced by healthcare at the inception of the NHS differed greatly to the challenges 
experienced today. Life expectancy was lower and more deaths were attributed to infectious disease than 
today, requiring an acute care model. Today, people in the UK are living longer. In England, in the period 
2007-09, life expectancy grew by 1.4 years for men and 1.1 years for women from the period 2003-05 
56 
reaching 80.9 and 82 years respectively (155). For more immediate consideration, life expectancy at age 65 
grew by 1.1 years for men and 1.0 years for females during the same period (155), indicating that the 
elderly are increasingly living longer. This change in demographic is global; by 2050, the proportion of 
people aged over 60 years in the world will double, and the number will exceed the number of those aged 
under 15 years. In North America and Europe, 4% of the populations will comprise people aged 80 and 
over (156).  
The ageing demographic is driving a new trend of disease: long term conditions (LTCs) (34). LTCs are: 
‘diseases which current medical intervention can only control not cure. The life of a person with a chronic 
condition is forever altered – there is no return to ‘normal’.’ (157)pg3 
LTCs include, but not exhaustively: coronary heart disease (1,899,000 affected in England); heart failure 
(420,000 affected in England); and diabetes (1,962,000 affected in England) (158). In England, 17.5 
million people report having a long standing illness, 2.75 million of whom are aged 75 and over, 
accounting for 66% of their population group (159). Age is considered the biggest driver of the increasing 
prevalence of LTCs and an estimated 42% of the English population is expected to suffer with at least 
one LTC by 2025 (158). The Department of Health (DoH) (158) estimates that LTCs account for 69% of 
the total health and social care budget in England with public spending on long term social care expected 
to rise by 94% to £15.9billion by 2022. Their prevalence is not just found in developed countries; ‘80% of 
chronic disease deaths now occur in low and middle income countries...’ and approximately 60% of all global deaths 
are as a result of chronic disease (160).  
Wagner et al. (161) suggested as early as 1996 that the ill-equipped nature of the acute-care model was 
insufficient to support the growing trend of chronic disease. They argued that the deficiencies in the 
health system at meeting the growing needs of LTCs could be attributed to the acute-care model of 
diagnose and treat (cure) (161). In recognition of the inadequacies of the acute care model, the DoH 
developed the NHS and Social Care long term conditions model (35). 
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The NHS and Social Care long term conditions model (see Figure 3.2: The NHS and Social Care long 
term conditions model), was devised to reduce the amount of emergency bed days by 5%, because 5% of 
inpatients accounted for 42% of acute admissions and can be attributed to patients with LTCs (35). This 
was to be achieved by targeting specific populations of sufferers by disease severity and complexity within 
four tiers of the delivery system: promoting better health, supported self-care, disease management and 
case management. Delivery of this care in non-acute settings, such as the community and the patient’s 
home, was to be supported through better equipped infrastructure in these settings. In order to achieve 
this, there was a need for change and redesign in the structure of services, including new job roles and 
information systems, to deliver the three specific tiers of care for those with LTCs and a tier for 
supporting and promoting better general health amongst the population. All levels of care promote better 
health and deliver improved health outcomes by educating and empowering patients to take greater 
responsibility for their health. The most intense level of care is that of the CM programme. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The NHS and Social Care long term conditions model 
(Department of Health (35)) 
CM was introduced nationally in 2005 as a key component of the NHS and Social Care long term 
conditions model, and is a package of care, which covers a range of activities. More specifically, it 
identifies patients at high risk of hospitalisation with complex and multiple long term conditions. Patient 
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selection for CM is targeted to identify those who are frequently admitted to hospital or at risk of 
admission (35). It assesses treatment needs in conjunction with the patient, and devises a collaborative 
care plan that integrates multiple services, to provide holistic care, and the empowerment and education 
of patients (35). At the crux of the CM programme is care planning, which is a holistic approach to care 
design that focuses on the patient’s needs as determined by the patient, alongside the health professional, 
in order to assist patients in achieving the outcomes they want (35). CM programmes are led by advanced 
nurse practitioners, who have greater autonomy, and the ability to make decisions about their own actions 
(162).  
The principles of performance measurement, outlined previously, indicate that measurement should be 
specific to business operating systems within the organisation, such as the distinctly different care services 
provided within the NHS. The CM programme is a response to the increasingly demanding ageing 
demographic. Exploration of the concept of safety and safety measurement in the CM programme 
affords an opportunity to understand safety in a healthcare service, which is responsible for the outcomes 
of a growing number of vulnerable patients. 
3.3.1: Effectiveness of  case management 
Following the introduction of CM in the Evercare pilot in 2003, an evaluation study was conducted to 
examine the rates of emergency admissions of the intervention practices against control non-intervention 
practices (163). There was no significant difference between the two groups for emergency admissions or 
mortality rate. Despite this disappointing result, success was achieved in some areas of care such as the 
reporting of high patient satisfaction. Patients also valued the psychological support, the rapid response to 
crisis, medication monitoring, communication of LTC, investigation and treatments and the patient 
advocacy role played by the advanced nurse practitioners. A limitation of the study was its inability to 
specifically evaluate case managed patients against a control group because of a poor data trail – hospital 
episode statistics (the database used) do not classify primary care service utilisation and therefore it was 
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not possible to determine the primary care utilisation of patients admitted to hospital. Gravelle et al. (163) 
concluded that the programme of community nurses was likely to be popular with service users but 
unlikely to reduce hospital admissions without radical service redesign. This is reiterated in other attempts 
to drive care out of the hospital. The Partnership for Older People Projects (POPPs) was implemented to 
relocate resources to the community and homes, away from the hospital. However, an evaluation of 
multiple interventions (although none were specifically CM programmes) showed no reduction in hospital 
admissions in comparison to matched control groups (164). Similarly to that of the Evercare pilot 
evaluation, patients also reported benefits in quality of life.  
Although the evidence presented by the Evercare pilot suggests a lack of success of the CM programme 
to reduce hospital admissions, others have been able to show how CM is effective. Sutherland and Hayter 
(165) conducted a review of the literature that demonstrated the positive impact that nurse case managers 
had on five health outcomes: objective clinical measurement, quality of life and functionality, patient 
satisfaction, adherence to treatment and self-care and service use.  
3.3.2: Scope for improvements in case management 
The data on the CM programme suggests that it hasn’t been successful in reducing hospital admissions, 
which was its primary purpose. However, it has been more successful in improving quality of life and is 
proving popular with patients. This does not mean that there isn’t room for improvement in the quality of 
care. Some efforts have been made to determine the quality of the CM programme by addressing two of 
the three key components: effectiveness of care and patient satisfaction (147). Safety, the third 
component, as described by Darzi (147), has yet to be examined. With the conflicting evidence of its 
effectiveness and the uncertainty surrounding whether it is effective at all, questions on patient safety 
might be raised.  
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3.3.2.1: Scope for improvements to the effectiveness of care 
The King’s Fund (166) indicated a list of factors linked to the success of outcomes in the CM programme, 
which need to be overcome if community programmes, such as the CM programme are to have the effect 
predicted by some. These factors are: 
 Assigned accountability of an individual or team 
 Clarity about the case manager role and support to ensure they have the right clinical and 
management competencies 
 Accurate case findings methods 
 Appropriate case loads 
 A single point of access for assessment and a joint care plan 
 Continuity of care 
 Self-care 
 Joined up health and social services appropriately aligned to incentives 
 Information systems that support communication and data that is used to proactively drive 
improvements 
In addition, the Evercare evaluation also proposed programme improvement by providing 24/7 care with 
better links with out of hours services (163). In response to poor effects on hospital admissions rates, the 
Patients at Risk of Rehospitalisation (PARR) tool was developed as a more accurate method of identifying 
patients for CM (167). The tool is a case-finding algorithm that draws on patients’ previous use of the 
hospital but no attempt has been made to assess the effectiveness of the tool. 
3.3.2.2: Scope for improvements to the safety of community care 
Little or no investigation has specifically been undertaken on the safety of the CM programme. However, 
since 2007, there have been multiple publications on the topic of safety in home healthcare that are 
relevant to the case management programme. Blais et al. (39) describe home care as including:  
‘the provision of healthcare intervention to clients [patients] of all ages…for the purpose of providing curative, 
supportive, palliative and rehabilitation care for acute and longer term illnesses and conditions’ (39) pg1 
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The definition appears to be inclusive of the care delivered under the CM programme described 
previously, as well as other types of care provision including district nursing and social care. In an editorial 
in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) Quality and Safety, Romagnoli et al. (36) highlighted some key issues 
in home healthcare: 
‘Patients and caregivers must struggle to absorb confusing and potentially contradictory information imparted 
both by multiple clinicians prior to discharge from the hospital and by home care nurses. Providers, for their 
part, often have incomplete understandings of home environments and patient and caregiver capabilities. 
Despite these difficulties, patients are largely left to themselves, expected to be engaged in their care sufficiently 
to own and manage their medical conditions.’ (36)pg1 
It is apparent in the quote from Romagnoli et al. (36) that there are potential opportunities for harm, 
facilitated by poor healthcare professional understanding of the new environment, and patients and carers 
being the dominant care provider, regardless of capability or competency. This could be attributed to the 
relative infancy of care delivery in the home; there hasn’t yet been sufficient time to understand the new 
care environment or fully comprehend the implications. In an effort to begin to understand home 
healthcare, Lang and Nancy (168) established ten common themes surrounding safety in home care that 
distinguishes it from hospitalised care:  
1. The family is the unit of care, rather than a team of health professionals 
2. Therefore, safety of the patient, family, caregivers and providers is inextricably linked 
3. The setting of individual’s homes is unregulated and uncontrolled 
4. There are multiple dimensions of safety including the physical, emotional, social and functional 
5. Patients, families and caregivers have choice and autonomy 
6. Isolation is common with patients living alone and caregivers and health professionals working 
without supervision 
7. Communication has to occur on many levels with multiple stakeholders 
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8. Health professionals have to develop and maintain knowledge, skill and competencies across a 
breadth of illnesses 
9. There is a diminishing focus on prevention, health promotion and chronic care 
10. Insufficient human resources is persistent in home care 
Upon examination, the theme: ‘diminishing focus on prevention, health promotion and chronic care’ 
appears misaligned with the literature presented on CM. Lang and Edwards (168) suggest that rather than 
promoting prevention and maintenance in order to prevent institutionalisation of an elderly population, 
home healthcare services in Canada have become a service that treats acute care patients in the home 
resulting in a more reactive home care service. Where the CM programme strives to be a proactive 
management programme to prevent hospital admission, Lang and Edwards (168) argue that this is a 
diminishing focus in Canadian home healthcare. This disparity may be because the study by Lang and 
Edwards (168), was specific to the Canadian home healthcare system, and may not be entirely transferable 
to English healthcare. 
The application of RRR to the medical records of patients being cared for in their homes, detected an 
adverse event incidence rate of 13.2% with one-third considered preventable (38) . Whilst Blais et al. (39), 
calculated an incidence rate of 4.2%. In addition, Blais et al. (39) considered the exposure time of patients 
i.e. the length of time receiving home care, to calculate a 10.1% adverse events per client (patient) year. 
Those who experienced adverse events appeared to be more vulnerable populations, being ‘older, had more 
depressive symptoms and behavioural problems, and were more functionally impaired’ (57)Pg191. Johnson (169) 
determined an annual incidence in Winnipeg of 5.5%. The annual incidence rates of 10.1% (39) and 5.5% 
(169) fall within the ranges of 3.7% (1, 2) and 16.6% (8) calculated for hospital care. This indicates the 
seriousness of adverse events in the home care environment as being on par with the hospital and other 
healthcare settings, with falls being the most commonly occurring adverse event. This can be seen in 
Table 3.5: Types of adverse events in Canadian home care. 
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Table 3.5: Types of adverse events in Canadian home care 
Adverse event type (Blais et al. (39)) % Adverse event type (Sears et al. (38)) % 
Fall injury 17.2 Falls with injury 24.6 
Wound infection 14.0 Medication error 16.4 
Psychosocial, behavioural, mental 
problems 
11.8 Pressure ulcer 11.5 
Medication problem 6.5 General decline 11.5 
Pressure ulcer 6.5 Delayed healing 9.8 
Other wound 4.3 Infection 8.2 
Non-wound infection 4.3 CHF 6.6 
Syncope or seizure 4.3 Catheter injury 4.9 
Delayed wound healing 3.2 Bowel impaction 3.3 
Skin tear or laceration 3.2 Bleed  1.6 
  Dehydration 1.6 
  *this study did not include psychosocial 
outcomes 
 
As healthcare organisations look to save money and deliver better care through home care and 
community services, there comes an intensified level of scrutiny on the safety of these services. Research 
in this field is increasing and adaptions to methods of measurement are enabling their transference to the 
homecare setting. 
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3.4: Patients as stakeholders in safety 
The principles of performance measurement outlined in 3.2: Lessons from other industries: the case for 
performance measurement, implicate the customer as having a role in the design of performance 
measurement. However, Chapter 2 highlighted the absence of the patient in the measurement of safety, 
including the design of measurement and the reporting of performance. In 2002, Vincent and Coulter 
(170) made the following observation: 
‘The most remarkable feature in the many faceted patient safety movement is surely the lack of attention paid 
to the patient…lessons are sought from other industries and experts…Yet the one source of experience and 
expertise that remains largely ignored is that of the patient.’ (170)pg1 
The contributions patients make are still small, but some progress is being made, as will be presented here. 
The current role of patients in patient safety can be broadly categorised into: their perspective of safety; 
their involvement in safety improvement and their contribution to poor safety, all of which will be 
explored here. 
3.4.1: Patient perspectives of  patient safety 
As indicated by Vincent and Coulter (170), the patient perspective of safety largely remains an untapped 
source of expertise; however, some attempts have been made to address this. Following the publication of 
the IoM report (6), Robinson et al. (171) sought to determine the scale of the safety problem as perceived 
by physicians and the public. They concluded that physicians recognised the existence of a patient safety 
problem in healthcare, but they didn’t consider it to be as significant as the public perceived it to be. The 
patient’s perception of safety does not appear to be fixed: it alters with their experience of care. For 
example, when the continuity of their care is disrupted, i.e. when patients are unable to be seen by their 
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usual healthcare professional, patients can feel unsafe and this is more apparent in vulnerable groups, such 
as those with chronic conditions (172). Furthermore, Cleopas et al. (173) found that: 
‘inadequate staff responsiveness in the face of error, non-disclosure of error to the patient, and serious health 
consequences for the patient have a negative influence on respondents’ evaluation of the incident’. (173)pg139 
These studies provide evidence that patient perceptions of safety are susceptible to influence by their 
own personal experience of care. These influential experiences might make it difficult for patients to 
objectively assess the safety of the whole system. Patients can, however, provide valuable insight into the 
factors that contribution to patient safety. A study conducted to explore older patients’ perceptions of 
safety during organisational care transfers, identified four key themes that contribute to safety: 
communication, responsiveness, trust and traditional safety risks (174). Further examination of these can 
be found in Table 3.6: Key themes of safety in the organisational care transfer setting. It is worth 
examining further, the theme of trust, where participants of this study were found to be inherently 
trusting and even defensive of errors committed by healthcare professionals (174). Conversely, Elder et al. 
(175) found that patients who had experienced an adverse event, lost trust in their health professionals 
and Pandhi et al. (172) found that patients with high levels of trust felt more safe. In addition to the 
experience of having an adverse event, the severity of the event further influences the perception of 
safety, i.e. the more severe the adverse event, the greater the perception of the lack of safety (176). 
Multiple studies, in addition to that of Scott et al. (174), have been successful in eliciting the patient 
perspective of safety and identifying contributing factors. When engaging with patients in a prospective 
hazard analysis, Dean et al. (177) conducted a study within a chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD), supported discharge care pathway. They found the three highest ranked safety concerns, as 
perceived by the patient, to be: difficulties in accessing hospital admissions, information transfer to 
primary care and failure to communicate medication changes to primary care. Communication is 
implicated twice in this study, and previously in the study by Scott et al. (174), becoming a common 
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theme identified by the patient; presenting a convincing argument for its involvement in patient safety. In 
another study (40), when examining the patients’ and caregivers’ perspectives of safety, the term ‘home 
care safety’ did not resonate with them, preferring to describe concerns or challenges. Furthermore, their 
definitions of safety diverged from those of the paid healthcare providers. Providers were focussed on the 
patient and were almost exclusively physical in nature, being more aligned to that of the institutional 
setting (40). 
Table 3.6: Key themes of safety in the organisational care transfer setting 
(adapted from (174)) 
Theme Description 
Communication  Being informed 
 Having a means to contact a health professional 
 Being friendly and reassuring 
 Being apologetic after an incident and listening 
Responsiveness  Responding to individual needs 
 Short waiting times 
 Making the transfer an easy process 
Trust Trust was considered inherent in the participants regardless of experience 
originating from the assumption that health professionals were sufficiently 
trained 
Traditional safety risks  Physical safety 
 Falls 
 Healthcare acquired infections 
 Receiving adequate standards of care 
 Missed diagnosis 
 Medication errors 
 Excessive painful procedures 
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Patients can also provide a perspective on the types of errors committed, the consequent harm 
experienced and their relative importance. A study examining the patient perspective of harm in the 
primary care setting, indicated that patients reported breakdown in access to and relationships with 
clinicians, as more prominent than medical errors that were technical, such as diagnostic or treatment 
errors (89). These relate to the communication and responsiveness themes presented by Scott et al. 
(174) in Table 3.6. Furthermore, patients also reported harm of a psychological nature: 119 
psychological harms were reported in comparison to 39 physical harms and 12 economic harms (89). 
Despite the available information on the differing patient perspectives of safety, the dominance of the 
medical model in patient safety is still apparent in the clinical focus of safety measurement, which was 
critiqued in Chapter 2. Disparities between what patients would like healthcare to achieve and what 
healthcare is striving to achieve (indicated by what it measures), could result in healthcare systems being 
unsuccessful in delivering good and safe care, as perceived by the patient. In support of the need for a 
greater understanding of patient perspectives, Ocloo (178) argues that: 
‘Harmed patients’ perspectives provide a unique alternative standpoint to the dominant viewpoint of the 
medical profession, in highlighting the broader social processes that construct harm’ (178)pg511 
Ocloo’s research with a patient led safety group: Medical Harm Self-Help Network (MHSHN), revealed 
that the group wanted to campaign to challenge the dominant medical model, which they felt was working 
to their detriment. They also felt that healthcare systems adopted a paternalistic approach, which was 
oppressive to the patient and that their experiences had been excluded in the development of patient 
safety reforms. However, Ocloo concludes: ‘That these experiences have acted as an important catalyst for the 
emergence of a patient safety movement in healthcare over the last ten years’ (178)pg515. 
More recent controversies in healthcare safety support the notion that patients and the public can catalyse 
movements for reform, but consideration of the patient experience in the reform process is yet to be seen. 
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3.4.2: Patient involvement in improving safety 
Patient participation in healthcare is increasing as healthcare seeks to become more patient-centred. 
Patients should no longer be considered passive recipients of care, or passive victims of medical error. 
Vincent and Coulter (170) proposed that patients should be co-producers of care and safety, and could 
contribute to improving safety in multiple ways, including: helping to reach an accurate diagnosis; deciding 
an appropriate treatment; choosing a suitably experienced and safe provider; appropriately administering, 
monitoring and adhering to treatment; and identifying side effects or adverse events quickly and taking 
appropriate action. However, there may be difficulties with patients participating in safety. Longtin et al. 
(179) present the current knowledge of patient participation in patient safety efforts and provide a long list 
of factors that influence patient participation, including but not limited to: acceptance of the new patient 
role, confidence in own capabilities, stakes of the potential outcome, type of illness and co-morbidity. 
One way in which patients and the public can contribute to safety and influence reform, is to voice their 
concerns. The problems of poor quality and unsafe care uncovered at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust were brought to light by a patient and relatives group: Cure the NHS. As a result of the Cure the 
NHS campaign, a public inquiry was undertaken at the Trust to determine the cause of excessive 
mortality. Consequently, three other reports have been published in light of the poor findings (12, 180, 
181). The resulting reports make, in total, 308 recommendations or ambitions to improve safety in 
healthcare. This is evidence of the strength and power that patients and the public can have in improving 
safety by being involved in highlighting issues. All three reports called for greater patient and public 
involvement. Digital technology is another avenue that patients are using to empower themselves and 
voice their concerns. For example, www.patientopinion.org.uk is an independent website where patients 
can go and submit their opinions on the care they have received. On the 30th October 2013, 64,962 stories 
by patients and relatives had been submitted, there were 2125 staff listening, 56% of stories received a 
response and 6% led to a change. These stories can be positive or negative. 
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Research has investigated the opportunity for patients to report incidents, which has indicated an 
incidence of nearly 50% (182), substantially higher than the 9.2% incidence using retrospective record 
review (10). However, prospective analysis using ethnography indicated an incidence of 46% (183), 
providing further evidence of the under-reporting nature of methods that utilise healthcare professional 
reporting. Entwistle et al. (184), qualitatively explored the experiences of patients and family members 
who had spoken up about patient safety at the point of care. Their disposition to speak up about safety 
concerns was influenced by multiple factors including: 
 Gravity of the threat of harm 
 The relative importance of their concern given other patients’ needs and staff workloads and 
priorities 
 Their confidence about their grounds for concern, roles and responsibilities 
 The likely consequences of speaking up 
Entwistle et al. (184) concluded that patients that spoke up about error, were heavily influenced by the 
quality of the patient-professional relationship. The ability of patients to speak up might also be hindered 
by their perception of their role in healthcare safety. A survey by Rathert et al. (185) found that patients 
believed that their role in safety was to follow instructions (most common response of 23%) suggesting a 
passive role in safety. They also expressed the expectancy of competent care. There are two issues here: 
firstly, if patients believe healthcare to be inherently safe, it may not be obvious to them to criticise when 
it is not. Secondly, as a passive participant, they may feel they have no influence, preventing them from 
speaking out. Both of these issues could prevent patients from speaking out about safety. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) has recognised the increasingly active role that patients have in 
their healthcare provision and promote that this should be extended to safety (186). Figure 3.3: 
Relationships between patients’ rights and empowerment in healthcare safety, demonstrates the 
relationship between patients’ rights and patient empowerment, which support their involvement in 
healthcare safety. The system of care is divided into three domains; structure, process and outcome. The 
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structure, process and outcome (SPO) model was originally described by Donabedian (3) as a method for 
evaluating quality by breaking up the system of healthcare into component parts. Structure refers to the 
environment (physical, organisational, cultural etc.), processes are actions and outcomes are consequences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Relationships between patients’ rights and empowerment in healthcare safety 
(World Health Organisation (186)) 
The SPO model will be discussed further in section 3.5: Structure, process and outcome as measurement 
domains. The WHO also break down levels within each domain: macro (international environment), 
meso (organisational) and micro (patient). Figure 3.3 makes visible the links between patient contributions 
to safety through their compliance and participation in self-care processes, which are affected by the meso 
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Meso level 
Outcomes; incidence of 
avoidable adverse events; near 
faults and accidents, patients’ 
experiences of safety 
Macro level 
Mortality and morbidity as a 
result of avoidable adverse 
events; public trust in 
healthcare, reduced health 
expenditure through increased 
compliance 
Micro level 
Providing information about risks and 
benefits; obtaining informed consent; 
shared decision-making (SDM); patient 
participation in self-management; patient 
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and macro structures to influence meso and macro outcomes. It is within the mirco level that the WHO 
believes patients can co-produce health and actively participate in error prevention. Furthermore, it 
identifies patients’ experiences of safety as an outcome, in addition to the incidence of adverse events. 
What is absent from the micro level, are the sorts of activities that have been presented in the literature, as 
possible contributions to safety by patients: namely incident reporting. Instead, the WHO presents case 
studies of worldwide examples of patient involvement in safety, which were exploratory in nature. These 
case studies do not identify physical interventions in which patients contributed to safety improvement 
efforts. Rather, the case studies provide arguments for the need to generate a greater understanding of the 
patient role. This further supports the notion that the work on patient involvement in patient safety is 
fairly young, and further investigation is required. Examples of the case studies can be found in Table 3.7: 
Case studies of patient involvement in safety. 
Table 3.7: Case studies of patient involvement in safety 
(World Health Organisation (186)) 
Case Study Description of Case Study 
Patient participation in hand hygiene in 
Bulgarian healthcare 
Understanding what patients know about healthcare 
acquired infections and their intentions to ask healthcare 
workers to perform hand hygiene 
Blood transfusion safety in France: 
developing tools to support patients 
Understanding what patients know about their rights during 
the blood transfusion process and how comprehensible the 
available information is. 
Patient safety, rights and medication safety 
in primary care in Poland 
A survey was conducted, which revealed that patient 
understanding of pharmacokinetics was low as a result of 
poor quality education and poor medical practices 
As demonstrated by the WHO, patient involvement is desired; however, evidence to support the effect it 
has on improving outcomes is limited. In fact, a study demonstrated that patient involvement in 
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preventing wrong-site surgeries was unreliable (187). 200 patients were asked to mark the surgical site 
prior to surgery: 135 did so, 2 of who marked the wrong site (187). This suggests that patients alone could 
not be responsible for the prevention of error, but rather, need to be part of a multi-faceted approach. 
More work is needed to understand if patients can positively contribute towards improved patient safety 
outcomes. 
3.4.3: Patient contributions to safety 
So far, the perceptions of patients have been presented. Furthermore, the possibility of patients being 
involved in safety improvement has been discussed. In addition, patients can negatively impact on safety 
by contributing to the conditions that facilitate harm. The RRRs deployed by Johnson (169), Blais et al. 
(39) and Sear et al. (38) have been able to examine contributing factors. For example, Johnson (169) 
found that informal caregivers and patients contribute to 42.3% and 30.8% of adverse events, 
respectively. In the study by Blais et al. (39), in which an incidence rate of 4.3% was calculated, 56% were 
deemed preventable. More than 90% were associated with a higher utilisation of healthcare resources, 
68.8% with disability and 7.5% with death. Blais et al. (39) were also able to establish that 48.4% of 
adverse events were as a result of patients, 20.4% informal caregiver and 46.2% healthcare professionals. 
These data suggest that the contributions made by patients and informal caregivers to the occurrence of 
adverse events are significant, and that the outcomes impact on both patients and healthcare providers.  
According to Romagnoli et al. (188), home care nurses perceived the patient and informal caregiver 
contributions to be related to an inability to sufficiently care for wounds, follow medication regimes, 
manage durable medical equipment, and keep their homes free of hazards. They also considered the 
communication between healthcare professionals, from different care settings, to be reliant on patients 
and informal caregivers. Communication is an important component of safety during care transitions as 
perceived by the home care nurse and patients (174, 189). Particularly where healthcare professionals 
from the hospital have less experience of care delivery in the home, and may not have the same 
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understanding as home care nurses (189). This is further enhanced by Romagnoli et al. (188) who 
demonstrate that insufficient attention is given during care transitions to effective communication. 
Consequently, decisions made with inaccurate, incomplete or simply wrong information can result in 
adverse events, which were potentially preventable (190, 191). With between 5% and 79% of hospital 
readmissions deemed avoidable (192), tackling the communication issue in care transitions and between 
care settings might prove fruitful for both care providers and patients. 
The dissonance of safety theory between the acute setting and the primary care setting has previously 
been explored from the staff perspective, including district nurses and home care workers. McGraw et al. 
(193) found that the challenges in the home setting where different to those in the bounded setting of a 
hospital, which restricted the applicability of models of safety derived in the hospital setting. What is 
absent is an evidence base on the patient and caregiver perspective. 
3.4.4: Summary of  patients as stakeholders in safety 
The inherent trust patients place in healthcare professionals to deliver competent care to passive patients 
could be problematic in the pursuit of patient involvement in safety. Patients might find it difficult and be 
reluctant to question safety of care when they have expectations that, at the very least, care will be 
competent. The preoccupation with a medical dominant safety movement could conflict with the 
differing perceptions held by patients, who, place greater emphasis on non-medical error and harm. If this 
disparity remains, patient priorities will continue to be overlooked and healthcare organisations will 
struggle to meet the demands of the patient population. 
There is some evidence to support the contributions of patients to the management of patient safety. This 
includes understanding their perception of safety in terms of its scale, as well as what they perceive to 
contribute to, and be responsible for, safety. In addition, patients can actively contribute to safety 
management at the point of care by speaking up, questioning, and ensuring their own contribution to 
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healthcare is safe and compliant. The susceptible nature of the patient perspective to influence requires a 
more stable environment for patients to feel safe and to feel competent to contribute to safety. 
Relationships and trust with healthcare professionals and organisations must be well established to ensure 
effective communication. Organisations need to strive to be responsive to patient needs and to 
understand that the outcomes of importance to them might differ to those of patients. There is value in 
involving patients in patient safety, as the patient grows increasingly active in their healthcare 
interventions, such as the CM programme.  
3.5: Structure, process, and outcome as measurement domains 
The discipline of performance measurement recognises the limitations of outcome measurement and 
promotes the use of additional measures of input and process, which contribute to the achievement of 
outcomes. In 1966, Donabedian argued that an ‘assessment of quality must rest on a conceptual and operationalized 
definition of what the “quality of medical care” means.’ (194)pg692. This is aligned with the conceptual 
requirements of performance measurement outlined previously, which requires an understanding of, 
and alignment with, the organisations objectives, in order to inform the measures appropriately.  
Donabedian (3) first proposed the structure, process and outcome (SPO) model in 1966, to provide an 
alternative to the commonly used outcome measures, which he argued were not necessarily the most 
relevant measure of quality. For example, mortality rates for care of patients with fatal disease would 
possibly not be appropriate in the assessment of quality. Where mortality rates appear to be more 
appropriate, issues still exist. The use of mortality rates might be used in conjunction with a threshold 
level, which needs to be breached in order to trigger an alert that something is wrong with the system: a 
given number of patients have to die before being made aware there is a problem. Furthermore, 
Donabedian (3) argued that even if the relevant outcome is measured, it is sensible to be mindful that 
many things influence outcomes beyond the medical care provided. This might explain why safety has 
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been measured in the way it has: the outcomes measured are exclusively the result of care provision and 
exclude disease progression. Given the issues of outcome measurement, Donabedian (3) proposed the use 
of process measures as an opportunity to measure where action of care is good or bad. In addition, he 
discussed the assessment of structure: the setting within which care is conducted. He argues that having 
the correct structure, such as: suitable facilities; adequately trained staff; and accessible information, 
enables good practice (processes) to deliver optimum outcomes. 
Although the SPO model was originally described for quality measurement, it has been applied to patient 
safety. Patient safety and quality of care are closely related: safety is a component of quality (147). 
Subsequently, Davies, et al. (5) have applied the SPO model to a systems approach to patient safety. 
Figure 3.4: SPO applied to a systems approach to patient safety, is a diagrammatic representation of the 
relationships between SPO in the context of systems theory. 
Figure 3.4 describes the system as component parts composed of structure, process and outcome. Latent 
conditions are present in the structure of care. Active failures are associated with processes; inappropriate 
actions taken as a result of latent conditions within a system. Although the schematic is useful, it is 
oriented around what not to do and what not to achieve, which is how the definition of safety is 
presented; as a process of avoidance. In Figure 3.5: SPO applied to the Swiss cheese model, the SPO 
model is mapped onto the Swiss cheese model to demonstrate how they are related and how the SPO 
model is a systems approach to safety. 
The SPO model provides a theoretical foundation upon which to base an evaluation of quality or safety. 
However, Donabedian (195) himself acknowledged that evidence to prove the relationship between the 
three was lacking and would prove difficult to achieve; however, since this time, evidence has become 
available. 
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Figure 3.4: SPO applied to a systems approach to patient safety 
(Davies et al. (5)) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: SPO applied to the Swiss cheese model 
3.5.1: Evidence for and against the SPO model  
Evidence is available to support the existence of relationships between the three domains of the system. 
Rademakers et al. (196) were able to conclude that improvements in structure and processes could lead to 
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improved patient assessments of healthcare quality. Sainfort (197) identified the need for a method of 
causal modelling built on the domains of structure, process and outcome, to assess the quality of care in 
nursing care facilities. Kunkel et al. (198) conducted a large quantitative study to determine the 
significance of the relationships between structure, process and outcome and found it to be representative 
of the quality systems of hospital departments in Sweden. They were able to demonstrate that structure 
can influence both processes and outcomes, and, that processes directly influence outcomes. This can be 
seen in Figure 3.6: The relationships between SPO. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: The relationships between SPO 
(Kunkel et al. (198)) 
Carayon et al. (199) criticised the SPO model for being too process and outcome oriented, leading to 
punitive action against individuals. However, their alternative model: the Systems Engineering Initiative 
for Patient Safety (SEIPS) is predicated on the SPO model. The SEIPS model is however, more focused 
on structure, arguing that this is where more attention is required in a true systems approach to patient 
safety. Instead of using the term structure, the SEIPS model refers to structure as the work system, and 
breaks it up into smaller components: person, organisation, technologies and tools, tasks and 
environment. Carayon et al. (199) suggest that the model can be patient centred, with patients being 
allocated as both recipients of care who are subject to good or bad outcomes, and active participants 
involved in their care. Interestingly however, the model is ignorant of the patient contribution to the work 
systems, which are mostly related to the structure of care that organisations provide. This is unsurprising 
considering that in their study, the model was applied only to an outpatient surgery i.e. where care is 
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delivered in an environment controlled and regulated by the healthcare provider. Given the organisation 
derived nature of the model and its application to secondary care, it is deemed inadequate to reflect the 
care of the CM programme, but it does reinforce the usefulness of the SPO model as a foundation for a 
systems approach to patient safety, that can be built upon. Conversely to Carayon et al. (199), a literature 
review conducted on the structure, process and outcome characteristics of a crisis resolution and home 
treatment (CRHT) service for mental health, identified the strengths of the structural components in the 
literature, and criticised the evidence for outcome measures as being less substantial (200).  
The Nursing Role Effectiveness Model is another example of the application of the SPO concept in the 
acute setting but specifically evaluates the care delivered by acute care nurse practitioners (ACNP). This 
model is more descriptive of the types of indicators within each of the SPO domains and can be seen in 
Figure 3.7: The Nursing Role Effectiveness Model. Multiple studies were carried out to empirically test 
the validity of the model. Doran et al. (201) found that for the most part, the hypothesised relationships 
between SPO were supported using a cross sectional survey design and structural equation modelling. 
Sidani et al. (202) made further adaptations to the model to propose relationships between SPO and 
included patient in the structure of care. However, this only related to their personal characteristics such 
as: demographics, illness/health and resources. Other studies have further validated the Nursing Role 
Effectiveness Model in the acute care setting including: the organisational factors that influence the role of 
the nurse (203), practice patterns of nurses (204) and organisational changes resulting from the 
implementation of the ACNP role in the acute care setting (205). 
The Nursing Role Effectiveness Model informs the measurement of indicators that are sensitive to 
nursing care by operationalising the nursing role in terms of the independent and interdependent roles, 
which are essential in identifying the performance of nurses. However, because the model is focused 
solely on the care provided by nurses, it does not examine the whole system of care. For these reasons, it 
is deemed inadequate as a foundation for a model in the community, which is dominated by patient self-
care and where the nurse role is less clinical. The validation and extensive studies on the Nursing Care 
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Effectiveness Model provides evidence of the accuracy of the SPO theory as a component of the quality 
of healthcare, in particular, in the acute care setting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: The Nursing Role Effectiveness Model 
(Doran et al. (201)) 
The SPO model can also be applied to the unnecessarily high incidence of mortality at Mid-Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust. The public inquiry report (12), published by Robert Francis QC, was conducted 
following complaints of poor care and unnecessary deaths. The investigation uncovered between 400-
1200 unnecessary deaths during the period 2005-2008. The report highlighted the main contributory 
factors, which are provided in Table 3.8: Findings from the Francis Report, as well as an explanation of 
their contribution.  
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Table 3.8: Findings from the Francis Report 
(Francis (12)) 
Factor Explanation 
Negative culture A tolerance of poor standards, focus on financial targets, denial of 
concerns and isolation from practice elsewhere 
Professional disengagement Professionals did not pursue management with concerns they had – a 
degree of passivity 
Patients not heard Inadequate processes for dealing with complaints, even when patient 
data was collected, it was not acted upon 
Poor governance Poor grip on accountability and governance structures 
Lack of focus on standards of 
care 
Leadership was expected to focus on financial issues with little 
attention paid to the risk to quality 
Inadequate risk assessment at 
staff reduction 
The hospital was deprived of proper levels of nursing staff in order 
to meet financial demands of foundation trust status review 
Nursing standards and 
performance 
Inadequate standard of nursing, inadequate staffing levels, poor 
leaders and recruitment and training – declining professionalism and 
tolerance for low standards. Staff did report many incidents which 
occurred because of short staffing, exhibited poor morale in their 
responses to staff surveys, and received only ineffective 
representation of concerns from the RCN. 
Wrong priorities The Trust prioritised its finances and its FT application over its 
quality of care, and failed to put patients at the centre of its work. 
The contributory factors can be categorised by structure or process. Negative culture, poor governance, 
lack of focus on standards of care, nursing standards and performance, and wrong priorities are all 
components of the structure of care. Communication is a process, and thus in instances where 
communication is failing, so are processes. Risk assessment is also a process, and thus inadequate risk 
assessment is a component of a failing process.  
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The components of the SPO model can also be applied to the system of care presented in the NHS and 
Social care long term conditions model (this can be seen in Figure 3.2). The infrastructure, including: 
community resources, decision support tools and clinical information systems, and health and social care 
system environment, represents the structure of care. Similarly, the four delivery systems are processes of 
care. Both of which, the DoH argues, will produce better outcomes in the form of empowered and 
informed patients, as well as prepared and pro-active health and social care teams. 
3.5.2: Summary of  the utility of  the SPO model 
The use of the SPO model in quality and safety has proven to be effective in places. Table 3.9: Evidence 
of the utility of the SPO, has synthesised the information of the applications of the SPO model presented 
throughout this chapter. Although the relationships between the domains remains unclear, possibly 
because of the multi-factorial nature and complexity of outcomes, some generic relationships have been 
identified. The need to understand contributing factors in structures and processes has recently been 
endorsed by an assistant director of the Health Foundations who said: 
 ‘High quality care is dependent on having safe structures and safe processes that support good outcomes: we 
need to have good measures of these structures and processes to predict current and future safety, as well as 
having measures of outcomes that tell us how safe care was in the past.’ (206) 
The SPO model has been available for debate in the literature for over 50 years, and theoretically provides 
an opportunity to tackle patient safety measurement from a systems perspective. Despite its availability, 
healthcare has been slow to adopt the SPO model as a form of systems safety measurement; though this 
is perhaps less reflective of the usefulness of SPO, but rather, the culture of healthcare. 
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Table 3.9: Evidence of the utility of the SPO 
Model/Figure Structure Process Outcome Comments 
The NHS and Social Care long 
term conditions model 
 
referred to as 
‘infrastructure’ 
 
Referred to as ‘delivery 
system’ 
 
 
This model uses different language 
which in effective, describe the three 
components of the care system. 
Relationships between patients’ 
rights and empowerment in 
healthcare safety 
   
The SPO mode is also cross-cut by the 
macro, meso and micro levels within the 
system. 
SPO applied to a systems 
approach to safety 
   
This model identifies the relationships 
between the dialogues used within the 
SPO context. 
SPO applied to the Swiss 
cheese model 
 
Originally describes as 
‘latent conditions’ 
 
Originally describes as 
‘active failures’ 
 
This model refers to latent conditions 
(dormant errors within the system) and 
active failure (errors committed at the 
sharp end). These occur within the 
structure and process components of the 
system respectively. 
The relationships between SPO    
This model identifies potential 
relationships between the components: 
structure affects process and outcome, 
and process affects outcome. 
The Nursing Role Effectiveness 
model 
   
This model retains linear relationships 
but identifies specific indicators. 
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Utilising structure, process and outcome as domains for measurement, will enable the contributory factors 
of adverse outcomes to be understood and deficiencies in the system to be identified before adverse 
outcomes are experienced. Definitions of each of the domains for use in a measurement system design 
model can be found in Table 3.10: Glossary of structure, process and outcome terms. 
Table 3.10: Glossary of structure, process and outcome terms 
Domain Definition 
Structure The environment in which care is delivered: both physical and theoretical 
Process The actions of care 
Outcome Results of care 
3.6: The integrated safety measurement model 
Chapter 2 critically analysed the literature on the measurement of safety in healthcare. Limitations of 
current safety measurement were identified, and included: 
 A dependency on outcomes 
 An absence of patient engagement in the design 
 An absence of patient contribution in the identification of error and harm 
Subsequently, this chapter offers the principles of performance measurement as an alternative approach. 
The development of a safety performance measurement system for the CM programme would enable the 
quantification of the efficiency and effectiveness of action. This could be achieved by translating both the 
organisations safety vision, and the patients’ and service users’ requirements into a set of metrics. 
Furthermore, a whole systems approach would facilitate the measurement of metrics that: 
 Measure components of the system that are responsible for outcomes 
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 Measure components of the system that are amenable to intervention 
 Are not susceptible to manipulation 
 Promote positive behaviour change in favour of improved outcomes  
There is little doubt that safe healthcare is a vision of healthcare organisations. Patient safety has been a 
global priority since the publication of the IoM report (6), which highlighted the extent of medical error. 
In the English NHS, patient safety has recently been subject to criticism following the problems identified 
at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust and the following 11 Trusts that were placed into special 
measures as a result of further investigation.  
Performance measurement dictates that patients, as consumers of healthcare, are key stakeholders of care. 
This is further enhanced by the new philosophy of care in programmes such as CM, which aim to 
empower and educate patients to undertake better self-care. Consequently, patients are no longer just 
consumers of healthcare, but also engaged producers. This philosophy also extends to patient engagement 
in safety. Evidence has been presented (section 3.4: Patients as stakeholders), which demonstrates that 
research is seeking to explore the patient perspective of safety, their involvement in safety improvement 
efforts, and how they inhibit or facilitate the condition of safety. Safety measurement however, as 
described in Chapter 2, is still dominated by traditional stakeholders, namely providers and their staff. As 
patient-centred care grows to encompass patient engagement, they increasingly become key stakeholders 
of care, and of their safety. 
In attempting to address the issue of lagging indicators, performance measurement favours metrics across 
the system, from the inputs and processes that determine the outputs. Donabedian’s structure, process, 
outcome model, is a healthcare equivalent of a whole systems approach to measurement, and evidence 
has been provided to support its utility in its potential application as an underlying model to patient safety 
measurement. 
The proposition that the development of a safety performance measurement system could address the 
limitations of current safety measurement systems is welcomed in this thesis. However, it is recognised 
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that the current understanding of safety in home healthcare is limited by the small number of studies 
conducted in this setting. Prior to the development of relevant measures, further research is required to 
elicit more knowledge on: 
 What it means to be safe in the home 
 How patients maintain safety 
 What risks are present that need to be addressed 
 What outcomes are expected 
 How each of the stakeholders contributes to patient safety 
 What structural variables contribute to safety 
 What processes or actions are required to maintain safety or facilitate error 
The identified key stakeholders and the structure, process, outcome model are proposed as the basis of a 
measurement system design model that has been born out of the preceding literature review, and can be 
found in Figure 3.8: Integrated safety measurement model (ISMM). 
Kunkel et al. (198) empirically determined the relationships between the three domains in a Swedish 
hospital: structure impacts on process and outcome, and process only impacts on outcome (see Figure 
3.6). However, argument could be presented for the cyclical impact of process on structure; this is 
dependent on the inclusivity of each domain. In the case where process is specific to actions of clinical 
care, Kunkel et al.’s (198) conclusion might well hold true. However, in instances where processes include 
system assessment, such as risk assessment, it would appear reasonable to hypothesise that processes 
might influence the structure. As one would expect a poor result from a risk assessment to result in 
changes to the structure. This may not be so relevant in an environment where the structures are 
regulated and controlled, and even standardised in some cases, but when care is being delivered outside 
these environments, such as in the home, and risk assessments become core to the care of patients, 
processes might impact on structure. For this reason, the structure and process domains have been 
presented as cyclically impacting upon each other and both feeding into outcomes. 
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Figure 3.8: The integrated safety measurement model 
The ISMM is a theoretic model to assist in the method of constructing a safety measurement system. It 
identifies key stakeholders whom are essential in the design of the system and with whom, engagement 
should be sought.  Key stakeholders are those who have an interest in the outcomes and/or a 
contribution to make to the outcomes. This is over arched by three measurement domains: structure, 
process and outcomes. Structure is the environment in which the care is delivered, beyond the physical 
but into the organisational and social. Processes are the actions of care and outcomes are the 
consequences of care delivery. 
3.7: Summary 
Presented in this chapter are four core themes, which contribute to the underlying research problem, 
upon which this thesis is built. Firstly, that the discipline of performance measurement offers an 
opportunity to address the limitations of safety measurement outlined in Chapter 2. Secondly, patients are 
key stakeholders of care and should be engaged in the development of measures relating to patient safety. 
They also have a perspective of safety, which differs to that of other stakeholders such as healthcare 
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professionals and thus are a valuable source of information that is currently underutilised. Thirdly, patient 
involvement in healthcare is increasing, demonstrated by services such as the CM programme. The new 
philosophy of care is to educate and empower patients to take a bigger role and greater responsibility in 
their healthcare. This is being achieved in non-traditional care settings such as the patient’s home, rather 
than the hospital or GP surgery. These environments are not designed, nor necessarily equipped for 
healthcare delivery, as they are not controlled or regulated by the healthcare provider, but rather the 
patient. Finally, the literature on safety in community care settings such as the home is spare in 
comparison to the hospital setting. The RRR, first utilised in the Harvard Medical Study in 1990, wasn’t 
deployed in home healthcare until 2013. Canada has been pursuing a home healthcare safety agenda, and 
gives us some indication of the complexities of safety in home healthcare. 
The ISMM informs the design of safety measurement by identifying key stakeholders who should be 
involved in the design of the system and three overarching measurement domains. Using this model, this 
research will conduct a research methodology that seeks to explore the perspectives of key stakeholders of 
safety, through the lens of structure, process and outcome measurement domains. This is supported by 
generic performance measurement models, which advocate stakeholder involvement, in order to 
understand their expectations and their contributions to achieving the desired outcomes. In doing so, 
successful identification of components of each of the measurement domains will act to validate the 
model with respect to face validity: the degree to which something is considered to measure its intended 
phenomenon. 
The capacity of this research to progress beyond this is limited by the time required to deliver on the 
other characteristics. For instance, benchmarking of indicators will require time and further research 
efforts to understand what standards to set, and to generate evidence of their effectiveness at reducing 
harm to patient. This point also relates to the ability of performance measures to be easily changed as the 
circumstances change; evidence will be required to support this given the sensitivity and risk of what is 
being measured. Nevertheless, lessons can be learnt from the discipline of performance measurement, 
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particularly in the engagement of key stakeholders such as patients and staff, namely that they should 
stimulate improvement, and that they must provide fast feedback. All of which are currently lacking in 
safety measurement. 
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  Chapter 4
Research Design 
4.1: Introduction 
This chapter presents the philosophical and methodological approaches adopted to address the research 
aim and objectives proposed in Chapter 1. The aim of this chapter is to present a philosophically and 
methodologically coherent argument for the research design proposed. In doing so, the philosophical 
position of the researcher will be defined, followed by the selected methodology and methods to meet the 
philosophical demands. The aim of the research is presented in Figure 4.1: Research aim. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Research aim 
Before the commencement of research, the researcher must first understand their philosophical 
perspective; specifically, their ontology and epistemology. The importance of this has been succinctly 
articulated by Guba and Lincoln (207): ‘questions of method are secondary to questions of paradigm’ (207)pg105. A 
researchers ontology and epistemology dictates how they perceive the world and how knowledge is 
generated respectively, hence the need to be explicit in the research design; the way in which knowledge is 
generated during the research process is a consequence of the researcher’s ontology and epistemology. 
To describe a framework for safety measurement for the NHS case management 
programme, that is reflective of key stakeholder perspectives. 
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The researcher presents a critical realist philosophy that supports their personal interpretation of reality as 
well as meeting the demands of the research aim. Subsequently, a methodology is presented, which is 
more than the process of data collection and analysis (methods), but rather, is an encompassing strategy 
or plan of action, which postulates the use of particular methods (208). A range of data collection and 
analysis techniques are discussed and appropriate ones have been selected. The quality of the research 
design is supported through the use of validating techniques, individual to both the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches.  
A framework of the research design is presented in Figure 4.2: Research design framework. A mixed 
methods approach is proposed, using an exploratory sequential mixed method design (42). Deploying two 
sequentially related studies, the perspectives of key stakeholders will be explored using a qualitative case 
study (study I), validated and generalised using a survey (study II). From this deep and generalisable 
understanding, a framework for measuring safety can be devised. 
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Figure 4.2: Research design framework 
(Creswell and Plano Clark (42)pg124) 
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4.2: Philosophy  
4.2.1: Ontology and epistemology 
Ontology is concerned with how we exist, and epistemology with how we obtain knowledge of existence; 
a person’s philosophical position drives the nature of the research enquiry and ultimately the design. 
According to Guba and Lincoln (207), ‘inquiry paradigms define for the inquirers what it is they are about, and 
what falls within and outside the limits of legitimate research’ (207)pg108. 
The term paradigm refers to a collective assumption about the world and how knowledge is derived from 
it, which ultimately directs how research should be conducted (209). The researcher presents the 
philosophical paradigm of critical realism (originally described by Bhaskar as transcendental realism (210)), 
as that which underpins the researcher’s beliefs and therefore the research design. The selection of this is 
somewhat inherent; however, logical argument can be communicated through the inadequacies of 
alternative paradigms in relation to the research aim. Prior to the development of the philosophical 
language that coherently explains the critical realist paradigm, a dichotomy of inversely related 
philosophical paradigms existed, namely positivism and constructivism (207). From the positivist 
perspective, ontologically, reality is independent of the mind and thus can be epistemologically, objectively 
observed and measured. This paradigm is strongly associated with traditional science (207). Conversely, 
the constructivist perspective dictates that there are multiple ontologically and epistemologically, socially 
constructed realities.  
Neither perspective is adequate to support the research aim, which implicitly assumes a socially 
constructed element to reality as well as the possibility of commonalities. This draws from both 
constructivist and positivist paradigms. The critical realist perspective, therefore, provides an alternative 
middle ground, to capitalise on the shortcomings of the opposing paradigms. Critical realism, presents 
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that, ontologically, ‘the world is structured, differentiated, stratified and changing’ (211)pg5. Bunge (212) similarly 
considers critical realism to arrange reality into levels, within which are underlying mechanisms, which can 
generate events. Bhaskar (210) outlines ontology to exist within three domains: the empirical, the actual 
and the real. In describing this, Bhaskar promotes that there are mechanisms that may or may not lead to 
events, which, may or may not lead to experiences, yet only events are empirically observable (see Table 
4.1: Ontological domains of critical realism). Therefore, critical realism supports the notion that in order 
to attain knowledge of the phenomenon, you must understand the underlying, unobservable mechanisms, 
in addition to the empirically observable events. Critical realism, therefore, concedes that reality is 
independent of the mind; however, it acknowledges there is a dimension that is socially determined and 
therefore dependent. 
Table 4.1: Ontological domains of critical realism 
(adapted from (210)pg13) 
 Domain of real Domain of actual Domain of Empirical 
Mechanisms X   
Events X X  
Experiences X X X 
In reference to the research aim posed, it is implicit that a component of safety is socially determined 
through experience. In proposing to engage with multiple stakeholders of safety, it can be inferred that 
there will exist multiple experiences, which is aligned with critical realism. By exploring the concept of 
safety from multiple perspectives, knowledge on underlying generative mechanisms can be determined in 
order to identify opportunities for events, which may result in the experience of adverse events.  
4.2.2: Intensive and extensive research design 
Rather than present a divide between qualitative and quantitative research, critical realism suggests the use 
of intensive and extensive research designs (211). Intensive research shares commonalities with qualitative 
research, and extensive with quantitative research. Critical realism advocates that both could be present at 
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the same and/or different times during the research process. Traditionally, qualitative modes of inquiry 
are an opportunity to explore and understand the meaning of a phenomenon and quantitative modes of 
inquiry enable objective testing of relationships between variables (213). Popay (214) states that qualitative 
research ‘explores the meanings people attach to their experiences and identifies and describes the social structures and 
processes that shape these meanings’ (214)pg100. Thus generalisabilty of the findings is limited to the participants 
being studied. However, it can develop concepts and themes, which can be transferred to similar contexts, 
situations or populations. 
Similarly, Danermark  et al.  (211), describe intensive research design as the study of one particular case 
(or several) in their context. Contrastingly, extensive research designs, study larger populations and try to 
find regularities and patterns using statistical analysis. Because critical realism advocates the use of both 
intensive, and extensive research design, a critical, multiple, methodological approach has been adopted.  
4.3: Methodology – mixed method design 
The research aim (see Figure 4.1: Research questions) has two key components: to explore the 
phenomenon of safety and to be able to devise a conceptual framework for safety measurement. 
Intrinsically, the research requires both an intensive and an extensive design: a single case and large 
population study respectively. The use of both in a pluralistic methodology is advocated by the critical 
realism paradigm. Therefore a mixed method design is proposed. (213) Creswell explains that: 
‘a mixed method design is useful when either the quantitative or qualitative approach by itself is inadequate to 
best understand a research problem or the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative research provide the 
best understanding’ (213)pg18   
The critical realist paradigm implicates the inadequacy of the individual adoption of either qualitative or 
quantitative research methods. Quantitative studies are unable to establish underlying mechanisms 
95 
because they are not observable in the domain of the empirical. On the other hand, qualitative studies are 
unable to exert the statistical generalisabilty of these mechanisms, because they cannot support the 
numbers and control, required to test them. Creswell (213) promotes the use of mixed methods when 
there is a need to understand a phenomenon followed by a need to generalise the findings to a population, 
which cannot be achieved by either mode of inquiry independently. 
Early definitions of the mixed method approach described it as a study that collected data with both 
quantitative and qualitative properties (215). Following further debate in the literature (216), the definition 
was extended to be inclusive of data collection techniques, analysis procedures and modes of inference ‘for 
the purpose of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration’ (216)pg123.  Creswell and Plano Clark (42) 
describe five core characteristics of mixed methods research: 
1. Rigorously collect and analyse both qualitative and quantitative data, mixing the two forms by 
either combining them, building sequentially on each other or embedding one within the other 
2. Priority is given to one or both forms dependent on the research question 
3. Uses them in a single, or multi-phase study 
4. Frames them within a philosophic paradigm 
5. Combines them into specific research designs to direct the study plan 
Greene et al. (215) suggest five reasons for selecting a mixed method approach. These can be found in 
Table 4.2: Reasons and relevance of a mixed method research design, as well as their application to the 
research design presented here. 
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Table 4.2: Reasons and relevance of a mixed method research design 
(Greene et al. (215)) 
Reason for Conducting 
Mixed Method Research 
Description Relationship to research presented 
Triangulation Seeks convergence and 
corroboration 
The quantitative study (study II) will determine 
whether there is corroboration with larger 
populations and between stakeholders. 
Complementary Seeks elaboration 
enhancement and 
clarification 
The quantitative data (study II) will enable 
clarification of differences between stakeholders if 
differences exist. 
Development Seeks to use results from 
one method to inform 
another method 
The results from the qualitative study (study I) will 
inform the survey design of the quantitative study 
(study II). 
Initiation Seeks to discover 
paradox and 
contradiction 
Not relevant to the research as the quantitative 
study seeks corroboration and confirmation of 
qualitative findings rather than contradictions. 
However, should a paradox present itself between 
the two data sets, it will be exposed and examined. 
Expansion Seeks to extend breadth The quantitative study (study II) captures a greater 
sample size. 
According to Creswell and Plano Clark (42), there are six mixed method designs. The convergent design 
aims to derive a complete understanding by collecting both quantitative and qualitative data because 
individually, each provides only a partial view. The explanatory sequential design aims to explain the 
mechanisms in a trend by first collecting quantitative data to identify the trend, then qualitative data to 
explain the trend. The embedded design lifts up the voices of participants in the case of injustice to 
provide evidence for a call for action.  The transformative design is used ‘within a transformative theoretical 
perspective to help address injustices or bring about change for an underrepresented or marginalised group’ (42)(pg127). The 
multiphase design requires multiple mixed methods over a long period of time to meet an overall 
objective. Finally, the exploratory sequential design first explores a topic through qualitative methods and 
them aims to make the findings generalisable through quantitative methods. Exploratory sequential design 
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can be used to develop a test instrument when a better understanding of the phenomenon is required 
beforehand (217). It is also suitable for generalising qualitative findings (218).  
Little is known of the multiple key stakeholder perspectives of safety in case managed care, as described in 
Chapter 3, and therefore, it is essential, in order to develop a framework that is reflective of them, that 
they be explored using qualitative means. Once an understanding has been achieved, an instrument in the 
form of a survey can be used to determine the representativeness of the perspectives gained to a larger 
population. Given this, the exploratory sequential design has been selected for use in this research. 
4.4: Method 
In mixed method designs, multiple modes of inquiry are deployed. In the case presented for the use of a 
sequential exploratory design, it is evident that each mode seeks to contribute to the overall aim. Each 
mode of inquiry also has its own research questions and objectives which contribute to achieving this aim. 
Therefore, the methods (data collection and analysis techniques) are presented as two studies: study I – 
case study and study II – survey. The methods in relation to the overall research design are discussed and 
the argument for their selection over other methods is presented. The details of the protocol are described 
in full in Chapter 5.  
4.4.1 Study I – case study 
The selection of the exploratory sequential mixed method design indicates that Study 1 aimed to explore 
and understand a concept or phenomenon, qualitatively. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to 
explore and understand the perspectives of key stakeholders of safety, when healthcare is delivered in the 
home. It strived to answer: how do key stakeholders perceive safety, and how do the perceptions differ 
between key stakeholders?  
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There are several strategies for conducting qualitative research including, but not limited to: ethnography, 
grounded theory, phenomenology, case study and narrative inquiry. According to Reeves et al. (219), 
ethnography explores the social interactions and behaviours within a culture (a team, an organisation or a 
community). It does not seek to test hypotheses; it is the investigation of a small number of participants 
through the power of observation. This enables the researcher to ‘get inside’ the culture and see how they 
see the world. However, the current research was concerned with understanding the perspectives of 
stakeholders from how they describe it, rather than the ethnographic approach, which is interpreted 
through the observation of behaviour. Therefore ethnography was rejected.  
Alternatively, grounded theory, originally developed by Glaser and Strauss (220), offers a strategy to 
develop an understanding of a phenomenon that is entirely derived from the data collected. As with 
ethnography, the strategy does not test hypotheses but rather, theory is drawn out of the data through an 
iterative study design and systematic analysis. The strategy strongly advises against using predetermined 
theories to remove bias from the analysis. This renders the strategy redundant here, as the literature 
review and subsequent model derived from the literature review, have strongly influenced the study 
design, data collection techniques and data analysis techniques selected. 
Narrative inquiry is a process of storytelling through researcher interpretation (221). The analysis of 
narrative inquiry is distinctively different from the thematic nature found in grounded theory because of 
the integration of time and context into the interpretation (222). Narrative inquiry is able to determine 
how people make sense of the world and like grounded theory, it is also exclusive of a priori interests. The 
researcher acknowledges that the perceptions and perspectives of the participants might differ over time, 
dependent on the individual’s experience. However, this research does not seek to examine the change of 
participants’ perceptions over time but commonalities across individuals, and therefore, narrative inquiry 
was rejected as a suitable mode of data collection and analysis 
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Phenomenological research is another strategy, which is deployed without preconceptions. It aims to 
describe, rather than explain phenomenon (223). Therefore, this was also unsuitable as an appropriate 
method. 
Alternatively, the case study method allows and encourages the researcher to ‘move in and out of the literature 
before, during and after the case study has begun’ (224)pg6. In doing so, the researcher can construct meaningful 
questions at the beginning of the research process to elicit meaningful responses. Continuous referral to 
the literature can occur during the process of analysis, which persists from start to finish.  The method 
employs an iterative-parallel process moving between stages of the research process. According to Stake 
(225), ‘case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within 
important circumstance’ (225)pgxi. Yin (43) describes case studies as empirical modes of enquiry that explore 
active phenomenon in depth and within real life contexts i.e. without controls.  
Case study does not advocate an ability to make generalisations to larger populations because of its 
specific nature (226); however, patterns within the data are discernible, enabling generalisations of the 
specific sample studied (224). Furthermore, multiple data collection methods are promoted including the 
use of both qualitative (intensive) and quantitative (extensive) methods as a form of triangulation, 
providing a strong analytical strategy  (43). Yin (227) considers the use of a broad variety of techniques a 
must, supported by Patton (228), to enhance the quality and credibility of the findings. Triangulation and 
other forms of validity will be discussed in 4.5.1: Validity of the qualitative approach. 
Critical realism is considered to be tolerant of many research methods (229), including case study, because 
it is associated with specific question types such as ‘what caused the events associated with the phenomenon to occur’ 
(230)pg123. With respect to this research, critical realism supports the drive to understand the underlying 
contributory conditions, which support or fail to generate, the condition of safety. Therefore, case study 
has been selected as a suitable critical realist approach.   
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4.4.1.1: The case 
A case can be described as an entity such as a person, an organisation, a social group, or a service (43). In 
this instance, the case is the case management (CM) programme within the English National Health 
Service (NHS). Yin (43), describes four types of case study design: single, holistic case; single, embedded 
case; multiple holistic cases and multiple embedded cases. Holistic case studies can be single-case or 
multiple-case in design but focus on one unit of analysis within each case. Contrastingly, embedded case 
studies explore more than one unit of analysis. In this research, the case has been defined as the service 
under investigation (the case management programme) irrespective of the data being collected from 
multiple care providers. Therefore, the data will be not cross analysed by geographical location. However, 
the key stakeholders will be analysed separately and then cross compared. The identified themes will be 
presented for the entire data set and comparisons of the different stakeholder groups made within the 
themes and differences clearly stated. This study, therefore, is a single case study with multiple, embedded 
units of analysis. 
Yin (43) provides five example case types for the selection of single case study design: 
1. The critical case – to test a well formulated theory 
2. The extreme or unique case – to investigate a rare phenomenon 
3. The representative – captures commonplace situations 
4. The revelatory – investigation of a previously undescribed phenomenon 
5. The longitudinal – studies the same case over two different points in time. 
Alternatively, Stake (225) has characterised three main types of case study: 
1. Intrinsic – to investigate a unique phenomenon 
2. Instrumental – uses a particular case  
3. Collective – use multiple cases 
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Figure 4.3: Case study design type proposed 
(adapted from Yin (43)pg46) 
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Implementation of the CM programme, as outlined in the Chapter 3, began across England in 2005 and 
was a relatively new service at the inception of the current research process. The significance of the 
service was its focus on the growing burden of the ageing population and increasing prevalence and extent 
of long term conditions (LTCs). The service was therefore considered a long term solution to the evolving 
health demographic by reducing reliance on acute services at times of crisis through better preventative 
management. Despite the shifting responsibility for outcomes and safety from healthcare workers to 
patients, to date, no research exists that explores the perspectives of its key stakeholders. Given this, the 
case study is revelatory in nature (43), and poses an opportunity to generate knowledge on a previously 
unexplored phenomenon.  By Stake’s (225) characteristics, the research is instrumental by using the CM 
programme as a particular case by which to explore safety. 
A non-probabilistic, purposive sampling method was utilised. Purposive sampling directed the 
recruitment of individual participants, which sought participants with specific characteristics (231). Firstly, 
NHS provider organisations were recruited to gain access to the service. All participants were selected 
based upon the following basic selection criteria: 
 Be older than 18 years of age 
 Be well enough to participate in the activity 
 Speak English 
 Be compos mentis 
4.4.1.2: Data collection techniques 
Case studies are not subject to a single data collection technique, but rather, are supported in a multiple 
method approach (43, 227), which supports the critical realist philosophy. Yin (43) presents six common 
data collections methods: direct observations, interviews, archival records, documents, participant 
observation and physical artefacts. However, this is not exhaustive and many more methods of qualitative 
data collection techniques can be used in the case study design. In addition to these, focus groups will also 
be discussed and their utilisation justified. 
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Archival record and document review have been conducted on publically available data on adverse events 
or patient safety incidents. Where relevant, these were accessed to draw conclusions on a fourth 
stakeholders’ perspective: the organisation.  
The research aim did not call for participant-observation in which the researcher is an active participant in 
the activities being conducted. Observation provides relatively little insight when exploring peoples’ 
perceptions through their expression of language. However, informal observations of the participants, 
their environments and their behaviour were noted during interview and focus group data collection, to 
draw on during analysis. Making observations of the social world is implicit in the daily activities one does: 
nurses observe their patients on the ward and police officers observe the gang of youths being disruptive 
at the local park. In a more social context, commuters observe the behaviour of fellow commuters on the 
train, or the shopper in a queue observes those ahead of them. It was this natural curiosity to observe that 
was utilised and documented as part of the research process. It is recognised that the process of 
observation loses some context but adds new dimensions (232). 
According to Yin (43), interviews enable the researcher to focus the discussion on a particular topic and 
explore in depth, generating insight on perceived causal inferences. The interview schedule is important in 
articulating questions. Interviews can be inaccurate due to poor recall and reflexivity where the respondent 
gives the interviewer responses that they want to hear (43). This research did not ask for participants to 
recall particular events and therefore this was not considered to be problematic. As with all qualitative 
research, the dynamics between the participants and researcher are influential on the data. The researcher 
endeavoured to encourage an open and honest dialogue to engage participants in open and honest 
conversation, in order to elicit knowledge of the socially constructed world. In essence, ‘how do 
participants perceive safety in relation to their home healthcare?’ 
Physical artefacts such as technical devices, instruments or works of art, can also be a useful source of 
evidence. During interviews some participants wanted to show physical artefacts such as mediation 
storage and bathrooms and this was documented in field notes. 
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Focus groups are another technique for collecting qualitative data. Bowling (231) describes focus groups 
as ‘unstructured interviews with small groups of people who interact with each other and the group leader’ (231)pg394. For a 
focus group, participants are assembled, an interactive discussion guided and personal experiences elicited 
to answer a research question (233). Focus groups, as a form of group interview offer an opportunity to 
collect multiple views and large amounts of data in a convenient and more time efficient manner (234). 
Furthermore, focus groups can enable participants to explore their own views with others, which is less 
likely in a one-to one interview with a stranger (234). However, Fern (235) demonstrated that focus 
groups did not produce significantly more or better ideas than individual interviews. Focus groups are 
commonly used in addition to other data collection techniques including in-depth interviews or surveys 
(236), both of which are being deployed here. Kitzinger (234) also recommends homogeneity within the 
group to avoid hierarchical structures forming; although diversity has its place in the focus group method. 
Limitations in the method include potential intimidation within the group that might inhibit interaction 
(237), which can be reduced with homogeneity. In this research, the focus groups were homogenous, 
consisting entirely of the CM nurses who deliver front line care.  
The dominant primary data collection techniques utilised were in-depth interviews and focus groups. In 
addition to these, the researcher made observations of the environment as well as behaviours exhibited by 
participants during the primary data collection. Furthermore, an informal examination of physical artefacts 
was warranted during some interviews, where participants brought them to the attention of the 
researcher.  
4.4.1.3: Data Analysis Techniques 
4.4.1.3.1: Modes of Inference 
Reasoning is a fundamental prerequisite for knowledge development. The ability to analyse, interpret and 
draw conclusions from data is critical to the research process. Danermark et al. (211) describe four modes 
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of inference that support and complement the philosophy of critical realism: deduction, induction, 
abduction and retroduction, each of which is described. 
Deduction is a logical mode of inference in which we draw valid conclusions based on correct premises. 
Its limitation lies in its inability to inform us of anything new about reality, beyond what is already known. 
Because its conclusions are analytical (conclusion is implicit in the premise), new knowledge cannot be 
gained about the abstract structure or mechanisms that make the phenomenon possible. 
Induction, like deduction is also a form a logical inference. However, inductive conclusions do not always 
follow the premise, but rather, entail the generation of new knowledge beyond the premise. Inductive 
knowledge draws conclusion of a larger population, over time, from a smaller sample. Also like deduction, 
induction is limited to inference of the empirically observed and lacks the capacity to identify underlying 
structures and mechanisms. Induction is also limited to a level of uncertainty of the generalisability and 
risks drawing the wrong conclusions despite the correct premise.  
In addition to the logical forms of inference (deduction and induction), critical realism supports abduction 
and retroduction. Abduction enables general patterns from observation to be described. From this, 
abduction enables inference of how something might be rather than deduction’s ability to prove that 
something must be (238). The essence of abduction is the possibility of gaining a deeper conceptualisation 
of something through interpretation (211), to reconceptualise by observing, describing, interpreting and 
placing in a new frame of ideas. Abduction is not an empirical generalisation, which can be achieved 
through induction, neither is it logically rigorous, which can be said of deduction, but generalisations of 
the case being examined can be made, but not extrapolated to larger, representative samples (44). 
Retroduction seeks to derive the underlying structures of the empirically observed, Danermark et al. (211) 
present retroduction as the: 
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‘…advancing from one thing (empirical observation of events) and arriving at something different (a 
conceptualisation of transfactual conditions). Where conditions are the circumstances that are required to 
exist.’ (211)pg96 
Although abduction and retroduction are not logically valid, they are complimentary to deductive and 
inductive inference by allowing knowledge of structures and mechanisms to be generated whilst 
recognising their limitations in line with critical realism. All four types of inference form the basis of 
knowledge generation in the critical realist paradigm, and thus were utilised in this research. 
4.4.1.3.2: Potential Data Analysis Techniques 
A variety of data analysis techniques were available to the researcher. The selection is dictated by a 
number of factors, including, but not limited, to the type of data collected, the purpose of the research 
and its underlying academic assumptions, and the philosophical position of the researcher. Discourse 
analysis, thematic analysis, interpretative phenomenological analysis and framework analysis are all suitable 
for the analysis of qualitative data; their suitability for the data collection methods outlined previously is 
discussed. 
Discourse analysis has multiple approaches and can be used on a wide variety of data including interview 
transcripts, samples of conversation and published literature (219). Reeves et al. (219) define discourse 
analysis as the study and analysis of language in order to reveal psychosocial characteristics of the 
generator.  However, this research is more concerned with understanding what people say and their 
perspective of a phenomenon rather than how or why it is said, and therefore discourse analysis was 
considered inappropriate for this purpose.  
Thematic analysis is most recognisably associated with the grounded theory strategy of research, first 
articulated by Glasser and Strauss (220) as a methodology. It analyses data by coding textual data in a 
systematic way to generate themes. Done in two phases, the first phase intensively codes small sections 
and the second phase applies the codes to larger exerts of text (239). Grounded theory analysis is iterative; 
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it should be conducted continuously throughout the data collection process, in order to inform further 
data collection. Adaptations of grounded theory coding have contributed to the development of thematic 
analysis as a method of analysis in its own right, without the need to have conducted a grounded theory 
study. However, both insist on the themes being drawn solely from the data, with little or no 
preconceptions to be made by the researcher. In fact, in the case of grounded theory, it is advised that a 
literature review not be conducted until after the primary data collection to prevent influence (220), and 
therefore neither were sufficiently suitable for the research to be conducted here. 
Another analytical approach is that of interpretative phenomenological analysis, which aims to explore 
psychological perspectives of a given topic (240, 241). Osborn (242) acknowledges the absence of a 
prescriptive method for conducting IPA and that it is more forgiving of the researcher’s influence and 
bias as the research instrument, and is associated with a constructivist philosophy. Consequently it was 
rejected as a plausible method of analysis for this critical realist study. 
Framework analysis, although originally designed for use in applied social policy research in the 1990’s 
(243), has since been applied to a broad spectrum of research (244-246) and has proved versatile. It is an 
analytical approach to qualitative data, which can be applied to answer research questions that fall into one 
or more of the following four categories (243): 
1. Contextual – identifying the form and nature of what exists 
 What are the perspectives of key stakeholders of safety in home healthcare and how 
does safety operate in the home? 
2. Diagnostic – examining the reasons, or causes for what exists 
 What factors contribute to the condition of safety? 
3. Evaluative – appraising the effectiveness of what exists 
 What affects the success or failure of a safe system?  
4. Strategic – identifying new theories, policies plans or actions 
 How can safety be measured better to encourage improvements? 
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As indicated previously, the research proposed can be considered from the perspective of any one of the 
four categories, therefore, demonstrating the applicability of the framework analysis technique to the 
research aim posed in this thesis. In addition to its relevance to the aim of this research, its suitability over 
other analysis techniques for use in this research lies within its acceptance of a priori influences over the 
thematic framework. Therefore, it is considerate of any model, or measurement domains identified from 
the literature prior to data collection. This makes it the most appropriate method of analysis for the 
qualitative data being collected in this research.  
Qualitative data is unstructured and unwieldy, and is usually presented in large volumes as textual script. 
The qualitative researcher is required to categorise, explore and map participant’s accounts, experiences 
and descriptions. Framework analysis provides a systematic and repeatable process for achieving this. In 
addition to the process, software such as NVivo (247) is available to enable the qualitative researcher to 
manage data more efficiently and will be used to facilitate the framework analysis of the qualitative data 
generated. Specifically, the researcher can index textual data into the thematic framework and use 
functions of the software to chart through framework matrices. Details of the process of conducting 
framework analysis are provided in the study protocol in Chapter 5. 
4.4.2: Study II – survey 
Surveys include multiple data collection techniques but are characterised by the systematic and structured 
collection of data of the same variables across at least 2 different cases (248).  Standardisation is 
fundamental and it is required that consistent answers are generated from consistent questions (249). 
Fink (250) identifies four forms of data collection technique for the survey design: self-administered 
questionnaires, interviews, structured record reviews and structured observation. Survey design specifically 
generates quantitative data in all forms of data collection (213). Using surveys, the qualitative findings can 
be extrapolated to be applicable to larger populations (44). 
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The benefits of using a self-administered questionnaire to gain opinions on the qualitative findings 
include: enabling engagement with larger populations, it is less resource intensive and it removes the 
researcher from the data collection process. The purpose of the survey is threefold: 
1. To determine the level of agreement with findings of the qualitative study 
2. To examine the differences between key stakeholder responses 
3. To contribute to the conceptual framework for safety measurement in home-delivered healthcare 
Quantitative data can be subjected to statistical analysis where ‘statistics is a branch of applied mathematics that 
deals with collecting, organising and interpreting data using well defined procedure’ (251) pg4. Statistics enable researchers 
to describe and summarise information, make predictions or generalisations and identify associations or 
relationships (251).  
The purpose of this study was to determine the representativeness of the findings from the study I. This 
was achieved by investigating the perspectives of a larger sample of key stakeholders through the use of a 
self-administered postal questionnaire. The items examined the level of agreement with key findings and 
enabled the opportunity to cross examine different stakeholder group’s responses. 
4.5: Validity 
The concept of validity differs between quantitative and qualitative approaches but it essentially serves the 
purpose to ensure the quality of the data collected and the interpretation of the results (42). 
4.5.1: Validity of  the qualitative approach 
Qualitative research serves a distinctively difference purpose to quantitative; primarily to explore the 
experiences of individuals, with little intent to generalise. Therefore, the way in which validity is 
determined must meet this different purpose. Guba and Lincoln (207) suggested a framework of four 
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criteria for assessing the quality of qualitative research: credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability. These address trustworthiness and authenticity rather than validity and reliability. 
Trochim and Donnelly (252) describe credibility of qualitative research as the believability of the results 
from the participants’ perspectives. Participants are seen as the best judge to determine the credibility of 
the results obtained from them. In the current research, the credibility of the findings was determined by 
asking the participants of study I to pilot the survey in study II, which was subsequently conducted in a 
fourth NHS provider organisation.   
Transferability, according to Guba and Lincoln (207), is the ability of the findings to be applied to other 
contexts and relates to external validity. Transferability is inherently difficult to establish in qualitative 
research. However, the quantitative study enabled some generalisations to be made and therefore 
supported the transferability of the qualitative study. 
Dependability is concerned with achieving the same results twice (252). This is also difficult to establish 
given the nature of qualitative research, which is built on the premise that everyone is subject to their own 
realities, influenced by their own experiences. Therefore, on any particular day, participants might respond 
differently, the interaction between the participant and researcher could change or the researcher might 
interpret differently. Similar to dependability, confirmability refers to the corroboration of findings 
between researchers rather than over time, which is limited by the same limitations as dependability. 
Despite difficulties associated with establishing trustworthiness and authenticity through credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability, the conduct of an exploratory sequential mixed method 
design, enhances the quality of the qualitative findings.   
Immy (232) describes four considerations for describing the validity of qualitative research. By being 
reflexive and transparent, by leaving an audit trail and ensuring naturalism of the participants, there is a 
mechanism for ensuring the quality of the research: 
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1. Reflexivity – continuously reflect on the researchers influence on the data 
2. Transparency – it is important to be transparent to demonstrate reflexivity through leaving an 
audit trail 
3. Audit trail – leave a record on the research design as the study progresses 
4. Naturalism – to use a design that reflects the beliefs of the participants and to leave them as 
undisturbed as possible 
Field notes were taken during and after the data collection, which included thoughts and experiences of a 
reflexive nature of the researcher. Finally, all data was collected at locations that had been selected by the 
participants themselves. 
4.5.2: Validity of  the quantitative approach 
The concept of validity for the quantitative approach can be divided into seven categories: face, construct, 
content, criterion-related, predictive, internal and external. The definition of these can be found in Table 
4.3: Types of quantitative validity. In addition to validity in the quantitative approach, one must consider 
the reliability of the instrument: the consistency and stability of the instrument over time. 
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Table 4.3: Types of quantitative validity 
Type of Validity Description of validity 
Face Validity The assessment of the logical link between the questions of the survey and the 
objectives of the study (253), which is achieved through subjective assessment by 
the investigators (231). 
Construct 
Validity 
To ascertain the contribution of each construct to the total variance of the 
observed phenomenon (253), and whether the item measures what it is intended 
to measure (42). 
Content Validity The assessment of the representativeness to ensure full coverage of the range of 
issues (42). 
Criterion related 
validity 
Whether the results relate to an external standard (42), comparison to a gold 
standard (231). 
Predictive 
Validity 
The degree to which an instrument can foresee an outcome (253). 
Internal validity If there is a relationship, is it causal (42), and  the extent to which the investigator 
can conclude there is a cause and effect relationship (254) 
External Validity The application to a larger population (231) in order to generalise (254) 
 
4.5.3: Triangulation 
Triangulation, as argued by Denzin (255), has the potential to reduce investigator bias and raise the 
researcher ‘above the personalistic biases that stem from single methodologies. By combining methods and investigators in the 
same study, observers can partially overcome the deficiencies that flow from one investigator or method’ (255)pg300. This can 
be achieved in four ways (256): 
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1. Data triangulation – the use of different sources in an effort to see if what we are observing and 
reporting carries the same meaning when found under different circumstances (this includes 
different times, places , people and groups of people) 
2. Investigator triangulation – use of multiple investigators to analyse and interpret data 
3. Theory triangulation  -using multiple theoretical viewpoints to analyse data, normally from 
multiple investigators 
4. Methodological triangulation – use of multiple methods to collect data 
In addition to this, Yin (43) expands on data triangulation as having two conditions: convergence of 
evidence and non-convergence of evidence. Convergence of evidence occurs when the facts of a single 
study are corroborated by multiple sources. Non-convergence occurs when multiple sources have been 
used but not to confirm facts, but typically to compare.   
4.6: Summary 
This research is predicated on a critical realist’s view of reality and thus the design presented in this 
chapter is aligned to the critical realist philosophy; there is a reality independent of the mind, which is 
influenced by underlying, unobservable mechanisms. Consequently, a sequential, exploratory mixed 
method has been deployed to meet the critical realist philosophy and the demands of the research 
question that require exploration of perspectives and generalisability of findings. As part of a qualitative 
study (study I), a case study of the CM programme will be conducted primarily using interviews with 
patients and carers and focus groups with staff (CM nurses). Other methods might be utilised informally 
such as observation and physical artefact examination. These findings will be tested in a quantitative study 
(study II), using a survey to determine the level of agreement with the findings from a larger population. 
From this, a framework for safety measurement can be proposed that is reflective of key stakeholders of 
the CM programme. 
The research design has enabled both data triangulation and methodological triangulation. Data 
triangulation will be conducted in a non-convergent matter: multiple stakeholder views will be collected to 
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compare rather than corroborate. The mixed method design has utilised both qualitative and quantitative 
data collection strategies (case study and survey) and multiple data collection techniques (primarily 
interview, focus group and questionnaires). 
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  Chapter 5
Study protocols 
5.1: Introduction 
In Chapter 4, the research design was constructed following an examination of those available in the 
literature. A sequential, exploratory mixed method was proposed, incorporating a case study and a survey. 
The case study was deployed in study I, with the aim of understanding safety from the perspectives of 
three key stakeholders; namely patients, carers and case management (CM) nurses. The survey was 
deployed in study II to determine if some of the key findings were applicable to a larger population and to 
uncover any differences between the stakeholder groups. This chapter presents the two study protocols as 
they were conducted in the current research. 
5.2: Study I protocol 
Study I aimed to achieve three things: 
1. An understanding of the perspectives of safety in the case management (CM) programme 
2. Validation of the integrated safety measurement model (ISMM) developed in Chapter 3  
3. To devise dimensions of measurement for each domain of the model, that are derived from 
understanding contributing factors as perceived by the three key stakeholder groups identified. 
This study was awarded a favourable ethical opinion by South Birmingham Research Ethics Committee 
(see Appendix 1). Subsequently, all other approvals were granted from each participating organisation, 
however, in order to maintain confidentiality, these are not included. 
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5.2.1: Setting and participants 
In order to engage with a larger population, three NHS organisations were recruited. They were 
conveniently selected; they were the first three approached who agreed to participate. Upon completion 
of all the necessary procedures and on approvals being granted, recruitment began. Study I engaged with 
three stakeholder groups. CM nurses and patients were included in this study following their identification 
as key stakeholders from the literature. Prior to the commencement of the research, the ISMM was 
presented to a group of CM nurses registered on a post-graduate qualification in long term conditions, 
who proposed the inclusion of carers in the study because they perceived them to be vital in the care of 
this patient group. Subsequently, carers were incorporated into the design of the research. 
5.2.1.1: Case management nurse recruitment and participation 
Presentations were delivered at a monthly team meeting of each organisation. This allowed the researcher 
to fully inform and interact with potential participants and answer any questions arising from the 
presentation. Attendees were provided with a staff participant information sheet (PIS) (Appendix 2) and 
Consent Form (Appendix 3). Contact details of those interested were obtained. A decision to participate 
was not required at the time of the presentation; attendees were given two weeks to go away, read the 
written material and make an informed decision. After two weeks, those who had shown an interest by 
leaving their details were contacted, and written consent gained by means of a signed consent form. Those 
who were unable to attend the presentation were sent the written material via the local collaborator. 
Those who had not left their details were encouraged to contact the researcher directly, should they 
choose to participate.  
In total, 17 staff members agreed to participate in the study. All were female and all held a community 
matron or case manager post. For anonymity, the names of the participating NHS organisations are not 
provided, however the staff participant numbers can be seen in Table 5.1: Staff participant numbers. 
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Table 5.1: Staff participant numbers 
NHS organisation  Participant Numbers 
Trust 1 (T1) 4 
Trust 2 (T2) 8 
Trust 3 (T3) 5 
Total 17 
 
5.2.1.2: Patient and carer recruitment and participation 
During the recruitment presentations delivered at the team meetings, where CM nurses were recruited, all 
CM nurse members of the team were asked to identify and recruit patients and carers through the delivery 
of a recruitment pack upon their next natural visit. The following selection criteria were used to 
purposively identify potential patient and carer participants: 
 Must be aged 18 or over 
 Must be a patient or carer of a patient being case managed 
 Must be able to speak English 
 Must be able to participate in an interview for approximately an hour 
Patients and carers who were identified as suitable by the CM nurses were given a recruitment pack, 
which included a patient participant information sheet (PIS) (Appendix 4), and a carer PIS (Appendix 5), 
and an eligibility questionnaire (Appendix 6). The PIS advised patients and carers of the study, their 
potential involvement and asked them to complete and return the eligibility questionnaire. Patients, who 
returned the questionnaire and expressed an interest in participating, were contacted via telephone. An 
appointment was made to conduct the interview at a location, date and time convenient for them. All 
participants requested the interview take place in their home and the researcher accommodated all 
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requests. Patients and carers signed a consent form (Appendix 7) prior to the commencement of the 
interview. 
Although it was originally intended that patient and carer interviews would be conducted separately, two 
groups of respondents (two patients and two carers), instigated by the patient, requested that the 
interviews be conducted as one. This was because they did not feel comfortable or confident to 
participate in isolation from their carer. Given that this supported the notion of the importance and 
reliance on carers, the researcher felt it was important to explore their joint views rather than to omit their 
views. The analysis attempted to disentangle their views where they reflected only one of the participant 
groups. It is acknowledged that in qualitative interviewing, the process is co-creative and thus influence is 
naturally exerted onto participants when describing their experiences (257). Parahoo (258) explains that an 
interview with couples generates the potential for three different perspectives: the researcher/participant 
one, the researcher/participant two and the researcher/participant one and two. Therefore, by conducting 
them jointly, the third perspective has been gained. The presence of the partner can inhibit or facilitate the 
narrative (259), therefore, the researcher actively observed the nature of their behaviour, language, and 
interactions and considered it in the interpretation of the data. 
The qualitative nature of the single case study limits the use of statistical inference and thus the sample 
size denotes less importance than in a quantitative study. Rather, in qualitative research, the term 
‘saturation’ is frequently used to determine the sample size as the process persists. Saturation is the point 
at which no new information is being extracted from participants and therefore, continuing to collect data 
holds no value as nothing new is being learned. Guest et al. (260) examined the operationalisation of the 
saturation concept and found it to be inadequate in the literature. Guest et al. (260) set out to identify a 
figure, which could be quoted to support proposals and protocol development prior to data collection. In 
doing so, they found that data saturation occurred within the first 12 interviews with basic metathemes 
being present from 6. Therefore 15 patients and carers (in total) were recruited. 
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Patient and carer configuration is detailed in Table 5.2: Patient and carer participant numbers. In total, 
patient participation was 9 (Pn=9) and carer participation was 6 (Cn=6).  
Table 5.2: Patient and carer participant numbers 
NHS organisation Patient Interviews Carer Interviews Joint Interviews 
T1 1 1 0 
T2 3 2 2 
T3 3 1 0 
Patients and carers are coded in the thesis as follows: 
 CP*** and CC*** are patients and carers, respectively of Trust 1 (T1) 
 DP*** and DC*** are patients and carer, respectively, of Trust 2 (T2) 
 NC*** and NP*** are patients and carers, respectively, of Trust 3 (T3) 
5.2.2: Data collection 
5.2.2.1: Case management nurse data collection 
Qualitative focus groups were held with CM nurses at convenient locations within the host organisation, 
arranged by the local collaborator. Dates and times were agreed between participants to ensure all of those 
who were interested in participating were able to do so. The focus groups lasted 1h 35m (T1), 1h 25m 
(T2), and 2h 02m (T3), which is approximately within the parameters defined by Robinson (261) of 
between 1-2 hours. They were held in private rooms, which limited interruptions, and were within close 
proximity to amenities such as toilets and refreshments. Participants were able to leave for breaks at any 
time and help themselves to refreshments throughout. Robinson (261) defines focus groups as being 
typically 5-8 participants; however, one group was restricted to four members due to the comparatively 
small size of the team being invited to participate. 
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The focus group schedule was designed with the assumption that the focus group would take 1 hour and 
30 minutes. Therefore time was allocated to an introduction (15 minutes), model review (15 minutes) and 
idea generation (65 minutes). The introduction was an opportunity for the researcher and participants to 
introduce themselves to one another. The model review enabled participants to look at and critically 
appraise the ISMM, which was presented to them. Following this, participants were encouraged to express 
their perspectives of safety in relation to: what safety in the home means; the conditions and actions, 
which support or fail it; and the outcomes of safety. Because the research was interested in understanding 
the perspectives of safety, no pre-determined questions were devised to bias the conversation; however, a 
flexible plan (as per timing details above) was implemented to manage time. The researcher actively 
interacted in the discussion in order to fully explore ideas, concepts and perspectives identified in the 
focus groups. This was done carefully to avoid introducing new ideas that were not identified by 
participants.  
Field notes were taken during the interviews and further documentation was taken immediately after 
leaving the organisation. Focus groups were digitally recorded and videoed with consent obtained from all 
participants. Data was transcribed by an external company (TypeOut (262)), which is used by the 
University of Warwick for transcription services and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
1998 (263). Participation was confidential and the data was anonymised so only the researcher would 
know who had participated or have access to the single file that could identify participants. 
5.2.2.2: Patient and carer data collection 
Qualitative, in-depth interviews were conducted with nine patients and six carers. Single interviews, which 
were expected to last up to an hour but across the cohort, varied from between 31m to 1h 13m. The two 
joint interviews lasted 01:24 and 01:37. The focus group interview schedule was deployed in order to be 
able to cross compare the findings across all participant groups. Details of the focus group schedule can 
be found in 5.2.2.1: Case management nurse data collection. Field notes were taken during the interviews 
and further documentation was taken immediately after leaving the property. All data was collected at the 
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patients’ and carers’ homes, as requested by them, at dates and times suitable to them. Interviews were 
digitally recorded with consent from all participants, transcribed verbatim using an external source 
(TypeOut (262)) and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (263). Participation was 
confidential and the data was anonymised so that only the researcher would know who had participated 
and have access to the single file that could identify participants.  
5.2.3: Data analysis 
Framework analysis (243) was conducted on all transcribed data collected, enabled by NVivo (247). 
Framework analysis was conducted using the five step process: familiarisation, identification of a thematic 
framework, indexing, charting and mapping (243). The formal, documented process for conducting 
framework analysis can be found in Table 5.3: Process of framework analysis. Translation of this into 
practice has been described here.  
Prior to commencement of analysis, the a priori framework was developed, which included five 
overarching key domains derived from both the literature and the experience of the data collection: 
1. Definition of safety 
2. Multiple key stakeholders 
3. Structures 
4. Processes 
5. Outcomes 
The framework was applied to the patient and carer data, which were treated as a single unit of analysis 
because of the combining of two of the participant couples’ interviews. However, where differences did 
occur, they were documented. The same framework was applied to the CM nurse data, which were 
treated as a different unit of analysis. Where relevant, new themes were populated and attributed to CM 
nurses. In addition, differences in previously identified themes were documented. 
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Following the transcription of the audio recordings, all were checked by the researcher to ensure no 
meaning or data had been lost. Audio files were listened to with the transcripts, for the researcher to 
reacquaint themselves with the discourse context of the transcriptions and additional notes were made, 
concluding the familiarisation phase.   
From the listening process, further themes were identified within the five overarching domains. These 
themes were coded in NVivo (247) as nodes (thematic). The transcripts were uploaded to NVivo (247), 
re-examined and all of the text allocated to the previously identified themes in the process of indexing. In 
some cases, no theme appeared appropriate to allocate the text to and thus a new theme was generated.  
Following indexing, the sections of texts within the themes were charted into a table. An example of a 
chart can be found in Appendix 8. The left hand column of the chart detailed the themes and/or sub-
themes found, and the top row identified the participant or focus group. This enabled the researcher to 
determine the level of presence each theme had across the participants. Where data is presented as a 
theme in Chapter 6, it infers a level of agreement across a large proportion of participants. The charting 
process identified some themes and subthemes that lacked a consistent presence across participants. 
Where this was the case, data was: amalgamated with another theme where appropriate; used as isolated 
examples; or disregarded. 
Relationships that were identified during the course of the analysis were mapped. Finally, the data were 
interpreted in relation to the current understanding available in the literature: this has been conducted in 
Chapter 8. 
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Table 5.3: Process of framework analysis 
(adapted from (243)) 
Step Description 
Familiarisation The process of becoming familiar with the data by listening to audiotapes, 
and reading transcripts and field notes. This is best achieved with all data; 
however, if the data set is large, a sample can be selected. For this study, 
familiarisation was feasible with all data collected. 
Identification of a thematic 
framework 
Themes are identified following the familiarisation step, which will have 
multiple sources. These sources include issues and theory informed by the 
original research aims and objectives that were present in the interview 
guides, emergent issues raised by participants and analytical themes 
derived from the recurrence of participant views and experiences. 
Indexing The systematic application of the thematic framework to all of the data 
set in its textual form. In a single passage, multiple themes can be present 
and need to be referenced. 
Charting Data can now be removed from their original context and rearranged 
according to their theme. Each chart might be of a theme, and each 
column represents a subtheme. Each row contains quoted data of 
individual participants. 
Mapping and Interpretation Key characteristics can be drawn from the data and an interpretation can 
be made. It is here that the researcher can define concepts, map the 
nature of phenomena, create typologies, find associations, provide 
explanations and develop strategies 
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5.3: Study II protocol 
The purpose of this study was twofold: to quantify the level of agreement of an additional sample of a 
case managed population with the qualitative findings of study I; and, to examine the perspectives of each 
of the key stakeholder groups and identify any statistically significant differences. A substantial 
amendment was made to the original ethics application and granted approval by South Birmingham 
Research Ethics Service (see Appendix 9). 
5.3.1: Data collection 
A fourth NHS organisation granted approval for the study to be conducted within its clinical case 
management service. Following advice from the ethics committee, the survey was piloted with the original 
patient and carer participants, over fears that the language was incomprehensible. A glossary was inserted 
to ensure all participants had the same understanding of some of the terms. All of the patient and carer 
participants were asked to participate, however due to ill-health or death, only two patients and two carers 
were retained. Conducting the study in a fourth organisation i.e. a different organisation to those that 
participated in study I, was perceived to improve transferability and credibility of the findings, therefore 
allowing the findings to be generalised.  
5.3.1.1: Patient and carer data collection 
A list of all of the patients on the case load was obtained following ethical approval. As this list contained 
the names and addresses of patients, it was not handled by the researcher, but rather an appointed person 
within the organisation’s research and development department. There were 807 patients on the list. A 
random number sequence was generated from an online random number generator (264). The sequence 
was assigned to the patient list in a Microsoft, Excel spread sheet (265). The patient names were then re-
ordered in ascending order. An invite to participants included: the participant invitation sheet (Appendix 
10); and two surveys (Appendix 11), which was posted with a reply envelope to the first 200 patients 
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(numbers 1 - 200). This was repeated in batches of 200 until all patients on the list had been invited to 
participate. The surveys were posted in batches of 200 for two reasons. Firstly, if the response rate was 
deemed sufficient, given that the invites were posted in a random order, there would have been no need 
to invite more, reducing the burden on patients to participate and maintaining an ethical position. 
Secondly, production and management of the survey invites was time consuming and intensive; breaking 
them into batches improved the manageability of the task. Each batch of two hundred took 
approximately 5 days to despatch and this was achieved over several weeks.  
The invites were personalised to each patient and requested the participation of their carer, if they had 
one. Although the study had selection criteria (see Table 5.4: Selection criteria for study II), the researcher 
was unable to know which of the patients on the case load met them. Therefore, patients self-selected. 
Informed consent was assumed with each completed questionnaire, as was the fact that the participant 
had sufficient competency of the English language to comprehend the questions.  
Table 5.4: Selection criteria for study II 
Selection Criteria 
A patient on a  case management programme, a carer of a patient on a case management programme or a 
CM nurse 
Over the aged of 18 years old 
Competent to read and understand English 
Capable of providing informed consent 
5.3.1.2: Case management nurses data collection 
CM nurses were invited to participate via email, sent by the clinical case manager lead. The body of the 
email contained the invite and requested the attached participant information sheet (Appendix 10) and 
survey (Appendix 11) be printed and return by post to the researcher. This invite was repeated twice. 
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Following a poor return rate, the clinical case manager lead handed out the participant information sheets 
and surveys at the team meeting and offered CM nurses the opportunity to complete them during the 
team meeting. 
5.3.2: Data Analysis 
For quantitative data, analysis can be broadly categorised into either descriptive statistical analysis or 
inferential statistical analysis. Descriptive statistics were undertaken in Microsoft, Excel (265). Inferential 
statistics were undertaken in SPSS (266). 
Descriptive statistics were applied to all of the questions in the form of frequency and/or percentages and 
are presented using graphs such as bar charts where applicable. Given the small sample size, it was 
deemed inappropriate to attempt to use inferential statistics to establish any association between groups. 
5.4: Summary 
Two studies were conducted using the protocols detailed above. The findings are presented in Chapter 6 
for study I and Chapter 7 for study II. They are jointly discussed in Chapter 8. 
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  Chapter 6
Study I 
A qualitative exploration of  key stakeholder perspectives of  
safety in healthcare delivered in the home 
6.1: Introduction  
The integrated safety measurement model (ISSM), proposed in Chapter 3, captures the key stakeholders 
of the case management (CM) programme, as evident in the published literature. Additionally, it proposes 
three dimensions from which to approach the measurement of safety to ensure a comprehensive 
assessment is achieved. Presentation of the ISMM to a group of case management (CM) nurses resulted in 
the incorporation of carers into the methodology. Chapter 4 identified the critical realist position of the 
researcher, described and explained the adoption of a mixed methods approach and discussed the 
appropriate data collection and analysis techniques available. The study protocol has been provided in 
Chapter 5.  
This chapter explores the perspectives of three of the key stakeholders (patients, carers and CM nurses) 
and the conditions that they believe, support or fail the generation of safety through the exploration of 
structures, processes and outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of study I, 
which aimed to understand the perceived contributing factors to safety in home healthcare, and in the 
process, qualitatively validate the ISMM. Little discussion of the findings is offered here, except where to 
justify further investigation. Discussion of the work is available in Chapter 8. 
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6.2: Findings 
The interviews and focus groups conducted were constructed and performed to explore five key themes. 
These five key themes formed the a prior framework, which was built on and added to during the 
familiarisation and thematic framework development stages. The thematic framework can be found in 
Appendix 12. These themes are presented here. Table 6.1: Participants of study I, details the coding of the 
participants and aligns them with the units of analysis (please refer to Table 4.3). 
Table 6.1: Participants of study I 
Unit of Analysis Identification Code 
Patients and Carer Patients Carers   
CP001 CC001   
DP002 DC002   
DP003 DC003   
DP004 DC004 joint interview 
DP006 DC001 joint interview 
DP005 NC001   
NP001    
NP005    
NP006     
Case management 
nurses 
T1 (n=4)     
T2 (n=8)    
T3 (n=5)     
6.2.1: Definition of  safety 
CM nurses participating in focus groups, and patients and carers participating in interviews, were asked to 
explore the definition of safety. Initially, some patients and carers struggled to articulate what being safe in 
the home meant: “I’m stumped…I will have to come back to that one” (DC003), but most were able to at least 
describe safety, if not define safety i.e. give an account of the characteristics rather than explicitly give a 
meaning. The themes identified within each group are presented here (and visualised in Figure 6.1: 
Thematic framework for the a priori theme of ‘definition of safety.), comparisons are drawn between CM 
nurses, and patients and carers, and definitions described. 
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Figure 6.1: Thematic framework for the a priori theme of ‘definition of safety 
Safety was commonly described by the CM nurses as the action or process of risk reduction for the 
purpose of preventing harm. This was expressed by participants across all three focus groups, examples 
can be found in Table 6.1: Examples of risk reduction. In addition, one particular CM nurse expressed the 
interchangeable nature of the terms safety and risk: “I think instead of safety you could almost substitute risk 
actually, I think they’re, I think they’re actually interchangeable in this coz we tend to think of risks” (T1). This was then 
accepted by the other three participants of that particular focus group. Similarly, patients and carers in this 
study also expressed risk reduction as a component of safety (also see Table 6.2). However, as is evident 
in Table 6.2, patients and carers don’t use words like ‘avoiding harm’, unlike the CM nurses, instead 
choosing to describe activities that they believe contribute to safety, which involve reducing the risk of 
harm. In addition, patients and carers described preparedness as a component of risk reduction; to be 
ready to implement risk reduction at a later date as their disease deteriorates. For example, CP001 talks 
about how she has purchased a sofa bed for the lounge, ready for the day that she can no longer get up 
the stairs as a result of her chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD): “originally I was going to make the 
bedroom down here, because this goes into a bed, we brought it especially…but I didn’t want to go down that avenue until it 
was really desperate” (CP001). 
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As indicated in Table 6.1, CM nurses strive to prevent patients coming to harm. In addition to this, they 
suggest that safe healthcare is unachievable. One CM nurse said: “I'm not sure that there's any such thing as safe 
healthcare” (T3). Another said “I think with things like safety you can reduce risk, but you can’t always guarantee” (T2). 
Some CM nurses did place some onus on the patients and their family for being unable to ensure safety: 
“I mean one mustn’t just say that I won’t come to harm because patients can be living with family who are actually abusing 
them” (T1), but this was not consistently expressed across the three groups. 
Another component of safety expressed by the CM nurses was the concept of compliance to best practice 
and evidence based care. Evidence of this can be seen in Table 6.2: An example of compliance with best 
practice. 
Table 6.2: Examples of risk reduction 
CM nurse quotes Patient and carer quotes 
“So whatever we’re doing we’re trying to steer them or 
support them or guide them, um, in ways that they don’t 
come to any harm because that’s not what we want them to, 
to come to.” (T1) 
“He just generally keeps an eye on me; if I have to come 
down in the night to go to the bathroom he comes with me, I 
have to wake him up and he comes with me…because I’m 
frighten to come down on my own, in case I’m taken ill” 
(CP001) 
I think it stood out to me that there was no sort of mention 
of risk management within that definition of safety. (T3) 
“I try and be responsible, you know, not put myself into 
anything, to a dangerous position when I’m on my own.” 
(DP002) 
“We assess them for risk of things like pressure sores which 
is detrimental to safety.” (T2) 
“Well, to me her would never get in the bath, right, and I 
thought well the best thing to do is get rid of the bath and 
have the shower where it is and hers got more room to hang 
onto thing” (DC002) 
“I suppose that it means that you are delivering healthcare 
that’s going to keep the patient safe and it’s not going to 
cause them any harm.” (T2) 
“Making sure there’s no obstacles that you can fall over… 
That’s why I had fitted carpets in the hall and passage, 
because I’d got loose carpets.” (NP001) 
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Table 6.3: An example of compliance with best practice 
Transcript of conversation in T3 
“I mean we've got, we've got to put in there somewhere haven't we evidence based care.” 
“So we’re not just going round willy nilly on a whim.” 
“Making things up.” 
“Yeah make things up as we go, we stick to what we know is tried and tested through research.” 
“Yeah so, so we’re, we’re approaching it from the point of view that we’re delivering the highest standard of care as we can.” 
Three themes were identified by the CM nurses in relation to the definition of safety, these were: risk 
reduction; compliance to best practice; and the unattainable nature of safety in healthcare. In addition to 
this, T1 did distinguish between different outcomes of patient safety. They differentiated between 
psychological safety: “But to me emotional and psychological safety for the patient as well too” (T1) and social safety: “I 
want to make a point about social safety as well bearing in mind physical and emotional safety and nowadays families are 
fragmented and you may have somebody living in a block of flats, families may be miles away and they [patients] have lots of 
services going in but nothing really substitutes for that close family support” (T1). Furthermore, participants of T1 
believed that patients would place greatest emphasis on, and be most concerned about their physical 
safety. This differentiation wasn’t made by the other focus groups, however, T3 did raise the question of 
staff safety, but didn’t expand on this; they just presented it as a component of safety. 
Patients and carers shared the belief with CM nurses that risk reduction was a component of safety, but 
this was as far as their common agreement went. Patients and carers didn’t use words such as harm or 
adverse event; instead they discussed specific events that were relevant to them, commonly falls. Patients 
and carers also believed that meeting patient needs by being ‘looked after’ was a component of what it 
meant to be safe. When asked what safe home healthcare was, one patient responded: “it’s to know that 
somebody is there to look after me in case I’m ill” (CP001), another: “What it means is somebody looking after you, just to 
help out” (NP006). The meeting of needs was expressed by some of the CM nurses too, but not to the extent 
and consistency across participants as the patients and carers did.  
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Another theme identified from the patient and carer data was that of the contribution made by carers. 
The 24 hour nature of the carer role inherently places some responsibility on them, as well as the 
obligation of spouses to perform this role regardless. 
“Well I am aren’t I, 24 hours a day, yes… Because I mean okay when DP004 goes to hospital the nurses 
attend to her there, but when she’s back I'm her nurse really for 24 hours a day.” (DC004) 
Wherever I can, I try to keep an eye on it as well you know… Well I would as her husband anyway, 
wouldn't I?   (CC001) 
The CM nurse perspective of safety shared in common with patients and carers the concept of risk 
reduction. However, CM nurses gave focus to compliance with best practice and acknowledged an 
inability to guarantee safety. Conversely, patients and carers discussed safety in the context of 
meeting needs and acknowledged the role of the carer, and to some extent themselves, by 
participating in risk reduction activities. 
6.2.2: The existence of  multiple stakeholders 
The existence of multiple stakeholders was identified from the literature and presented in the ISMM, and 
thus, formed a prior theme in the framework analysis approach. Stakeholders were considered to be those 
who had a role or a contribution to make in ensuring the safety of patients who are being cared for in 
their homes. From the data, three key themes arose: the role of patients; the irreplaceable role of carers; 
and the role of many other provider organisations and their staff (see Figure 6.2: The existence of multiple 
stakeholders). 
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Figure 6.2: The existence of multiple stakeholders 
6.2.2.1: Patients as stakeholders 
Some patients, and carers of patients, who identified patients as stakeholders of safety, acknowledged the 
patient role as one of compliance. For example, DP003 expressed their role to be ‘to do as told’: 
 “I think I have a responsibility to do as I’m asked and to make sure as I umm, stick to the, the drugs that 
I’m provided with and not abuse them, because I, I’d hate to do so, you know, the drugs, when I’m trying to 
help you. So that’s a responsibility of mine.” (DP003) 
NP005 places ultimate responsibility on the patient and in contrast to DP003, affords patients the 
opportunity to choose whether or not to comply:  
“Yes, yes, the patient is bigger than the other three, if you like, because ultimately any decision taken by the 
other three bodies or people must come finally from yourself. They cannot make the decision for you.” (NP005) 
Although not many patients and carers explicitly acknowledged the role of patients in patient safety, all 
patients and carers described activities, which they undertook to reduce the risk of harm. Examples of this 
have been provided in Table 6.1, where patients and carers were defining safety as the activity of risk 
reduction.  
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CM nurses in T2 talked about the role of the patient in relation to their capabilities: “I think some patients are 
more able to than others” (T2). Whereas T3 discussed how focus and attention was given to other parts of the 
system, such as the structures and processes, but not the patients: “I think my point is all the reporting we do is 
around the structure and the process and around the staff and the provider but not necessarily” (T3). 
It appears that there was some agreement as to the involvement and contribution of patients, however, 
the exact nature of this role remains unclear. Where some patients believed that ultimate responsibility for 
decision making lay with them, others felt their role was to be compliant with orders. CM nurses 
acknowledge that the capability of the patient determines the level of responsibility they should be 
afforded, but conversely, also place some of the final responsibility on patients as ultimate decision 
makers. 
6.2.2.2: Informal carers as stakeholders 
It was acknowledged that patients had a role, although the nature of this role was not consistently defined. 
Where there was consistency, was in the role and responsibility of informal carers performed by friends 
and family. 
The CM nurses acknowledged that it was important not to forget the carers’ involvement in looking after 
the patients, as they provided more care than people realise. The importance of carers was epitomised by 
this quote: “they’re kind of linchpins when they are involved” (T1). This particular team felt that the contribution 
carers made was vital, predominantly because they felt that they linked the patient with healthcare 
professionals, providing information and being the voice of the patient; acting as an advocate. They also 
believed that as resources decrease, greater onus would be placed onto them. Supporting quotes from the 
T1 focus group for carers as stakeholders can be found in Table 6.3: Examples of the importance of 
carers from T1.  
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Table 6.4:Examples of the importance of carers from T1 
CM nurse quotes from T1 
“They’re linking the patient, they’re linking with staff because they’re providing lots of information as well, so they’re sort of 
being the voices for the patient as well.” (T1) 
“There’s less and less formal services around, there’s less money to go around that it will be more of an onus on sort of family 
and informal carers.” (T1) 
In relation to the ISMM, T2 were confused as to where carers might be placed because they were not 
included on the original model. They discussed them as a provider, but didn’t believe this quite met the 
definition of provider in the ‘strictest sense’, and concluded that they needed to be clearly identified as a 
separate stakeholder. 
Patients, who had carers, and the carers themselves, also expressed the importance of the carer role. From 
just keeping an eye on patients: “he just generally keeps an eye on me” (CP001), to being the informant to the 
healthcare professionals: “she [wife carer] has a lot of input into, well I’ll tell you, they’ll grass me up if I don’t do 
something, if I’m trying to be clever or they’ll warn me to you know, be sensible” (DP003). This concurs with the CM 
nurses perspective, where they believed that the carers were a source of information on the patient. Carers 
expressed a sense of duty of care for their loved ones: “Whenever I can, I try and keep an eye on it as well you 
know, well I would as her husband anyway, wouldn’t I?” (CC001). One carer acknowledged the care that the CM 
nurses provided, but attributed final responsibility and demand to himself: “They do have their work cut out 
you know, but by and all it’s myself that looks after her. I want to do anyway” (NC001). Evidence has been provided to 
demonstrate the role of informal carers in the care of this particular patient population.  
6.2.2.3: Multiple provider organisations and their staff as stakeholders 
This project selected the CM programme as the target population. Despite the large input made by this 
service to patients, many other services and providers are also heavily involved. The types of organisations 
involved varied according to the needs of the patients. For instance, one patient (DP006) received help 
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from a charity for the blind because his diabetes had severely affected his sight. This same patient 
frequently used the services of an optician. Other more commonly used services and organisations 
included: the council and social services; hospitals and specialist consultants; other community allied 
health professionals, the GP and third sector organisations. Given the variation and complexity of the 
health of this patient population, the types of services utilised were broad, especially when concerning 
specialist voluntary organisations as shown by the diabetic patient. The CM nurses participating in the 
focus groups listed the same types of organisations as patients and carers. This has been presented 
graphically and can be seen in Figure 6.3: Types of organisations involved in the care of NHS case 
managed patients.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Types of organisations involved in the care of NHS case managed patients 
Participants in T3 discussed some concerns they had observed with private care providers, and implicated 
them heavily in the safety of patients: 
“I’ve just had to deal with an adult referral for one of my chaps who had dementia and COPD and heart 
failure because the care agency were documenting that they were giving him his medication and they weren’t, as 
a result he had a hospital admission and was ill.”(T3) 
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In this example, the participants are highlighting that non-NHS care providers and their staff contribute 
to patient safety. Therefore, it is important to realise that the providers of care, and similarly the staff, are 
not solely those of the NHS, but many other organisations who assist in the management of this patient 
group, as can be seen in Figure 6.1. These providers are broad and can be specific to the nature of the 
disease being suffered by the patient. 
6.2.3: Structure of  care delivered in the home 
All participants were  forthcoming with structures of care, which contribute to the safety of patients and 
nine key themes were identified (see Figure 6.4: Thematic framework for the domain of structure). An 
explanation for each as a dimension of structure is discussed in the proceeding sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Thematic framework for the domain of structure 
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6.2.3.1: Equipment 
Equipment was a key theme that emerged from across all of the participants in the study. The majority of 
patients and carers discussed equipment, referring to the positive impact its provision had had on their 
lives. For example, DP005 had recently had a stair lift fitted to assist him up and down the stairs because 
he felt he was at risk of falling: 
“Also, had a stair lift fitted a few weeks ago, um because I was having trouble getting up and down stairs, 
and it was a bit of a risk coming downstairs, although it wasn’t risky going up it was difficult” (DP005) 
Others expressed how essential the equipment was to their wellbeing: 
“the machinery that's provided now ... well I think I'd ... you know, if they took it off me, I would be 
extremely, extremely stressed” (DP003) 
“If it hadn’t been for all the medication and the various aids she’s been given… I think she’d have been in 
and out of the hospital all the time.” (CC001) 
In some cases, patients and carers discussed the negative implications, which were experienced 
when equipment wasn’t available to them. DP003 (DC003’s husband), can’t get up the stairs to get 
to bed because he gets out of breath, so he sleeps on the sofa in the lounge: “A stair lift so he hasn’t 
got to sleep on the settee…because he gets out of breathe going to bed.” (DC003). After the recorder was turned 
off, DP003 explained that he slept on the sofa, rather than have a bed in the lounge, because the 
lounge was the social place where his family visited and he did not want to compromise this 
(permission was granted to use this in the thesis). Inadequate equipment provision can impact on 
carers also, DP006 and DC001 explain: 
DP006: “Erm – a shower would help considerably” 
Interviewer: “What difference would that make?” 
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DC001: “A lot – it would be a lost easier, especially for me.” 
More examples can be found in Table 6.4: Examples of patient and carer quotes in relation to the 
absence of equipment. 
Table 6.5: Examples of patient and carer quotes in relation to the absence of equipment 
Patient and Carer Quotes 
DP006: “It would be a lot easier. I’m not very good on my legs at all, and it’s blooming awkward to stand in the bath.” 
DC001: “So when I wash him and he turns round he has to hold onto a wall, because he couldn’t just stand up on his own” 
“And, the same thing could apply to the front door, but apparently Social Services said, we can only fund one half step 
[laughing].” (DP005) 
Patients and carers related equipment to the functional activities they would like to be able to 
achieve, for example, getting around the house and up the stairs. In contrast, T1 discussed 
equipment in relation to telecare. T1, as well as T2 and T3 raised an important issue on the 
availability of the equipment and the speed at which they are available to patients: “And sometimes it’s 
about getting access to those things quickly which is, can be the problem. Like you might refer to an aid... but they 
might have a three-month waiting list” (T1).   
6.2.3.2: Environment 
The environment, in which the patients are being cared for, and also living in, was identified as a 
component of the structure of care. Similarly to the equipment theme discussed in section 6.2.3.1, the 
environment was discussed, predominantly, in one of two ways: the identification of environmental 
conditions that have been resolved to improve safety; or environmental conditions, which remain and 
present a risk. 
CP001 and CC001, as well as other patient and carer participants, identified the traditional bathroom as a 
risk, which had been resolved by the installation of a wet room: 
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“Before my shower, was in the bath so I had to climb in the bath. I used to love having a bath but I couldn’t 
even sit in the bath. I had to kneel in the bath because I couldn’t sit down because I couldn’t get out. And 
then I’d kneel in the bath and then end up with cramp in my feet. So I couldn’t do anything then.” (CP001) 
“The wet room that’s been put in. Previously of course she had extreme trouble getting in and out of the bath 
when we had a bath there…but now they’ve put the show in it’s not a problem you know. That’s been a big 
plus, certainly.” (CC001) 
Steps and stairs were also a component of the environment that were frequently identified as presenting a 
risk: 
“Also, had a stair lift fitted a few weeks ago, um because I was having trouble getting up and down stairs, 
and it was a bit of a risk coming downstairs” (DP005) 
CP001 had even considered relocating her bedroom into the lounge to avoid having to use the stairs: 
“Yes, because originally I was going to make the bedroom down here, because this goes in to a bed, we brought 
this especially in case, you know, but I really didn’t want to go down that avenue unless it was really 
desperate.” (CP001) 
CM nurses also identified the environment as a structure of care. T2 identified stairs: “Stairs, things like 
stairs.” (T2), and related this to accessibility of the property: 
“And I would say accessibility as well.” 
“Yeah,” 
“Whether they are able to get in or out of the property so that they can go out for their own mental health 
really.” 
Source: T2 conversation 
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Although not identified by the majority of participants, some suggested: cleanliness, heating, 
space/clutter and security, as can be seen in Table 6.5: Evidence relating to the environment as a 
component of safety.  
Table 6.6: Evidence relating to the environment as a component of safety 
Patient, carer and CM nurse quotes 
“Oh definitely, absolutely.  I think a clean home is most important.  Because many germs, germs don’t take prisoners, they 
don’t go, they don’t particularise themselves where they go.  The germs are everywhere.” (NP005) 
“The house and sanitary conditions, yeah” (T3) 
“Things like temperature in the house, if the house is cold.” (T1) 
“Well um, that there's adequate heating in the home…Um, would have to be one of the prime concerns.” (CC001) 
“Well obstacles for a start. You know, a way, you know whenever you’re walking round you certainly don’t want no loose 
cables, loose wires, loose carpets.” (DC004) 
“DC003’s (wife) very err, safety conscious with making sure everything's locked and everything's ... and all that at night, err, 
you know, so ... um, without like err the various things we've had done to the house to make it secure, the security light and 
that.” (DP003) 
The CM nurses were in agreement with patients and carers in relation to heating and cleanliness. In 
addition, T2 and T3 also identified the state of repair of the property as a component of structure, an 
example is provided from T3: 
 “Umm I guess umm poor lighting and umm well sort of ill repair of house can affect their risk of falling or 
umm also even their sort of mental health really as well, particularly.” (T3) 
T3 discussed how the condition of a patient’s home might affect the length of time they spend there, and 
how it impacts on their relationship with the patient. They talked about patients, for whom, they needed 
to wear over shoes when entering the property because the house was so dirty and you couldn’t sit on the 
sofa: 
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“I guess it could umm effect your umm comfort with seeing that particular individual more so than the 
follow on visit, I would guess it effects your umm the time you might want to spend within a house” 
“Yeah and extremely damp, extremely cold and you know it’s bound to effect how, how long you want to 
spend with that particular patient, you know I mean obviously you try and give them the best service you 
can but clearly I couldn’t sit down in that environment so I was stood throughout my consultation which is 
gonna effect the patient’s ease at talking to you as well.” 
“Umm so I think it does effect your care to a degree, you know I mean you try to minimise that and you 
try to amend that for future as well but you know obviously you do have restricted control over that and it 
doesn’t always happen instantly as well.” 
Source: T3 conversation 
A range of environmental conditions have been identified by all stakeholder groups; specifically, they 
relate to the physical environment of the patients home. 
6.2.3.3: Services 
Patients and carers identified a range of health and care services as being important in the safety of their 
care, most related to their availability. For example, DC001 and DP006 talked positively in their joint 
interview about the generic availability of the NHS:  
DP006: “We’re coming back now to the National Health. What country in the world can you do that?” 
DC001: “I mean, they’re always there for me if I need help. Like, you know, and they’ll say, “Bring him up 
and I’ll-I’ll check him over.” 
NP001 talked about the service availability of the CM programme as a good alternative to the long waits 
to see a GP, which could result in hospitalisation: 
“Oh yes. Because you couldn't get an appointment at the doctors for three or four days and by that time your 
chest infection had taken hold and it was difficult and you ended up in hospital.” (NP001) 
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NC001 and his wife were looked after by a multi-disciplinary care team including case managers, which 
they believed provided better service provision: 
“Well they've got ... they've got about a dozen or so nurses up there and they're on like a rosta throughout the 
week, they work seven days a week some of them. Some of them have to be on at weekends, Sunday and what 
have you.  But err, they do a good job.  They're on call there and they ... if they want rebandaging or anything 
like that, you've only got to call them and that day, it might not be straightaway but they'll be there to look 
after [wife] and rebandage her leg or what have you” (NC001) 
For others, service availability was related to the service being available to use when needed, rather than 
using them all the time: 
“I mean *name* from the Chest Clinic rang me up the other day and she said what we’ll do now is because 
you’re managing better with your antibiotics and that, erm, she said I won’t be ringing you up so often, but 
she said if ever you need us, you just pick up that phone, she said and we’ll talk you through it, so”. (CP001) 
“They are concerned, well I, I, they are concerned they’ll say, “Well, you know where … if you need us you 
know where we are. And I do call them, I have done in the past because … and they don’t mind coming.” 
(NP005) 
T3 considered the availability of the CM programme and raised the issue of possibly offering a 7 day a 
week service. However, they believed this would impact on the core competency of the service, which 
was to have a single point of contact for patient care, and they felt this may be lost with a 7 day service. 
An extract of this conversation is available in Table 6.6: Extract from a conversation in T3 about a 7 day 
service. 
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Table 6.7: Extract from a conversation in T3 about a 7 day service 
“Think it’s very hard to say because part of our role is to work as individuals and provide a one-to-one support with umm 
you know a particular named person and umm it’s about knowing your patients and them knowing you so that you can 
detect changes in them, and that close working relationship I believe improves health outcomes largely but I guess the fact that 
you don’t necessarily have umm, you know 7 day cover. You know it might avoid patient admissions and that might improve 
health outcomes but then you couldn’t provide the same person to provide those 7 day covers.” 
“So it could have a detrimental impact in the fact that you wouldn’t necessarily be dealing with the same person as often you 
know, you’d lose that personal contact so it’s a hard balance to say because it’s never been tried I guess.” 
“Whether, which way round would be the best. Whether having that particular individual that they know and trust, is the 
health benefit or whether having a 7 day a week service is, would be a better health benefit.” 
“And I would say largely from a patient reporting aspect that they value having a particular individual that they can go to 
which would be lose if we start doing cover 7 days a week.” 
Source: T3 conversation 
T3 further justified why the service should not be 7 days; they believed their role to be a facilitator, and 
that patients who required weekend assistance needed acute and reactive care, which was not their role: 
“Dunno our role’s very much one of a facilitator rather than reactive delivery of care in an acute situation.” 
“But we do have patients that go in over a weekend when they might not if they’ve got somebody to call, I’m 
not suggesting that we should really.” 
Source: T3 conversation 
T1 identified lack of knowledge of services as a component. One participant in particular went into detail 
about patients needing to know what services were available, but also needing to know what services were 
required, and questioning whose responsibility it was to aid people in choosing the right services. The 
transcript can be found in Appendix 14.  
Patients and carers identified the availability of healthcare services as a component of safe healthcare. This 
did not necessarily translate to service utilisation but rather, the option to access services on an ad hoc basis 
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or when perceived to be required by them. CM nurses, on the other hand, provided a different 
perspective. Some CM nurses raised issues of the delays between referrals to service access, which had not 
been expressed by the patient and carer group. In addition, T3 in particular, toyed with the concept of a 7 
day service who highlighted the benefits and disadvantages. They concluded that it would not be 
advantageous, mostly because it would interfere with their relationships with patients, which they perceive 
to be vital to their role as care facilitator. 
6.2.3.4: Financial Resources 
The identification of financial resources as a structure of safe care was led by the CM nurses. All three 
focus groups discussed in some detail the implications of financial resources on safe care. 
T1 and T2 highlighted concerns they had for patients who had financial resources at their disposal. They 
argued that those with financial resources were more at risk and that this came down to one fundamental 
reason: those without financial resources receive support from the state and thus use of services did not 
incur any financial penalty. These discussions can be seen in Table 6.7: Examples of CM nurses 
identifying non-state funded patients as at greater risk. Consequently, patients with financial resources 
have a choice to make: whether to spend their money on social care provision or leave it to loved ones 
when they pass away. T1 raised the point that regardless of whether patients choose to fund their own 
social care, ultimately, where provision falls short at keeping people safe, the NHS picks up the difference. 
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Table 6.8: Examples of CM nurses in T1 identifying non-state funded patients as at greater risk 
CM nurse quotes from T1 
“In terms of safety as well, um, if you haven’t got any money it would seem that you are right. It’d mean that you can 
actually, services are there for you” (T1) 
“If they are in private accommodation…they have to pay for the pendant alarms. If they are council accommodation that’s 
free.” (T1) 
“I find it quite difficult when you see people making choices that compromise their safety either from wanting to stay 
independent or not wanting to spend money, and you’re, you know, and it’s just like you save a for a rainy day, it’s raining, 
like spend the money” (T1) 
“Sometimes it’s a bit perverse because what you were saying about your lady who’s at risk of falling, she, if she doesn’t want 
to pay for her Careline, then why can’t we for whatever amount of money it is a month when it could cost what £300 a night 
for her to be in hospital, spend 30 quid a month?” (T1) 
In other examples, T2 identified the abuse of financial support given to patients, who sometimes use 
funds to cover the cost of things like gardeners and window cleaners. Some of the CM nurses perceived 
this to be inappropriate. However, in the same focus group, others argued that the money was to aid them 
in remaining dependent at home, and for them to determine their own needs and spend accordingly (see 
Table 6.8: Evidence of the CM nurse perception of the use of state funds). Others who are eligible for 
funding don’t use it at all because they don’t want to be seen as charity. 
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Table 6.9: Evidence of the T2 CM nurses perceptions of the use of state funds 
CM nurse quotes 
“Some people like gardeners, window cleaners.” 
“It’s not supposed to be for that, is it?  It is actually to help provide personal care, isn’t it?” 
“Hmm.” 
“Attendance allowance really, it isn’t necessarily for gardens.” 
“It’s for personal care.” 
“But I thought it was to provide support” 
“to maintain people’s independence at home” 
“But it’s for them to choose.” 
“their need to choose sort of …” 
Source: T2 conversation 
“But it’s like heating allowance, I mean they have the heating allowance, we go in some houses and they are colder inside than 
they are outside and it’s not that they haven’t got the finance to pay” (T2) 
“They know it’s not means tested because we explain to them.  Still won’t accept it because it’s deemed as charity.” (T2) 
For patients and carers, discussion around financial resources was dominated by not being eligible for 
funding to pay for things. This either resulted in having to pay for things themselves, or going without, 
these can be seen in Table 6.9: Examples of the patients’ perceptions of finance.  
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Table 6.10: Examples of the patients’ perceptions of finance 
Patient Quotes 
“The same thing could apply to the front door, but apparently Social Services said, we can only fund one half step” (DP005) 
“Everything costs money. I mean to have day carers every single day would cost me err £30/£50 odd a week. So err, I 
don’t much like paying out that sort of thing so make do myself” (NP005) 
“But no, they wanted £2,000 and I says, “No SON, you’re not paying that, no”. I mean (laughter) he’s got himself, 
his wife and his home.” (DP004) 
Patients who were in receipt of a lot of financial support, such as CP001 and NP001, made no comments 
that implicated financial resources as a barrier to safe care Instead they appeared to have sufficient service 
and equipment provision. This supports the themes that were identified within the CM nurse focus 
groups, where they believed patients who had access to financial resources, did not make decisions that 
were best for their safety, but rather to maintain their wealth. 
6.2.3.5: Communication Infrastructure 
Communication infrastructure was identified by all of the stakeholder groups, as being an important 
structural component of home healthcare. This was further supported by the identification of 
communicating as a process (see section 6.6.4.3), which could not be achieved without an available 
infrastructure. Participants described communication infrastructure as the physical and organisational 
facilities required to assist communication. This included telephone lines that were used to make contact 
with health professionals, family and other services. Some patients had specialist communication 
infrastructure installed because of their vulnerability. For instance, DP005 and NP001 had care lines 
installed. Others simply ensured they carried mobile phones with them for emergencies. See Table 6.10: 
Evidence of the patient and carer perspective of communication infrastructure. 
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Table 6.11: Evidence of the patient and carer perspective of the communication infrastructure 
Patient and carer quotes 
“Well I've got a mobile phone, DC003 got a mobile phone, so you know, that's something else to be honest with you, mobile 
phones have really helped didn't they you know, because they keep you in touch, you know what I mean.” (DP003) 
“A lifeline. Er - phoning the hospital.  My children, friends.” (DP006) 
“Yeah. But you see if I'm here I can get to there. If I'm here I can get to this. If I'm anywhere round about there's a phone 
there, there's a phone there.  So there's plenty of contact, and that machine there… From out in the kitchen, they can hear 
you from the kitchen, the bathroom, the bedroom, anywhere.” (NP001) 
When the CM nurses of T1 discussed communication infrastructure, they talked about it in the context of 
the relationships they had developed with the patients They believed greater communication resulted in 
more trust and subsequently patients revealing more information to them: “I suppose it’s about trust, trusting 
us. I think from what patients tell us, they, they trust us a great deal but maybe don’t trust A&E as much or, um, their 
GP” (T1). T3 discussed it in relation to their incident reporting process acting as an infrastructure for 
patients to feel they were having complaints heard: “I think when, when you report an incident that involves the 
patient sometimes the patient and the relative feels that that’s their complaint, that’s their, their mode of complaint if you like 
that you’ve reported an incident.” (T3). The presence of a communication infrastructure is perceived to facilitate 
the process of communication, which supports an exchange of information to achieve safer care. 
6.2.3.6: Patient Characteristics  
From the analysis, four patient characteristics were identified as having a potential role in safety: attitudes, 
patient understanding, circumstance, and autonomy and independence. Evidence of each is available in 
Table 6.11: Evidence relating to patient characteristics from patients and carers. 
Patient attitudes was a broad micro theme that encompassed things such as a reluctance to change or use 
services, a sense of coping, and putting on people. CP001 insists on still ironing the towels like she has 
always done, even though it is exhausting for her. DP006 is in pain, but he feels he just has to “learn to live 
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with it” (DP006). And DP002 doesn’t talk much about how she feels because she fears people will get fed up 
with her. Another patient attitude was that of a general feeling of being safe in their homes. 
CM nurses perceived some patient attitudes to negatively impact on health outcomes, in particular they 
highlighted: pride, denial, poor understanding, fear of vulnerability, and institutionalisation. These are 
inter-related and undistinguishable as independent factors. For instance, CM nurses believed some 
patients to be proud and unwilling to accept their deteriorating health: “they are very proud and won’t want to 
accept they have got a problem” (T2). CM nurses attributed the majority of these behaviours to the patient 
groups ‘war time’ up-brining in which they were made to ‘make do’: “they’re brought up in the war…and they 
had to keep going” (T2). Ultimately, the CM nurses find this difficult to overcome: “it’s not anything we can sort of 
risk manage you know” (T3). 
Patient understanding appears to be quite important in some instances. For example, DP002 and DC001 
both highlight the importance of understanding diabetes, to prevent hyperglycaemia. And NP005 talks 
about how he feels that asking questions to learn more is promoted in the CM service. 
Patient circumstance mostly relates to the conditions of the individual patients; their multi-morbidities, 
and the way in which they affected that patient’s ability to undertake particular activities. The impact of 
DP002’s multi-morbidities has meant that when she started to have bladder trouble, there was little that 
could be done to relieve her because of the greater implications of the treatment on the multi-morbidities. 
Similarly, DP006 can’t have the heart transplant he needs because another component of his treatment 
isn’t sufficiently effective. In some cases, patients can accommodate their own characteristics: DP003 
can’t walk very far without falling, but enjoys his garden. In order to enjoy his garden he has to walk to 
the garden bench and sit down, and take a mobile phone with him, just in case. 
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Table 6.12: Evidence relating to patient characteristics from patients and carers 
Micro theme Patient and carer quotes 
Patient 
Attitudes 
Reluctance to change “I know, I know, it’s silly isn’t it. Oh dear.  But I thought no I’m not going 
to give everything up, you know.” (CP001) 
Sense of coping - “It does get you down but I mean, I’m in pain now… but you learn to live with 
it.” (DP006)  
 Putting on people - “Well, not really because I think they get fed up, don’t they?  They’re hearing 
the same, ‘Oh, moaning again,’ you know. So now I don’t, erm don’t tell him.” (DP002)  
 Being safer – “Erm, it’s knowing how to put it in to words really. Erm, I just feel safer” (CP001) 
Patient 
understanding 
 “Yeah, well I’ve got with me, you know, I, I have those little thick tablets, what are they? For 
diabetes?” (DP002) 
“Oh yeah, the more information I get, I ... I ... on what's the matter with me, the more information I 
get, the better understanding of the disease, the better to cope with it” DP003 
“In fact we are encouraged nowadays to say what we think, to err, ask questions. Now this is the most 
vitally important of all, if you don’t ask questions, you don’t get to know.” (NP005) 
Patient 
characteristics 
“Yes, the bladder.  Erm, the, the doctor there … I can’t have an operation, a proper operation because 
of my heart. I can’t err, I can’t have an anaesthetic.” (DP002) 
“You see, with the operation and things like that, if my pump had been good I should have had-I 
should have had a heart transplant but my pump is no good.” (DP006) 
“In the better weather I can sort of have a walk in the garden and sit on the garden bench you know, 
something like that, which err ... well I've got a mobile phone” (DP003) 
Autonomy and 
independence 
“I don’t always act on it but I do listen… And I know that whatever they’re doing is for my own good, 
you know, for my own health” (CP001) 
“I don’t think I could cope.” (DP005) 
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Patients are afforded a degree of autonomy and independence whilst being cared for in the home; having 
the option not to follow the advice or instructions of the healthcare professionals. CP001 admitted to not 
always acting on the advice given to her, despite knowing it was for her own good. DP005 talked about 
how having his car to drive himself to places helped to maintain his independence and that he does not 
think he would cope if he did not have his independence. DP003 recognised that the more information 
he had on his disease, the better he could cope with it.  
6.2.3.7: Carer Characteristics 
Three carer characteristics were identified within the structure of care: carer attitudes, carer presence and 
carer health. The carer attitudes that were expressed were truly humbling. Carers explained the inherent 
and obligatory nature of their role as carer. Quotes of evidence are available in Table 6.12: Evidence of 
carer characteristics. 
Table 6.13: Evidence of carer characteristics 
Patient and carer quotes 
“As her husband I would be her carer anyway wouldn't I?... I wouldn't be much of a husband would I, if I 
didn't?” (CC001) 
“Well I’m here to keep [her safe] – I was a carer before all this lot started.” (DC002) 
“No it’s easy, he’s my husband. I have told him.” (DC003) 
“Well I don’t grumble about it. It don’t upset me being a carer because I mean I’ve been married to her 65 
years next January. I mean if I can’t help her now” (DC004) 
“I most definitely believe umm, I want ... I want to be a carer if I've got sufficient knowledge to do what I 
want to do to get her better.” (NC001) 
Carer health is also important, not only for themselves, but to maintain the care and support they give to 
their loved ones. Similarly to the patient, they cannot do all of the things they used to: “I can't do all that I 
used to be able to do. You don't as you get older.” (CC001). DP003 talked about the pharmacy service that delivers 
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her drugs, which saves her husband from having to do it: “I don't want DC003 to rush about with stuff like 
that” (DP003). For DC001, she had been supporting her husband to bathe, but it was getting difficult for her. 
Having a shower installed would not only prevent harm to the patient but to her, as the carer also: “a 
shower would help considerably… it would be a lot easier, especially for me.” (DC001). DC004 told a harrowing story, of 
the time he had walked to the paper shop and whilst out he had a heart attack and was taken by 
ambulance to the hospital, leaving his wife at home. The hospital did arrange for her to be put into a care 
home whilst he was receiving treatment, but he refused to let that happen to her and discharged himself 
from the hospital so that he could return home to his wife. In other instances, patients and carers told 
stories where the carer was participating in activities which were putting themselves at considerable risk. 
For instance, DC002 would walk behind DP002 every time she walked up the stairs because she was likely 
to fall. As part of their supporting role, carers are also at risk of harm as a result of caring for the patient. 
Some patients and carers identified the intensity of the role played by the carer: “Now if I tell you this would 
you believe me or not? I’ll tell you I’ve worked from 14 until 65, this is the hardest job I’ve had. It’s a 24 hour job” (DC004). 
Some carers had accommodated the patient to meet their needs, such as DC003, who only worked two 
hours a day at a school within walking distance so she could easily return if needed by her husband: “I only 
work at the school, I only do two hours cleaning for the school, I’m right there… if anything happens, I’m back.” (DC003). 
This was despite having their income squeezed as a result.  
Another characteristic of carers that T3 highlighted was their potential to be challenging and unco-
operative: “Perhaps we should talk about aggressive and challenging relatives?” (T3). A section of transcript is 
provided in Table 6.13: Exert of a conversation on challenging carers of the discussion on challenging 
carers. Essentially, T3 have some patients with carers who cause them stress, which results in a 
conscious effort trying not displace this stress on the patient. The CM nurses of T3 described a patient, 
who isn’t receiving a particular care service because the service does not want to engage with the 
difficult family. Difficult carers could have a detrimental effect on patient health if they are not 
receiving adequate care provision. 
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Table 6.14: Exert of a conversation on challenging carers 
T3 transcript 
“Yeah well they directly cause us stress.” 
“Right.” 
“Increase our stress levels and you have to constantly try and be conscious that you don’t want to spend less time or energy 
with the patient because of how the relative is behaving to you so it’s a confident balance in trying to work with the relative 
and not let them have a negative effect on how you deliver the care to, to the patient.” 
“And they can be very time consuming can’t they?” 
“Yeah.” 
“And, and add to your workload.” 
“Yeah definitely.” 
“As well.” 
“I know one of my ladies is quiet a, I can’t prove it but she’s currently been refused a service ‘cause this, her daughter who 
I suspect has personality disorder and err they say that she hasn’t got, we have potential and I don’t agree with them but I 
suspect that because they’ve encountered this daughter they are umm more reticent about providing a service and I’m not 
blaming them, I can understand ‘cause this woman has lost me sleep over the last 10 years since I’ve known her so, it can 
be very challenging trying to balance umm the needs of the patients against your relationship with the carer and the 
relatives.” 
6.5.3.8: Operational conditions  
The operational conditions were raised by two of the focus groups (T2 and T3) and not by any patients or 
carers. These related specifically to the organisational environment required to undertake occupational 
activities. However, the extent of the discussions held within T2 and T3 around the personal experiences 
they had had, raised concerns over the possibility of this being present in more organisations, and thus 
significantly contributing to patient safety. 
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Caseload was discussed by both focus groups, but not necessarily in relation to the number of patients 
being served by any one staff member, but rather the dependency of individual patients in the context of 
the patient numbers: “I suppose it’s a dependency in one patient in context of your caseload, it is isn’t it?” (T2), which 
impacts on the “frequency and time, how long you spend” (T2) with those individual patients. Even if caseloads 
were considered by the number of patients, T2 described how their caseloads were determined by a 
minimum number of patients they were required to serve, with no cap on the maximum and they “can’t 
say that we’re closed, we would still take a patient on if they needed” T3. One participant explains how in the past, 
they have had to overcome rising demand with stable or decreasing capacity: 
“We had an issue a few years ago where we were just packed to capacity and breaking, you guys probably all 
know about this, and we did create a waiting list and it enabled us to get more staff because we were putting 
in incident forms every week saying this many patients have been waiting this long, this is at the end of the 
week how much System 1 work hasn’t been done and we’re putting those forms in every week.” (T3) 
Another participant of T3 talked about everyone going through a meltdown because of the intensity of 
caseloads and the implications of this: “you’ve just got yourself so overwhelmed by the workload that you think it’s only 
a matter of time before something goes wrong, and that was all due to intensity of caseloads” (T3). This was related back to 
the intensity of the caseload rather than the volume or the number of patients: “Because we were all just going 
under with the volume of visits and the sort of level of intensity of the patients at that time, it wasn’t the case they were bigger it 
was just that the patients on the caseload were all really unstable” (T3). 
From this, T3 described a situation where caseloads could be managed by large numbers of staff, but if 
they were not sufficiently trained it was not very effective: “Intensity of caseloads maybe, but then you can have all 
the staff in the world but if they’re not trained” (T3). However, both focus groups concluded that training does not 
necessarily prepare you for the individuality of each case, which can be eased with experience: “A lot of it’s 
experience” T2 and “I think we have adequate training but whether you encounter a certain, already you’ve encountered a 
certain symptom or a problem before, the training can’t prepare you for every eventuality can they?” (T3). The participants 
in T3 were complimentary about how their organisation managed competency through “supervision and one-
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to-ones” (T3). However, when asked whether having more training would improve patient outcomes, they 
admitted to feeling that some training was a ‘box ticking’ exercise: “some of the feel like ticking boxes, other are 
really, really useful.” (T3). Participants of T2 and T3 identified the importance of caseload, its intensity and 
adequate training as being important in patient safety and outcomes. 
6.2.3.9: Staff attitudes 
Staff attitudes to patient safety revolved around a core theme: their role and how it was hindered by the 
care setting. Off the back of this, the CM nurses absolved themselves of responsibility because they 
believe ultimate responsibility lies with the patient. 
The CM nurses were confident in defining their role as the ‘empowerer’: to engage patients in taking 
responsibility for themselves, and to facilitate integrated working between other contributing services. For 
example, CM nurses described their role as “to make patients take responsibility for themselves” (T3) and “that’s 
what we’ve tried to facilitate [integrated working]” (T1). This was echoed amongst the focus group participants 
across the three locations. Despite their role to empower patients, they placed ultimate responsibility for 
safety and health outcomes on the patients, who they believe to be the decision makers. In some cases, 
this led to the CM nurses feeling powerless to influence patients: “it’s still their home and they’re very much at the 
centre of their care, it’s their decision whether they take on board your advice or recommendations” (T2) and “you know 
sometimes we can be seen as being responsible for somebody’s blood glucose being poor but you know in actual fact sometimes 
know matter what you put in it’s the patient’s responsibility that falls down really” (T3).  
CM nurses perceived themselves to have less control than their hospital based counterparts as one 
participant indicated “there’s also a power balance, because in the community people are much more in change of 
themselves…but often once you’ve been in hospital you’re a little but more vulnerable…which means patients are more likely 
to accept [recommendations] if it means they can go home” (T1). Consequently, the CM nurses were left feeling 
frustrated by this power-shift and feeling like they were “banging [their] head[s] against a brick wall” ” (T1). This 
was exacerbated by two factors: staff felt more experienced than patients to make judgement calls, but felt 
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they had less power and influence in comparison to the hospital setting. For example, one CM nurse 
expressed that “the patient obviously knows themselves but we also know the grand scheme of all the hundreds of patients 
that we come into contact with and what could happen” (T2). Another participant explained that in the hospital 
environment, care “is more imposed upon you” (T3) and another expressed that “by the very nature that you visit 
somebody in their own home, you can’t really influence what goes, what happened when you’ve walked out of that house” (T2). 
6.2.4: Processes of  home healthcare 
Processes of healthcare delivered in the home were categorised according to three broad themes: self-care 
and management; clinical care of the case manager and communicating (see Figure 6.5: Processes of 
healthcare). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Thematic framework for the domain of structure 
6.2.4.1: Self-care and management 
Patients and carers dominated the identification of self-care and management activities, with CM nurses 
contributing comparatively little. Self-care and management can be categories into seven subthemes (see 
Figure 6.6: Self-care and management subtheme framework): medicating; adjusting to LTC; personal care, 
home care, diet management, functional mobility and exercise. A description of each of these can be 
found in Table: 6.14: Self-care and management sub-themes, and evidence of each of these themes can be 
found in Table 6.15: Evidence of processes of self-care and management sub-themes. 
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Figure 6.6: Thematic framework for the domain of structure 
Table 6.15: Self-care and management subthemes 
Process Description 
Medicating Taking medication 
Personal care Attending to the physical and emotional needs such as bathing 
Home care Attending to the physical living environment such as cleaning 
Diet management Attending to nutritional needs 
Functional mobility The mobility of an individual in relation to their ability to conduct self-care 
Exercise Activities to sustain or improve health and fitness 
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Medicating was a commonly identified process across all patient and carer participants in the study. The 
complexity of medicating is evidenced by the multiple micro-themes that were also identified, these were: 
storage, prescription management, self-medicating, and carer administration. Examples of these can be 
found in Table 6.16: Evidence of the micro-theme of medicating. 
Storage of medication was important, and some patients, such as CP001 opted to use pill organisers. The 
volume of her medication requirements meant she needed to use three pill organisers to be able to 
manage her medication safely and effectively. Other patients had their carers keep them out of reach and 
the carers would bring them down when the medication was due. Another alternative was for patients to 
use prescribed blister boxes, which supply a week’s medication in all the correct doses, as does NP006. 
Prescription management is the identification of the need for further supplies of medication, and the 
actions taken to ensure the availability of the supplies when necessary. For DP003, a pharmacy does this 
for him. For DP002, DC002 ensures this is done. Another micro theme within medicating was the 
process of self-medicating. In the case of DP003, not self-medicating properly has previously resulted in 
emergency visits from a doctor, and he now believes that educating patients to understand why they need 
to take their medication is important. For some patients, their carers manage their drugs and assist in 
administering them. For example, DC004 believes DP004 wouldn’t remember to take them unless he 
instructed her to. 
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Table 6.16: Evidence of the micro-theme of medicating 
Micro-theme Patient and carer quotes 
Storage “Yes, I’ve got 3 pill organisers…Otherwise I wouldn’t know what I was taking.” (CC001) 
“All the safety, they’re up in the – because hers got little boxes and, err, I came down the other day 
to the breakfast and I get them out for her.  I get the things out for her jabs, you know, and by the 
time hers had her breakfast and done that, it’s ten o’clock!” (DC002) 
 “I have them delivered in box form…Well individual days, there’s a weeks supply in one box.” 
(NP006) 
Prescription 
Management  
“Yeah because the chemist will go and fetch my prescriptions for me and they'll deliver them to the 
door. That's Lloyds Pharmacy.” ( DP003) 
“Oh yes. I have the prescription off the doctors and I take it up to the chemist and then bring them 
back too.”  (DP002) 
Self-medicating “Yeah, and of course one doctor come, an emergency doctor who was only very young, and err he says 
err, you know ... I said to him, oh I think I've got some of them, she said okay show me them and 
when he see them he said, I think you'd better take those to your doctor.  I thought oh dear, because 
I wasn't taking the course like. So education is important.” (DP003) 
Carer 
administration 
“If I didn't she wouldn’t have them, she’d just forget she’s got to have them…Yeah, I shall do 
all that, and they’re all … some of them on the shelf in there you’ll see, on the window sill and 
they’re all marked up.” (DC004) 
“Perhaps as I say, the nebuliser sometimes, I have to say, oh look you know, how about having a 
go on your nebuliser you know.” (CC001) 
“Well of course he has a 34 and then I have to twist it again, but of course he couldn’t do that, 
because he couldn’t see.” (DC001) 
Adjusting to LTC was another sub-theme within self-care, which had micro themes. The action of 
adjusting to living with an LTC heavily revolved around reducing activities, which could otherwise cause 
harm. NP005 recognises that he can’t do gardening anymore and has had to replace this with other 
hobbies. Others, like DP005, have recognised the need to reduce activities and be realistic about their 
situation. There is also a component of changing roles within the relationship. For instance, CC001 is 
used to doing all of the house work to her own standard, but now her husband has to do it. DP003 is no 
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longer the earner in the family and this isn’t something he is comfortable with but is having to adjust to. 
Another component is that of changing behaviours. NP001 has to change the way in which she gets to 
the telephone to ensure she doesn’t fall over. Evidence of all of these can be found in Table 6.17: 
Evidence of micro-themes of adjusting to LTC. 
Table 6.17: Evidence of micro-themes of adjusting to LTC 
Micro-
theme 
Patient and carer quotes 
Reducing 
activities 
“Many people have different ideas of what their quality of life wants to be. Err, the things that I did before 
active, gardening, I can no longer do, so I have to adjust for that to my other hobbies.”( NP005) 
“It’s difficult, you know I’ve had to work hard to accept in this situation that I can’t do as much as I’d like 
to do but er, you’ve got to be a bit realistic about things and face facts and bite the bullet as they say and, deal 
with your problems the best you can.” (DP005) 
Changing 
role 
“I do like to try and keep things clean, you know.  Erm, and bless him, I mean *husband* does a lot, you 
know, but obviously it’s not as you always want it is it? But no, I’ve had to let that go over my head now 
because there’s nothing I can do about it, you know. And he does it, you know.” (CP001) 
“The quality of life I have now is I can err, I can't work, which I did ... I did used to err like being a ... you 
know, bringing money into the house, being a breadwinner if you like.” (DP003) 
Changing 
behaviours 
“Now, in looking after yourself, like say the phone rings, I'll go round there, because I know if I think I'm 
going to fall, or I start to fall, I can grab something close and hang on to it.  he same if I go there. I'll hold on 
that door.” (NP001) 
For patients in this study, their carers were heavily supportive of self-care and management activities. 
They either assisted or delivered care that aimed to sustain or improve the well-being of the patients. In 
Table 6.16: Evidence of micro-themes of adjusting to LTC, multiple carers, including CC001, DC002, 
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DC003 and NC001, discuss how they support self-care and management activities. These range from 
assisting with bathing, to cooking, cleaning and medicating. 
 
In comparison, CM nurses contributed very little to identifying processes of self-care and management. 
T3 were the only focus group to give self-care activity of patients any consideration and it only related to 
medicating. One participant explained how one of her patients with dementia had experienced ill health 
and was admitted to hospital because her formal carer was documenting administration of medication but 
wasn’t actually giving it to him:  
“So for example I’ve just had to deal with an adult referral for one of my chaps who had dementia and 
COPD and heart failure because the care agency were documenting that they were giving him his medication 
and they weren’t, and as a result he had hospital admission and was ill.” (T3) 
However, this could be considered a clinical care process of a trained care giver, rather than supporting 
self-care. T3 also acknowledged that they could place their patients at risk through clinical error, this will 
be discussed next. 
6.6.4.2: Clinical care of the case manager 
Patients and carers identified clinical care activities undertaken by the case managers that contributed to 
their health and well-being, thus, subsequently their safety. Patients described activities such as: listening 
to the chest, taking measurements such as blood pressure and weight, administering medication, 
prescribing medication, and wound management. Examples of which can be found in Table 6.18: 
Evidence of clinical care processes identified by patients and carers. This was echoed by T3 and the CM 
nurses who described a minimum data set “that would include blood pressure, heart rate, listening to their chest, 
temperature” (T3).  
 
 
163 
Table 6.18: Evidence of clinical care processes identified by patients and carers 
Patient and carer quotes 
“Erm, she tests all my chest thoroughly and I mean thoroughly” (CP001) 
“She weighs you, does your blood pressure” (DP002) 
“Yes, that’s another job they go, I have some of these patches, it’s a pain patch.” ( DP005) 
“She'll leave me a prescription err if your sputum turns green with having COPD.” ( NP001) 
“They can dress the leg, they've got the bandages and the ointment and the expertise, I don't possess that.”  (NC001) 
In addition to identifying the clinical care processes listed above, CM nurses also described the care they 
provided at a higher level. They described the individuality and personalisation of the care they provide, 
through information and education:  
“it’s the whole idea is actually using words that will actually suit the patient or individual that we actually 
end up using, we can’t use, all the same as and say it’s, it’s not one sentence or one phrase that’s going to suit 
everyone”( T1) 
“very much needs led, then you go in as often as they need you once they start to pick up then we can back off 
a little bit and they are more self-managing” (T2) 
For some patients, the clinical care provided by the case managers was described as vital, and kept them 
out of hospital, see Table 6.19: Evidence of how vital patients and carers believed the case managers to 
be. 
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Table 6.19: Evidence of how vital patients and carers believe the case managers to be 
Patient and carer quotes 
“So if he, they didn’t have these nurses come in, he would have to go up in hospital so... These nurses come in and they keep 
him going don’t they?” (DC003) 
“The virtual ward as it's called, err, do all sorts for me, to stop me going in hospital.  In fact they have stopped me going in 
hospital recently, with an intravenous umm, you know, antibiotics. They've avoided me going into hospital.” (DP005) 
“They’re vitally important, they’re very, they’re very important. Vital in fact, a lifeline” (NP005) 
T3 also acknowledged that they could place their patients at risk if they mis-diagnosed or wrongly 
prescribed drugs: “we could do them physical harm if we mis-diagnose or incorrectly prescribe” (T3). It was discussed by 
T3, that drug errors made by themselves would be self-reported, but errors that patients made were not 
because “we’d be there all day with incident forms.” (T3). Another cause for concern for T3, was when patient 
medication regimes were altered whilst admitted to hospital: “there has been cases where patients have had their 
medication changed and ended up going straight back into hospital because the hospital have changed their medication.”(T3). 
This indicates the need for adequate communication between care services to maintain the most effective 
drug regime. T3 discussed how it could take months of trial and error for the most effective regime to be 
identified, to then be undone when admitted to hospital.  
6.6.4.3: Communicating  
The action of communicating was a commonly identified process across patients and carers and CM 
nurses, with all participants except two carers and one patient identifying communicating as a process of 
care. Examples of which can be found in Table 6.20: Evidence of communicating as a process of care. 
CP001, can ring for an ambulance and inform them of his deterioration, when needed, in order to receive 
medical care that will hopefully prevent further harm. DP003 appears to have gained an understanding of 
his role in his care as executing instructions that have been communicated to him. DP005 raises the issue 
of the difficulty some individuals experience in communicating, which he believes can lead to abuse. 
 
165 
 
Table 6.20: Evidence of communicating as a process of care 
Patient and carer quotes 
“I know that if I need help or if I’m not well, then he’s here to either ring up for an ambulance or ring somebody.” (CP001) 
“I think I have a responsibility to do as I'm asked to do and to make sure as I umm, stick to the ... the drugs that I'm 
provided with and not abuse them, because I ... I'd hate to do so, you know, the drugs, when I'm trying to help you.  So that's 
the responsibility of mine.” (DP003) 
“I know what I’m talking about, and I know what I’m saying and, I can understand other people’s point of view and that 
sort of thing. A lot of older people can’t stick up for themselves and I can... And I have seen older people miss treated in 
hospitals.” (DP005) 
Similarly to service in structure, patients and carers identified the option to communicate with others just 
as comforting as communicating with others. Evidence of this can be seen in Table 6.21: Evidence of the 
availability to communicate.    
 
Table 6.21: Evidence of the availability to communicate 
Patient and carer quotes 
“Well, I feel safe in the home.  And I know that the nurses they come in, they’ve got a telephone number that I can, err, if 
I’m in trouble I can phone them and that’s nice. I don’t like being left on my own” (DP002) 
“But, erm, as I say, if I go out it’s always on my mind. And I mean I’ve got a mobile here, I very hardly use it, I always 
take it with me and I think well if I'm in trouble or anything and I’ve … she wont pick it up.” (DP004) 
“I mean *name* from the Chest Clinic rang me up the other day and she said what we’ll do now is because you’re managing 
better with your antibiotics and that, erm, she said I won’t be ringing you up so often, but she said if ever you need us, you 
just pick up that phone, she said and we’ll talk you through it.” (CP001) 
For CM nurses, communicating with patients about their disease is also a part of their clinical role, 
indicated by the nature of their role to inform and educate: “we’re walking around with information that we have 
to share with patients and give them as an when they actually need it” (T1). T3 believed this to be quite important in 
patient safety: 
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“I think a big safety aspect of our role is that fact that you know it’s whether patient you know sort of engage 
or you know follow through on advice, whether they are compliant with their medicine or whatever which 
equals their outcome.” (T3)  
Use of appropriate language in communicating with patients was recognised as important because there 
had been instances where patients claimed to not know of their conditions, when they had probably been 
told about them. T1 discussed how the word harm was sometimes inappropriate as it could scare patients, 
but that also, sometimes scare tactics were required: 
“Well, every patient is different so you’ll use the word harm if necessary, er, cos it’s not one size fits all. So if 
you think frightening tactics are going to work with somebody you’ll use them, um, and then you, you pitch it 
according to how, how the patient is, is playing it really.” (T1) 
T2 discussed the use of multiple terminologies depending on who they were talking to: 
“Because there’s a professional, perhaps… terminology and a patient terminology.” (T2) 
6.2.5: Outcomes of  home healthcare 
Four categories of patient-related outcomes were identified: clinical care sensitive outcomes, functional 
health status, psychosocial outcomes and adverse events, each of which is discussed (see Figure 6.7: 
Outcomes of healthcare). 
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Figure 6.7: Thematic framework for the domain of structure 
6.2.5.1: Clinical care sensitive outcomes 
Clinical care sensitive outcomes for patients centred on two broad types of clinical outcomes: disease 
specific outcomes and hospital admissions. CM nurses did not identify disease specific outcomes in 
relation to patient safety. However, patients and their carers described disease specific outcomes along 
with how these impacted on other outcomes. For example, CP001 suffers with breathlessness because she 
has COPD, which she finds very frightening: “it’s not breathing that is one of the most frightening things, is when you 
can’t breathe” (CP001), resulting in the experience of a negative psychological outcome. The type of disease 
specific outcomes varied between individuals. For NP001, the colour of her sputum was important to 
warn of any infection on her chest as a result of her COPD. For NP005, he was interested in his prostate 
specific antigen, which indicated the seriousness of his prostate cancer. For DP006, it was his vision, 
which he was losing because of his diabetes. Patients and carers as well as CM nurses identified 
hospitalisation as a clinical outcome, which was avoided where possible, evidence of which can be found 
in Table 6.22: Evidence of the avoidance of hospitalisation. 
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Table 6.22: Evidence of the avoidance of hospitalisation 
Patient, carer and CM nurse quotes 
“the nurse is what try and keep him out of hospital” (DC003) 
“the virtual ward as it’s called, do all sorts to stop me going into hospital” (DP003) 
“because of all the medication she has been getting…“  (CC001) 
our key role is to prevent people where clinically possible from going into hospital. (T2) 
6.2.5.2: Functional health status 
Given the importance allocated to self-care and management as processes of care for patients being case 
managed, there is evidence to suggest the importance of a person’s ability to conduct such activities as a 
desired outcome of care. Particularly, when the primary aim of the CM programme is to support patients 
to self-care and manage their own health and disease. Evidence of the importance of self-care and 
management as processes of care can be found in Appendix 13 and will not be repeated here. One’s 
ability to undertake basic and physical activities as well as activities of daily living is described as functional 
health status. One component of functional health status that patients specifically identified as an 
outcome was mobility, and not necessarily ability to walk but ability to get around: “whilst I can drive the car I 
can’t walk anywhere when I’ve got out of the car other end, as I say, half lying on a trolley, er I can then cope.” (DP005). Poor 
mobility, or a lack, of mobility impacted on psychosocial outcomes: “And she gets frustrated with it.” (DC004). 
An individual’s functional health status could be seen as a measure of how well they can be safe, this was 
further evidenced by the CM nurses indicating that a patients responsibility for their safety was 
competency dependent (see section 6.2.2.1 for more information). 
6.2.5.3: Psychosocial Outcomes 
Patients, carers and CM nurses identified a large range of psychological and social outcomes, which occur 
as result of their ill health. Examples of the types can be found in Table 6.23.Evidence of psychosocial 
outcomes. 
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Table 6.23: Evidence of psychosocial outcomes 
Negative psychosocial 
outcome 
Quotes 
Depression “I think we can contribute unfortunately to depression sometimes, you know umm I guess 
sometimes we sort of bring up end of life care and people might be in denial and it’s difficult 
to always pitch it right I guess, you know.” (T3) 
Embarrassed “I found it difficult to get in and out of the bath.  If I got in, I couldn't get out and then I'd 
have to ring somebody and come and get me out of the bath and that was embarrassing.” 
(NP001) 
Frustrated (I mean, years ago I used to, I can’t do what I used to do and I get very frustrated, like 
cleaning windows and washing walls. I mean I used to do all that, but I just can’t do that 
now and I do get very frustrated because I can’t do all what I used to.” (CP001) 
Social outcome “Whether they are able to get in or out of the property so that they can go out for their own 
mental health really.” (T2) 
Vulnerable “The crooks and the drug crazed people that break into houses, that worries me a bit 
because I can't do a lot about it if they do.” (DP003) 
The detail of each of the outcomes isn’t necessarily important. What is important, is that patients do 
experience poor psychological outcomes and depleting social interactions with their diseases. Similarly to 
the disease specific outcomes, where insufficient care is not achieving optimum outcomes, unnecessary 
psychological and social harm could be experienced by the patient. Despite this, some patients 
experienced feeling grateful. CP001 said she was happy to be alive: “Well I mean by happy to be alive is when 
I’ve seen, I could have been on oxygen on permanently” (CP001). DP003 expressed similar feelings: “my dad god bless 
him, I felt sorry for him lying in a bed in hospital with all his faculties here, and couldn't do nothing, stare at four walls.  I've 
got to be honest, I'm never ungrateful about life, I don't know whether I could cope with that.” (DP003). In the case of 
CP001 and DP003, both were aware of the possible alternative situations for their conditions and were 
grateful they do not suffer in that way. The psychosocial outcomes were mostly identified by patients, but 
some carers did identify specific emotions experienced by their loved one. CM nurses also recognised the 
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generic mental health of patients as being important. One focus group (T3), discussed how they 
contributed to the psychological harm of patients by inadvertently enforcing the sick role onto them by 
being so heavily involved in their care. This discussion can be found in Table 6.24: CM nurse contribution 
to psychological harm. 
Table 6.24: CM nurse contribution to psychological harm 
CM nurse discussion 
“Yeah I don’t think we, I think it’d be hard to say that we sort of harm their social aspect, I can see much more how we 
harm their, we could harm their psychological aspect if it leads to this.” 
“I think like NS017 said about the sick ones think we can sometimes reinforce what people can’t do or how ill they are 
inadvertently.” 
“I agree yeah to help move on.” 
“Just the fact that we’re monitoring them so regularly and, and we tend to umm” 
“be focussing on what’s wrong with them as opposed to what they can do.” 
“It can do yeah. Umm it can add to them sort of seeking healthcare, more readily taking less responsibility from themselves, 
umm and I think we can contribute unfortunately to depression sometimes, you know umm I guess sometimes we sort of bring 
up end of life care and people might be in denial and it’s difficult to always pitch it right I guess, you know. I think our 
approach you know obviously needs to be different to each patient in terms of discussing some sensitive issues.” 
 
6.2.5.4: Adverse events 
Adverse events were identified as a safety outcome. Falls were a commonly identified adverse outcome by 
both patients and carers, for which evidence can be found in Table 6.25: Evidence of falls as an adverse 
event. A severe consequence of falling appeared to be the fear of repeat falling, which resulted in patients 
altering their behaviour to try to prevent a reoccurrence. These behaviour changes lead to patients being 
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more home bound or restricted in the activities they could undertake without supervision, evidence of this 
can be found in Table 6.26: Evidence of the impact of falls. 
Table 6.25: Evidence of falls as an adverse event 
Patient and carer quotes 
“coming down the stairs her fell down, the last three steps, and it shattered, well when I took her down, err, to the hospital, 
they found out it had shattered all of her ankle” (DC002) 
“the last time I went in was last June because I fell down the stairs before I had the chair and broke my ribs” (CP001) 
“I was coming out the shower when I missed the Zimmer frame.  I fell back and hit my head on the tiles at the back” 
(NP005) 
Table 6.26: Evidence of the impact of falls 
Patient and carer quotes 
“I have phases where I can’t get out on my own and that’s now because I had a lot of falls and I’m frightened to go out on 
my own. So I do feel safer when I’m in the house.” (DP002) 
“I'm always frightened of falling down.” (DP004) 
“Because, I daren't go out without my sticks. I'm frightened of falling.”  (NP001) 
In addition to falls, all three key stakeholder groups identified infection as an unwanted outcome. Some 
patients described infection as a complication of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). For 
patients with COPD, preventing infections of the chest appeared vital in maintaining a stable health status 
and preventing hospital admissions. For example, DP003, who suffers with COPD, describes a time 
where IV antibiotics for a chest infection were given at home by the CM nurse, which prevented him 
from going into hospital. In addition, he acknowledges that keeping the house clean would reduce his 
exposure to infection. Other patients, carers and CM nurses described infection as an adverse event rather 
than a complication of the primary diagnosis of the patient, which is related to hygiene and the condition 
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of the environment. Evidence of this can be found in Table: 6.27: Evidence of infections as adverse 
events. 
Table 6.27: Evidence of infections as adverse events 
Patient, carer and CM nurse quotes 
“Well we’re, we’re a walking infection control risk aren’t we if we don’t adhere to what we should, our protocols so. (T3) 
“Oh definitely, absolutely. I think a clean home is most important. Because many germs, germs don’t take prisoners, they 
don’t go, they don’t particularise themselves where they go. The germs are everywhere.” (NP005) 
“Oh gosh, yeah, I mean err, really strictly speaking, if we went to the letter, I don't suppose I should have the dog here.” 
“DP003” 
“The house and sanitary conditions, yeah.” (T3) 
CM nurses briefly identified medicating as a self-care process and the possibility of medication errors (see 
section 6.2.4.1). However, they recognised that errors that occurred as a result of patients or carers were 
not reported to their incident reporting system, unlike errors they had committed. 
6.3: Areas of further investigation 
There are limitations of qualitative research, which raise doubt as to the generalisability of the findings of 
this study. Consequently, this research adopted an exploratory, sequential, mixed methods design, to 
increase the validity of the findings by using a survey to question a fourth sample of the population on 
components of the findings. The purpose of this was to determine their level of agreement, or the extent 
to which a difference between stakeholders exists. Identified here are the findings that warrant further 
investigation in the confirmatory quantitative study. 
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6.3.1: Competing definitions of  safety 
This chapter has explored in depth, the perspectives of safety in the CM programme of the patients, their 
carers and CM nurses. In 6.2.1, patients and carers described a definition that was different to the CM 
nurses. In previous research, the perceptions of safety in various settings have also been shown to differ 
between key stakeholders (40). Language disparities between patients and carers, and CM nurses could 
indicate that the terms commonly used by health professionals, and in the literature, such as ‘harm’ and 
‘adverse events’ are not familiar to patients. The CM nurses implicated that they might contribute to this 
phenomenon by classifying terminology for patients differently to other health professionals. A disparity 
in language in a service that is dependent on co-operation and co-production of health outcomes, could 
cause confusion and make achieving expectations difficult as priorities are misaligned. However, the CM 
nurses believed that medical terminology could scare patients and be difficult for them to comprehend. 
Given the divergent definitions described in this study, further examination is required to understand the 
extent to which these differences exist, and thus will be explored in the quantitative survey in study II. 
6.3.2: Identification of  responsible stakeholders 
The ISMM informed the underlying design of this research. It did so by identifying key stakeholders of 
the case management programme for engagement, as per the principles of performance measurement. 
The design of safety measurement is predominantly undertaken by researchers, health professionals and 
policy makers, rarely by patients, and less so their carers. This study has given a voice to previously 
unheard key stakeholders. The inclusion of carers in the design of the study is a result of a pilot 
presentation of the ISSM to a room of case managers studying for a post graduate qualification in long 
term conditions. They implicated carers as the unsung heroes in the care of this patient population. The 
participants of this study, regardless of which stakeholder group they were a member of, identified a range 
of individuals, groups and organisations as having a role to play in ensuring the safety of patients in the 
case management programme, including: patients; their carers, and CM nurses. However, this study has 
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been unable to elicit who has the greatest responsibility, not only for patients as the end users of the care 
service, but those who are facilitators of care, such as carers and CM nurses. 
6.3.3: Elements of  structure, process and outcome 
This study has identified dimensions for each of the structure, process and outcome domains. From this 
study, it cannot be concluded that this is reflective of the key stakeholders of the CM programme, only for 
those in this study. It is not possible to determine if all of the components identified here are 
generalisable, however, it is feasible to examine some. Selection for inclusion in the survey will be based 
on five criteria: 
1. There was overwhelming support and agreement between participants in this study, suggesting 
that this is relevant for the majority and to what extent, needs to be determined 
2. It has previously been identified in other patient safety literature and thus want to know if it adds 
to the body of evidence 
3. The findings seemed counterintuitive to theory, and thus, it is important to determine if there is a 
new, opposing contribution to knowledge 
4. The findings were expressed by only one key stakeholder group and further investigation is 
required to understand if this is generalisable to that group and whether differences exist between 
groups 
5. There is little or no research to confirm the finding and thus additional measures to this are 
required 
Structures selected for further investigation are presented in Table: 6.28: Structures for further 
investigation. Processes selected for further investigation are presented in Table 6.29: Processes for 
further investigation. 
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Table 6.28: Structures for further investigation 
Element (dimension) Findings selected for further investigation Justification  
Caseload (Working conditions) The greater the number of patients that a single case manager is responsible for, the greater the risk to 
patients. 
2 & 4 
Patient funding (Finances) Patients who are self-funded are at greater risk of harm than those who are state-funded. 3 & 4 
Equipment provision 
(Equipment) 
Adequate equipment provision reduces patient risk and improves safety (equipment such as such as 
zimmer frames, hand rails etc) 
1 
Service availability (Services) The availability of services is important for patient safety. For example the ambulance service, self-care 
classes and hospital clinics. 
1 
24 hour case management 
(Service availability) 
A 24 hour case management service would improve patient safety. 2 & 4 
Trained staff (Working 
conditions) 
Specifically trained staff reduce risk to patients and increase positive patient outcomes. 2 & 4 
Service knowledge (Services) Knowledge of available services is important for correct and suitable utilisation of services. 4 
Clutter (Environment) Having a less cluttered and tidy environment reduces patient risk and improves safety. 2 
Supported communication 
(Communication infrastructure) 
An environment in which communication between key stakeholders is encouraged can support patient 
safety. 
2 
Uncooperative carers (carer 
characteristics)  
Uncooperative carers and family members can negatively influence patient care, putting them at risk of 
poor outcomes. 
4 
Communication equipment 
(Communication infrastructure) 
Communication equipment such as care lines can reduce risk and improve patient safety. 2 & 1 
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Table 6.29: Processes for further investigation 
Dimension Findings selected for further investigation Justification  
Self-care and management Patients can be safer if they adhere to the care plan (maintain self care). 4 
Self-care and management Patients can be safer if staff adhere to policy and procedure. 4 
Self-care and management By managing medication effectively, patients can be safer. 1 & 2 
Self-care and management Participating in social activities such as visiting friends generates better outcomes (physical, 
psychological and social). 
4 & 5 
Communicating Communication between key stakeholders is important in managing outcomes. 1 & 2 
Communicating Communication between key stakeholders is important in ensuring patients remain safe. 1 & 2 
Self-care and management It is important for patients to have a suitable diet. 4 & 5 
Self-care and management It is important for patients to participate in exercise. 4 
Self-care and management Accepting life with a chronic illness and making adjustments facilitates better outcomes. 4 & 5 
Clinical care The role of the case manager is to empower patients to deliver their own care more effectively. 4 & 2 
Self-care and management Carers are an invaluable resource in managing patient outcomes and safety. 1 & 3 
Patient outcomes in this study were classified as: clinical care sensitive; functional health status, psychosocial and adverse events. Each classification has numerous 
specific outcomes. However, given the small number of participants in this study, a level of significance for individual outcomes cannot be determined. Therefore, 
participants will be offered a selection of outcomes, which relate to the four dimensions identified above, and asked to rank in order of importance.  
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6.4: Summary  
Study I has accomplished several things: 
1. It has described two alternative definitions of safety in home delivered healthcare according to 
patients and carers, and CM nurse 
2. It has confirmed the presence of multiple stakeholders existing in a multilevel nested system 
complex 
3. Provided evidence for the suitability of the structure process and outcome model as domains 
for safety measurement through the identification of 9 dimensions of structure, 3 core 
processes and 4 classifications of outcomes 
4.  Validated the Integrated Safety Measurement Model 
Therefore, it can be concluded that this study has met its aims and objectives. In order to determine the 
level of generalisabililty of the findings, an exploratory, sequential, mixed method design was adopted. 
Elements for further investigation have been proposed for inclusion in the survey, which is presented in 
Chapter 6: Study II. 
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  Chapter 7
Study II 
Quantitative examination of  key stakeholder perspectives of  
safety in healthcare delivered in the home 
7.1: Introduction 
In Chapter 5, the perspectives of key stakeholders of the case management (CM) programme were 
explored. However, as indicated in Chapter 4, the small sample size of qualitative research impedes the 
generalisabililty of the findings. Therefore, a mixed method design was proposed in order to ascertain 
whether a larger sample of the participant types were in agreement or conflict with the qualitative findings. 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to extend the sample size and triangulate the data using 
methodological triangulation through the deployment of a quantitative survey. The study protocol was 
presented in Chapter 5, section 5.3: Study II protocol. Presented here are the findings only. The survey is 
available in Appendix 11, justification for its content was presented in Chapter 6, section 6.3: Areas of 
further investigation. 
7.2: Results 
807 patients were posted the survey with an invite for them and their carers to participate. There were 62 
responses: 
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 7  responses advised that the patient was deceased 
 3 responses advised that the patient was hospitalised 
 11 responses advised that the patient had moved address 
 7 responses advised that the patient was too unwell to participate 
 35 patients completed the survey 
 In addition, 19 carers completed the survey 
A patient return rate of 4.3% was achieved for completed surveys with a 7.7% return rate when counting 
all responses, including non-completed surveys. The return rate for carers cannot be determined, as the 
(CM) programme does not know how many of its patients have informal carers. 50 CM nurses were 
invited to participate, 26 completed the survey. A CM nurse return rate of 52% was achieved. 
7.2.1: Demographics 
The demographic data (resulting from questions 1-6 of the survey) are presented in the following figures: 
 Figure 7.1: Percentage of total participants by stakeholder group 
 Figure 7.2: Percentage of patient participants with and without an informal carer 
 Figure 7.3: Breakdown of participant’s gender by stakeholder group 
 Figure 7.4: The average age of the participants within each stakeholder group 
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Figure 7.1: Percentage of total participants by stakeholder group 
Patient participants represent the largest group (45%), followed by CM nurses 
(31%) and carers (24%). 
Figure 7.2: Percentage of patient participants with and without an informal 
carer  
More patient participants had informal carers than didn’t (76% with to 24% 
without). 
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Figure 7.3: Breakdown of participant’s gender by stakeholder group. 
Across all stakeholder groups, more women responded than men. This was most 
apparent in the CM nurses responses, which came mostly from women, with only 
1% of total responses from men. More female carers responded than men, as did 
patients but to a lesser degree than carers. 
Figure 7.4: The average age of the participants within each stakeholder 
group 
On average, patients were the oldest group of participants, being 14 years older 
than carers and 35 years older than CM nurses. 
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7.2.2: Selecting a definition of  safety 
Question 7 of the survey invited particiants to select from three defitinions of safety. Figure 7.5: Preferred 
definition of safety by stakeholder group, shows that all three stakeholder groups showed a preference for 
the patient and carer derived definition. Further descriptions of the data can be found in Figure 7.6: 
Preferred definition of safety by stakeholder group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Total responses (as a percentage) for each definition of safety, indicates a preference for the 
patient and carer derived definition across all stakeholder groups, with 60% of all participants selecting 
this definition as being most reflective of their own in relation to home delivered health care. 
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Figure 7.5: Preferred definition of safety by stakeholder group 
All three stakeholders showed a preference for the definition derived by patients 
and carers (option 1) in study I (patients = 54%, carers= 74% and CM nurses = 
58%). Second to the patient and carer derived definition, patients then showed 
preference for the literature definition (option 3) and lastly the CM nurse derived 
definition (option 2). The CM nurse derived definition was second preference for 
both carers and CM nurses, followed by the literature derived definition. 
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7.2.3: Responsibility for key stakeholders 
Questions 8, 9 and 10 of the survey invited participants to identify who they perceived to have the 
greatest responsibility for the safety of each of the key stakeholders (patients, carers and NHS staff). The 
results for each question are described in the following figures: 
 Figures 7.7: Q8. Who do you think has the greatest responsibility for ensuring the safety of 
patients? 
 Figure 7.8: Q9. Who do you think has the greatest responsibility for ensuring the safety of carers?  
 Figure 7.9: Q10. Who do you think has the greatest responsibility for ensuring the safety of NHS 
staff? 
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Figure 7.6: Total responses (as a percentage) for each definition of safety 
In total, 60% of all respondents indicated that the definition derived from patients 
and carers (option 1) in study I was the most reflective of their definition of safety 
in the home. 18% of the total responses selected the CM nurse derived definition 
of safety (option 2) as most reflective, and 14% selected the literature derived 
definition (option 3). 
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Figure 7.7: Q8. Who do you think has the greatest responsibility for ensuring the safety of patients? 
Patients showed no clear preference in response: 29% believed patients to have the greatest responsibility and 31% believed 
carers have the greatest responsibility. However, 63% of carers believed that they had the greatest responsibility for the 
safety of patients. Similarly to patients, CM nurses showed no clear preference for who had the greatest responsibility, 
however, their responses were more heavily split between the NHS organisation (29%) and ‘other’ options (33%), with only 
8% indicating patients and 4% indicating carers as being ultimately responsible for patient safety. 
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Figure 7.8: Q9. Who do you think has the greatest responsibility for ensuring the safety of carers? 
Carers were the only stakeholder group to indicate a majority response; 58% of carers believed carers had the greatest 
responsibility for their own safety. Patients showed no clear preference in response, with 31% indicating carers as being most 
responsible and another 31% indicating NHS organisations.  14% of patients answered that they did not know. 33% of CM 
nurses believed carers to have the greatest responsibility, which was similar to the opinion of patients, but 25% indicated CM 
nurses as being most responsible and 25% responded ‘other’. 
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Figure 7.9: Q10. Who do you think has the greatest responsibility for ensuring the safety of NHS staff? 
Patients, carers and CM nurses all indicated the NHS organisation as having the greatest responsibility for NHS staff 
(78%, 84% and 54% respectively). 25% of CM nurses selected the ‘other’ response. 
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In summary, stakeholder groups did not achieve agreement on who was most responsible for the 
safety of patients and carers. In relation to the safety of staff, NHS organisations were perceived to 
have the greatest responsibility. 
7.2.4: Elements of  structure 
The results, in the format of percentages, for all questions relating to structure (11-21) can be found in 
Appendix 15: Results for questions relating to structure (questions 11-21). The results for each 
question are graphically presented in the following figures and text. 
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Figure 7.10: Q11. The greater the number of patients that a single case manager is 
responsible for, the greater the risk to patients 
76% of patients, 89% of carers and 67% of CM nurses agreed or strongly agreed that the greater 
the number of patients that a case manager is responsible for, the greater the risk to patients. 9% 
of patients and 8% of CM nurses disagreed or strongly disagreed, but no carers disagreed. 8% of 
patients, 5% of carers and 21% of CM nurses neither agreed nor disagreed. 
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Figure 7.11: Q12. Patients who are self-funded are at greater risk of harm than those who 
are state funded 
There was no clear agreement from the stakeholder groups about whether patients who are self-
funded are at greater risk of harm than those who are state-funded In fact, more patients and 
more CM nurses disagreed (disagreed and strongly disagreed) than agreed (agreed and strongly 
agreed). 
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Figure 7.12: Q13. Adequate equipment provision reduces patient risk and improves 
safety 
74% of patients, 100% of carers and 86% of CM nurses either agreed or strongly agreed that 
adequate equipment provision reduces patient risk and improves safety. 15% of patients did not 
know the answer and 6% of patients and 4% of CM nurses disagreed. 
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Figure 7.13: Q14.The availability of services is important for patient safety. 
The availability of services was considered important by 94% of patients, 100% of carers and 
96% of CM nurses, indicated by an agree, or strongly agree response.   
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It can be seen from the evidence provided, that patients and carers, by giving a majority response in 
agreement with the statement, believe that a 24 hour case management service would improve patient 
safety. In contrast, CM nurses disagree.  
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Figure 7.14: Q15. A 24 hour case management service would improve patient safety. 
The importance of a 24 hours case management programme for the safety of patients generated 
contrasting responses from the key stakeholders. CM nurses indicated a preference to disagree 
with this statement, with 60% disagreeing and 15% strongly disagreeing (75% in total disagreed). 
Contrastingly, 77% of patients and 79% of carers either agreed or strongly agreed that a 24 hour 
case management service would improve the safety of patients. 
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Figure 7.15: Q16.Specifically trained staff reduce the risk to patients and increase positive 
patient outcomes 
General agreement was obtained that specifically trained staff reduce the risk to patients and 
increase positive outcomes. 94% of patients, 100% of carers and 86% of CM nurses either 
agreed or strongly agreed. 
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Figure 7.16: Q17.Knowledge of available services is important for correct and suitable 
utilisation of services 
General agreement was obtained that knowledge of services is important for their suitable and 
correct utilisation. 91% of patients agreed or strongly agreed, as did 94% of carers and 100% of 
CM nurses. 3% and 5% of patients and carers respectively did not know the answer. 
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Q18. Having a less cluttered and tidy environment reduces patient risk 
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Figure 7.17: Q18.  Having a less cluttered and tidy environment reduces patient risk and 
improves safety 
Across all participants, the general consensus was with agreement. 94% of patients, 95% of 
carers and 96% of CM nurses either agreed or strongly agreed that having a less cluttered and 
tidy environment reduces patient risk and improves safety. 3% of patients did not know the 
answer and 4% of CM nurses disagreed. 
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Figure 7.18: Q19. An environment in which communication between key stakeholders is 
encouraged can support patient safety 
3% of patients did not know if an environment in which communication between key 
stakeholders is encouraged can support patient safety. However, 91% of patients either agreed 
or strongly agreed that it did, as did 95% of carers and 96% of CM nurses. 
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Figure 7.19: Q20. Uncooperative carers and family members can negatively influence 
patient care, putting them at risk of poor outcomes 
4% of CM nurses strongly disagreed and 3% of patients disagreed that uncooperative carers and 
family members can negatively influence patient care, putting them at risk of poor outcomes. 
However, 96% of CM nurses and 91% of patients either agreed or strongly agreed, as did 95% 
of carers. 
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In summary, when the responses were aggregated into agreed or disagreed, agreement was achieved 
on the following ten questions: 
 Q11. The greater the number of patients that a single case manager is responsible for, the 
greater the risk to patients. 
 Q13. Adequate equipment provision reduces patient risk and improves safety (equipment 
such as such as zimmer frames, hand rails etc) 
 Q14. The availability of services is important for patient safety. For example the ambulance 
service, self-care classes and hospital clinics. 
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Figure 7.20: Q21. Communication equipment such as care lines can reduce risk and 
improve patient safety 
9% of patients and 4% of CM nurses did not know if communication equipment such as care 
lines can reduce risk and improve patient safety and 8% of CM nurses and 5% of carers 
disagreed. Despite this, the majority of patients (83%), carers (95%) and CM nurses (83%) either 
agreed or strongly agreed. 
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 Q15. A 24 hour case management service would improve patient safety. 
 Q16. Specifically trained staff reduce risk to patients and increase positive patient outcomes. 
 Q17. Knowledge of available services is important for correct and suitable utilisation of 
services. 
 Q18. Having a less cluttered and tidy environment reduces patient risk and improves safety. 
 Q19. An environment in which communication between key stakeholders is encouraged can 
support patient safety. 
 Q20. Uncooperative carers and family members can negatively influence patient care, putting 
them at risk of poor outcomes. 
 Q21. Communication equipment such as care lines can reduce risk and improve patient safety. 
For question 12, concerning whether being self-funded influences patient safety, no majority was 
achieved, although more participants disagreed than agreed (37% to 27%). The remaining participants 
either expressed indifference (19%) or did not know (17%). Although question 15 achieved a majority 
agreement, the responses were clearly split between stakeholder types (see Figure 7.14), and therefore 
should be considered with prudence. A summary of the total findings in relation to agreement and 
disagreement can be found in Figure 7.21: Disagree and agree aggregated responses for all stakeholder 
groups for questions 11 to 21. 
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7.2.5: Elements of  Process 
The results, in the format of percentages, for all questions relating to process (questions 23-33) can be 
found in Table 7.8: Results for questions relating to process (questions 23 to 33). In conclusion, all 
statements had a high level of agreement (either agreed or strongly agreed) across all participants. 
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Figure 7.21: Disagree and agree aggregated responses for all stakeholder groups for 
questions 11 to 21. 
In all questions except 12, a majority of participants were in agreement with the findings from 
study I, which were presented as statements in this survey. 
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Table 7.1: Results for questions relating to process (questions 23 to 28) 
Question Stakeholder Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
know 
23 Patients can be safer if they 
adhere to the care plan 
(maintain self care). 
patient 0% 3% 3% 66% 23% 5% 
carer 0% 0% 11% 63% 26% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 4% 25% 54% 17% 0% 
24. Patients can be safer if staff 
adhere to policy and 
procedure. 
patient 0% 6% 3% 66% 25% 0% 
carer 0% 11% 11% 39% 39% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 0% 13% 58% 29% 0% 
25. By managing medication 
effectively, patients can be 
safer. 
patient 0% 0% 6% 54% 40% 0% 
carer 0% 0% 0% 42% 53% 5% 
CM nurse 0% 0% 4% 46% 50% 0% 
26. Participating in social 
activities such as visiting 
friends generates better 
outcomes (physical, 
psychological and social). 
patient 0% 0% 3% 50% 44% 3% 
carer 0% 0% 5% 47% 48% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 0% 4% 50% 46% 0% 
27.Communication between 
key stakeholders is important 
in managing outcomes. 
patient 0% 0% 0% 51% 37% 11% 
carer 0% 0% 5% 32% 63% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 4% 0% 38% 58% 0. 
 28. Communication between 
key stakeholders is important 
in ensuring patients remain 
safe. 
patient 0% 0% 0% 49% 42% 9% 
carer 0% 0% 5% 26% 69% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 0% 0.0% 42% 58% 0% 
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Table 7.2: Results for questions relating to process (questions 29 to 33) 
Question Stakeholder Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
know 
29. It is important for patients 
to have a suitable diet. 
patient 0% 0% 0% 51% 49% 0% 
carer 0% 0% 0% 47% 53% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 0% 4% 46% 50% 0% 
30. It is important for patients 
to participate in exercise. 
patient 0% 0% 6% 61% 33% 0% 
carer 0% 0% 11% 63% 26% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 4% 13% 62% 21% 0% 
31. Accepting life with a 
chronic illness and making 
adjustments facilitates better 
outcomes. 
patient 3% 3% 3% 57% 31% 2.86% 
carer 0% 0% 11% 42% 42% 5% 
CM nurse 0% 4% 13% 50% 33% 0% 
32. The role of the case 
manager is to empower 
patients to deliver their own 
care more effectively. 
patient 3% 0% 6% 53% 24% 15% 
carer 0% 5% 11% 47% 26% 11% 
CM nurse 0% 0% 8% 33% 58% 0% 
33. Carers are an invaluable 
resource in managing patient 
outcomes and safety. 
patient 0% 6% 3% 41% 50% 0% 
carer 0% 0% 0% 42% 58% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 4% 0% 38% 58% 0% 
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In order to visually represent the level of agreement and disagreement with each of the statements, the 
disagree and strongly disagree responses were aggregated, and the agree and strongly agree responses 
were aggregated and are presented as a bar chart in Figure 7.22: Disagree and agree aggregated 
responses for all stakeholder groups for questions 23 to 33. 
 
 
 
In summary, overall agreement was achieved with each of the 11 statements relating to elements of 
process.  
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Figure 7.22: Disagree and agree aggregated responses for all stakeholder groups for 
questions 23 to 33 
When data is aggregated for all stakeholder groups, agreement is achieved at 75% or higher in 
every statement. Disagreement occurs in no more than 5% of the sample. 
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7.2.6: Elements of  outcome 
Question 35 asked respondents to rank, in order of importance, 15 outcomes (35.1-35.15). Analysis 
has been conducted on ranks 1, 2 and 3 (the three most important outcomes). It is important to note, 
that in the free text (question 36), respondents repeatedly commented that it was difficult to assign a 
level of importance to each outcome, as they were all important. Therefore, not all participants 
completed question 35 (patients = 7, carers =3 and CM nurses = 4 did not complete this question). 
The data is presented and summarised in the following figures. 
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Figure 7.23: Outcomes ranked 
1st by stakeholder group 
Quality of life was the outcome 
most commonly ranked 1st by all 
stakeholder groups. For CM 
nurses, quality of life was 
followed by disease related 
outcomes (15%) and hospital 
admissions (10%). For patients, 
the next most popular 1st choices 
were falls followed by pain.  For 
carers, it was disease related 
outcomes followed by feeding. 
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Figure 7.24: A comparison of outcomes ranked 1st, 2nd and 3rd (aggregated) by stakeholder group 
When aggregating the data for the top 3 most important outcomes, quality of life remains the most popular for both CM nurses and carers. However, 
patients more favourably rank pain, followed by quality of life and then falls.  
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7.3: Summary  
Using methodological triangulation, Study II has been able to identify where participants agreed or 
disagreed with the findings of study I. Patients, carers and CM nurses have indicated a preference for 
the patient and carer derived definition of safety. This study has been unable to determine who is 
perceived to be most responsible for the safety of patients and carers, however it was able to implicate 
the NHS organisation as being responsible for the CM nurses. For the majority, patients, carers and 
CM nurses agreed with the statements on structure and process derived from study I. With the 
exception of self-funded patients being at greater risk, with which, patients, CM nurses and to a lesser 
extent carers, disagreed. Also, CM nurses did not agree that a 24 hour case management service would 
improve safety, unlike patients and carers. Quality of life was the most important outcome as indicated 
by all stakeholder groups. Explanations of these findings and further discussion are available in Chapter 
8. 
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  Chapter 8
Discussion 
8.1: Introduction 
An analysis of the safety measurement literature in Chapter 2 identified a series of limitations that 
rendered the majority of widely used measurement methods as counts of harm, rather than measures of 
safety. In some cases, these methods were useful as epidemiological tools or to facilitate the execution of 
further improvement processes, such as root cause analysis, through the identification of error and harm. 
However, the focus of these tools on the sharp end of the system, on outcomes, limits the understanding 
one can derive of the cause of harm and/or error. Consequently, the methods measure past performance 
and lack any predictive capability. Performance measurement suggests that the measurement of 
determinants of outcomes boosts predictive capabilities and should be devised in collaboration with 
stakeholders, including consumers. This research, therefore, aimed to describe a framework for safety 
measurement for the NHS case management (CM) programme that is reflective of key stakeholder 
perspectives. The objectives of this research were to: 
6. Create a model that identified the key stakeholders of the CM programme and overarching 
domains for measurement to inform the research design 
7. Validate the model 
8. Explore the concept of safety from the stakeholders’ perspectives  
9. Understand what it means to be safe in the home for the key stakeholders of this patient group 
and determine desired outcomes and influencing factors 
10. Devise a safety performance assessment framework that manifests the perspectives of the key 
stakeholders 
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The purpose of this chapter is to critically interpret the findings in relation to the literature and understand 
what contribution this research has made. In doing so, and in line with the proposed aim and objectives, 
this chapter will present a previously unknown understanding of safety in the CM programme. From this 
new understanding, validation of a model to aid in the design of measurement systems will be achieved, 
along with a proposal of an alternative definition of safety and the construction of a conceptual 
framework for safety measurement in the CM programme.   
8.2: Understanding patient safety in the case management 
programme 
In exploring the key stakeholders' perspectives of safety in the CM programme, a new understanding of 
safety has been achieved. An alternative definition of patient safety in home delivered healthcare has been 
proposed, extensive outcomes identified, processes inclusive of the patient determined, and structures 
across the whole system have been established. 
8.2.1: An alternative definition for patient safety in home delivered 
healthcare 
The exploration of the different stakeholders’ perspectives of safety in study I resulted in the construction 
of two different definitions of safety: one derived from the patients and carers (jointly) and one derived 
from the CM nurses. CM nurses and patients and carers shared the belief that risk reduction was a 
component of safety. However, beyond this, their definitions of safety differed.  
The CM nurse definition of safety: safety is the prevention of harm through risk reduction and 
compliance with procedure or care plan. There is inherent risk in healthcare: it will not be harm 
free. 
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The patient and carer definition of safety: safety is the meeting of complex care needs to generate 
positive clinical, physical, psychological and social outcomes and the reduction of risk of 
negative outcomes. Patients and carers can actively participate in efforts to be safe in addition to 
healthcare provider contributions. 
The CM nurses definition of safety is similar to the definition found in the academic literature and health 
policy documents. The CM nurses make reference to adhering to procedure or care plan, which is also 
found in the Davies et al. (18) definition of patient safety: ‘…use of best practices shown to lead to optimal patient 
outcomes.’ (18)pg12. The CM nurses also acknowledge the infeasibility of an environment in which no harm 
occurs. This reflects the Runciman et al. (9) definition, which describes safety as the ‘reduction of risk of 
unnecessary harm associated with healthcare to an acceptable minimum’ (9)pg19.  Given that nurses are educated using 
academic literature, and their daily work activities are dictated by policy, it is unsurprising that the CM 
nurses’ definition of safety resembles those available in the literature. 
Patients and carers, however, describe safety from an alternative perspective as a condition of positive 
outcomes, rather than the avoidance of negative outcomes. Patients and carers consider the meeting of 
patients’ needs a component of safety, which is more traditionally aligned with the definition of quality. 
For example, Lord Darzi (147) describes the effectiveness of care dimension of quality, noting that it ‘may 
extend to people’s well-being and ability to live independent lives’ (147)pg47, whereas the definition of safety is more 
commonly described as the avoidance of additional harm and is exclusive of the underlying condition (6). 
However, the CM programme does not seek to cure acute illness or injury, but rather, to optimise the 
management of long term disease to sustain quality of life. Care that does not meet patients’ needs could 
result in unnecessary disease progression and, therefore, unnecessary harm to the patient.  
Although the definitions of safety commonly share the process of risk reduction/harm avoidance, the 
existence of otherwise divergent definitions of safety between key stakeholders may be problematic, 
especially when engaging patients in safety improvement efforts. This is becoming increasingly important 
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in healthcare as large, globally influencing organisations announce efforts to involve patients in safety and 
safety improvement (186). Where differences exist, patients could strive to achieve different outcomes as 
dictated by their own perspectives of safety. Given the multitude of barriers already recognised in patient 
involvement in safety (179, 187), any additional barriers to successful and cohesive outcomes are not 
welcome. 
In order to ascertain the level of agreement with the qualitatively derived definitions, a larger sample of 
patients, carers and CM nurses were afforded the opportunity to select their preference from the patient 
and carer derived definition, the CM nurse derived definition or the Runciman et al. (4) definition. The 
purpose of the survey was to elicit which definition of safety key stakeholders felt most closely reflected 
their own views in relation to care in the home. Despite one of the definitions (option 2 on the survey) 
being derived from the CM nurse data in study I, the majority of CM nurses in the survey study selected 
the definition derived from the patients and carers (option 1). As one might expect, the majority of 
patients and carers also selected option 1. These findings, if taken at face value, indicate that the 
stakeholders’ definition of safety was most closely reflected by the definition derived from patients and 
carers. 
There are several theories that may explain this; one commonly reported in the literature is the response 
order effect. This occurs when the order of response options effects the respondent’s selection (267). 
Krosnick and Alwin (268) argue that respondents preferentially select items early in the list as a result of 
‘primacy effects’ (268)pg203. Consequently, later items aren’t afforded the same level of consideration and thus 
may be selected less frequently than those earlier in the list. This could potentially explain the high level of 
affiliation with option 1 across all key stakeholders. However, Krosnick and Alwin (268) were also able to 
determine that this was more apparent in respondents who displayed less cognitive sophistication (those 
with a high school education or lower with Word Sum scores less than 6), which suggests that this would 
have influenced the CM nurses less. 
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Alternatively, the CM nurses selection might have been influenced by the choice of definitions available. 
Zaller and Feldman (269) argue that a presupposition of a survey is that when respondents indicate a 
preference for X, it is a result of a well-defined, pre-existing state of favour for X. In actual fact, 
respondents are susceptible to partially constructed ideas, which, when questioned are subject to influence 
by the options offered. Therefore, the CM nurses might have showed preference for the patient and carer 
derived definition of safety because they did not have a previously well-defined definition and were 
influenced by its presence. After all, this definition encompasses reducing risk, which is commonly 
associated with safety, but is also more comprehensive. It includes the meeting of positive needs, rather 
than the mere avoidance of negative occurrences and is more reflective of the evolving care model, where 
harm can be experienced through unnecessary disease progression.  
8.2.2: Extended outcomes of  safety 
This research presents four categories of outcomes relating to patient safety as perceived by the 
investigated key stakeholders. These are: adverse events, psychosocial outcomes, functional health status 
and clinical care sensitive outcomes. In addition, health-related quality of life (HRQOL) has been 
proposed as an outcome because of its relationship with the four categories of outcomes. 
8.2.2.1: Adverse events: common measures of safety 
Study I implicated falls, infections and medication events as important adverse events. Adverse events are 
the most commonly measured outcome of patient safety (19, 21, 61). In this study, falls were especially 
troublesome because patients who experienced falls subsequently suffered a fear of repeated falling. There 
is evidence to suggest that as many as one in three elderly fallers develop a fear of falling (270). This fear 
becomes a risk factor for further falls (271). Blais et al. (39) and Sears et al. (38) found falls with injury to 
be the most common type of adverse event present in the medical records of home care patients in 
Canada. In addition to falls, both infections and medication errors were also identified as adverse events 
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experienced by home care patients (38, 39). Falls and infections (specifically of the urinary tract) are 
measured by the NHS safety thermometer as targeted outcomes for improvement by policy makers (21). 
In addition, the NHS safety thermometer also measures pressure ulcers (21), which are also prevalent in 
the medical records of home care patients (38, 39). The perceived importance of pressure ulcers to care 
providers can be inferred from the financial incentive placed on them in the Commissioning for Quality 
and Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework (272), which prioritises the improvement of pressure ulcer 
prevalence. It is recognised that the subjective and experiential nature of qualitative research does not 
exclude pressure ulcers or other adverse events as relevant measures of safety, simply because they were 
not identified in the sample of study I. There is evidence to suggest that adverse events, in addition to 
those identified in this research, remain important in the delivery of safe care to patients receiving care in 
the home. 
8.2.2.2: Non-traditional outcomes of safety 
Adverse outcomes are the traditional measure of safety in healthcare; however, this study has identified 
other types of outcomes that were perceived to be important to the investigated stakeholder groups. 
These were categorised as: psychosocial outcomes, functional health status and clinical care sensitive 
outcomes. 
Runciman et al. (4) give some consideration to psychosocial outcomes in their classification of safety, in 
particular, in relation to harm. They describe harm as including disease, injury, suffering, disability and 
death, where ‘disability is the experience of anything subjectively unpleasant, any type of impairment of body structure or 
function, activity limitation and/or restriction of participation in society’ (4)pg21 and disease is ‘physiological or 
psychological dysfunction’  (4)pg21. However, the clinical focus of the adverse events measured, suggests that 
psychosocial outcomes are not well reflected in current safety measurement. Previous research has 
reported that patients identified more psychological harms than physical harms (89). This study supports 
the notion that patients, and also carers in this case, place emphasis on these types of harm.  
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The healthcare of patients of the CM programme is mostly delivered by the patients, or their carers, in the 
process of self-care and management. Patients and carers in study I described self-care activities that 
prevented hospital admission and other negative outcomes. This was further supported by CM nurses in 
study II. Evidence suggests that patients who are more able to self-care are less likely to be hospitalised 
(273). Therefore, it is important for patients to be able to maintain independence through adequate self-
care provision. A lack of self-management skills has also been implicated in an increased risk of early 
readmission to hospital (274). Functional health status can be used as a measure of someone’s ability to 
perform daily activities to meet basic needs, such as self-care (275). Functional health status, therefore, is 
proposed as a safety outcome. It is hypothesised that measuring and monitoring functional health status 
could identify patients at risk of being unable to adequately perform self-care, who would consequently be 
at greater risk of harm.  
Clinical care sensitive outcomes were outcomes that were perceived to be amenable to clinical care 
interventions. Mainz (276) describes these as the five D’s: 
1. Death: a bad outcome if untimely 
2. Disease: symptoms, physical signs and laboratory abnormalities  
3. Discomfort: symptoms such as pain, nausea, or dyspnoea 
4. Disability: impaired ability connected to usual activities at home, work or recreation 
5. Dissatisfaction: emotional reactions to disease  
Some of these are captured in other types of non-traditional outcomes. For example, emotional reactions 
to disease and disability can be captured in psychosocial outcomes and functional health status. In this 
research, clinical care sensitive outcomes are outcomes that are mostly amenable to clinical care with little 
influence from social or psychological functions. One such example is the prescription of prophylactic 
antibiotics to patients prone to chest infections because of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD). 
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The non-traditional outcomes presented contribute to a person’s quality of life and thus form the patient’s 
health-related quality of life (HRQOL). In patients with heart failure, poor HRQOL is associated with 
hospital readmission and is comparable to other predictors, such as a history of diabetes, previous 
hospitalisations, and treatment with angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors (277).  
8.2.3: Patient inclusive processes 
Chapter 2 has discussed the absence of process measures in safety measurement, despite research 
indicating that patients place greater emphasis on these aspects of care (89, 174, 177). The findings of this 
research suggest that there are three broad categories of processes that relate to the CM programme: 
communicating, self-care and management, and clinical care processes of the CM nurse. 
8.2.3.1: Communicating 
In study I, communicating was identified as a process of care, one that appeared especially important in 
the prevention of disease progression and episodes of crisis. In study II, there was overwhelming support 
from the three key stakeholder groups, who believed that communicating was important in managing 
both outcomes and safety. For CM nurses, the process of communicating enabled them to empower and 
educate patients: a key component of their role. For patients and carers, it was perceived as a means of 
advising healthcare professionals of their health status, particularly when at risk of experiencing an episode 
of crisis.   
The term communicating represents the process of information exchange. In other literature, however, 
the term communication is preferred. For instance, Scott et al. (174) and Dean et al. (177) identified 
communication as a key theme in patient safety, which encompassed the means by which to 
communicate. In this research, the communication infrastructure is: the mechanisms used to facilitate the 
flow of information and understanding through the process of communicating, it has been separated 
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from the process of communicating and identified as a structure of care (see section 8.2.4.4: 
Communication infrastructure). 
The CM nurses highlighted the use of multiple terminologies, which were dependent on whom they were 
communicating with. With patients, they were reluctant to use terms such as harm. This corresponds to 
the findings of Lang et al. (40), who discovered that patients did not identify with the term ‘home care 
safety’ instead choosing language such as ‘challenges’ or ‘concerns’. When discussing the definition of 
safety with key stakeholder groups, patients and carers used positive language (meeting needs) to describe 
safety. In comparison, CM nurses used negative language (avoiding harm). The CM nurses’ reluctance to 
use what they perceived to be ‘professional language’ with patients could explain this phenomenon.  
8.2.3.2: Clinical care processes of the case management nurse 
Patients, carers and CM nurses identified activities that were undertaken by the CM nurses as part of their 
role. Sargent et al. (278) have previously been able to elicit five categories of case management tasks as 
perceived by patients and carers: clinical care, co-ordination of care, education, advocacy and psychosocial 
support. In comparison, the patients and carers of this study mostly identified tasks associated with the 
clinical care category. However, this could be because the patients and carers did not associate safety with 
the other four categories previously determined by Sargent et al. (278). CM nurses, on the other hand, did 
emphasise their need to empower and educate patients and to integrate care provision. CM nurses also 
highlighted that mis-diagnosing or mis-prescribing could put patients at risk. There is evidence of an 
overall prevalence of 42% for potentially inappropriate prescribing among community dwelling elders, 
which doubles their likelihood of an adverse drug event and is associated with a two-fold increased risk in 
emergency room visit (279), implicating the clinical care role heavily in the safety outcomes of patients. 
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8.2.3.3: Self-care and management 
The patient and carer participants of study I identified a range of activities that described the process of 
self-care. This was further supported by all stakeholder groups in study II, with the majority from each 
stakeholder group agreeing upon the importance of self-care. Carers assist heavily with self-care activities. 
Within this research, self-care extends to incorporate the activities that carers support patients to perform. 
The importance of self-care and management in preventing hospital admissions has already been 
identified in section 8.2.2.2: Non-traditional outcomes of safety. This is considered a fundamental process 
of care.  
There are measurement tools available in the literature that could possibly assist in the identification of 
patients who struggle to perform self-care. Fillenbaum (280) describes a measure of instrumental activities 
of daily living specifically for the elderly that was able to predict mental and physical health function. 
Fillenbaum (280) proposes that this tool could be used to identify patients in need of additional 
interventions. The Functional Status Questionnaire is an alternative measure of how well a patient is 
functioning (281), and others are available. Further testing of such tools would be required to determine 
their predictive capability for poor outcomes and their validity in the elderly, community dwelling 
population. There is further evidence to support the significant contribution of the patients and carers in 
patient safety. Johnson (169), and Blais et al. (39) have published data that implicates patients and informal 
caregivers in the cause of adverse events in homecare. Romagnoli et al. (188) concluded that their 
contributions were a result of an inability to perform particular self-care tasks such as caring for wounds, 
following medication regimes, managing durable equipment and keeping their homes free of hazards.  
8.2.4: Whole system structures 
Traditionally, the structure of care is mostly considered from the organisation’s perspective: their facilities, 
their staff, etc. This research heavily implicates the patient in the structure of care. 
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8.2.4.1: Environment and equipment 
The environment and equipment were both identified as dimensions of structure and are closely related. 
The environment is the surroundings within which the patient resides and conducts healthcare; it can be 
significantly influenced by the provision, availability and use of appropriate equipment, which can enable 
patients to remain safely independent and prevent harm. In addition to this research, there is empirical 
evidence available to support the inclusion of the environment and equipment in the structure of care. 
For the visually impaired, home assessment and modification, which aimed to reduce hazards in the 
environment or provide equipment, has shown to be effective at reducing falls by up to 41% (282).  In a 
study examining the reason for this improvement in falls, La Grow et al. (283) concluded that the 
environment was better adapted to the patient’s disability. La Grow et al. (283) recorded an average of 4.7 
hazards per home, some of which were comparable to the hazards identified in this research, including: 
steps/stairs, bath/shower, tidiness/cleanliness and carpets/rugs. In a more heterogeneous population, 
Clemson et al. (284) conducted a meta-analysis and discovered a 21% reduction in falls, following 
environmental interventions for the community dwelling elderly. Other research, however, has indicated 
that home hazard reduction is not effective in the general older population, although it is effective in 
targeted populations with a history of falls and limited mobility (285). 
Hazards in the home are increasingly recognised as a safety threat in home healthcare. In 2012, Gershon 
et al. (286) devised a home hazard identification checklist to facilitate visual inspection to detect hazards. 
Further work is needed to determine if the identification of hazards leads to improved patient outcomes. 
In a previous study, Gershon et al. (287) discovered a range of environmental conditions that home 
healthcare workers perceived to compromise safety, including, but not limited to: clutter; poor light, 
unsanitary conditions, damp/mould, air pollution and animal hair (some of these have also been raised in 
this research).  
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Falls have previously been implicated in this research as an adverse outcome, and improving the 
conditions that contribute to their occurrence is important in reducing their prevalence. The evidence 
suggests that improvements to the physical environment, which can be adapted with specific equipment, 
as well as the removal of other hazards, can reduce the risk of falling (284). The use of a safety assessment 
checklist to identify hazards is a process of care that, following the introduction of relevant interventions, 
could influence the structure of care as well as the outcomes of care.  
The environment has previously been implicated in the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety 
(SEIPS) model as a structure of care (199). However, it is not implicated in the Nursing Role 
Effectiveness model (201). This could be because the former is promoted as examining the system, as is 
this research, whereas the latter is specific to the role of the nurse. The physical environment of the 
hospital setting might not be sensitive to nurse intervention because the environment is more rigid and 
standardised. In the home, however, the environment is not subject to regulation and is difficult to 
standardise (40), so further consideration is required to ensure the safety of the homecare environment. 
8.2.4.2: Services 
Services – especially their availability and accessibility – were identified as a structure of care for the CM 
programme. However, this is absent from both the SEIPS model (199) and the Nursing Role 
Effectiveness model (201). This may be because these two models were designed to reflect hospital care 
where patients receive an integrated care service from a range of health professionals, such as doctors, 
nurses and occupational therapists, all whilst temporarily residing at the hospital. However, for patients of 
the CM programme, their health is dependent on a variety of care services; part of the CM nurse role is to 
facilitate their integration. The lack of availability, and access to, services such as domiciliary care (288) 
and mental health services (289) have previously been criticised for putting patients at risk.  
CM nurses raised the possibility of extended hours for the CM management programme, but rejected this 
as a viable option because they believed it would negatively impact the relationship-dependent service 
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currently provided. This was further supported by CM nurses participating in the survey, 70% of whom 
disagreed that a 24-hour CM service would improve safety; however, 74% of patients and 79% of carers 
believed that a 24-hour CM service would improve safety.  General practitioner (GP) working hours have 
been implicated in the overuse of Accident and Emergency. David Cameron explains that ‘sometimes 
people using Accident & Emergency really just need to see a GP but for hard-working people it is often 
too difficult because [they] are at work, [and] can't get an appointment at the time that fits.’ (290). This 
suggests that extending the available hours of primary care services could reduce the burden on hospitals. 
Further work is required to understand whether the service hours of the CM programme influences 
outcomes such as hospital admissions. 
8.2.4.3: Financial resources 
In study I, CM nurses felt that patients with sufficient resources to fund additional social care did not 
necessarily make choices that were best for their health. In comparison, CM nurses felt that patients 
without financial means were adequately supplemented by the state. Patients and carers didn’t explicitly 
acknowledge this in study I. However, some patients with financial means did describe delaying paying for 
things or going without. In healthcare, financial resources have been implicated in the safety of patients. 
For example, the Francis Report (12) highlighted how the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
prioritised cost cutting exercises in response to reduced financial resources, which contributed to an 
unacceptably high mortality rate. There is the possibility that budget holders could put patients receiving 
home healthcare at similar risk if patients’ needs are not prioritised. However, for the patients of this 
research, finances weren’t discussed in relation to those providing care but rather, in relation to the 
patient.  
Conversely, in study II, more patients and CM nurses disagreed than agreed with the statement that 
‘patients who were self-funded were at greater risk of harm than those who were state funded’. Patients 
who are self-funded could be reluctant to acknowledge that they are at greater risk as a result of their 
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financial resources. In contrast, patients who are state funded might find it difficult to understand why 
people with means would not choose to spend their money on ensuring their safety. Low socioeconomic 
status is associated with poor health outcomes (291) and patients of this group are more vulnerable to 
adverse events (292), which could explain why CM nurses are also reluctant to agree with this sweeping 
statement. There doesn’t appear to be any research that investigates the relationship between financial 
means for social care provision for community dwelling elders and patient safety outcomes. Therefore, 
more research is needed to understand the impact that self-funding has on patient outcomes. 
8.2.4.4: Communication infrastructure 
Communication infrastructure was identified as a structure of care and is further supported by the 
identification of communicating as a process. Communication is frequently identified in the literature in 
relation to patient safety (174, 177), and the Nursing Role Effectiveness model allocates communication 
to the process of care (201). This study categorises communicating as a process and communication 
infrastructure as a structure, acknowledging that the process is better enabled with the appropriate 
infrastructure in place.  
8.2.4.5: Patient and carer characteristics 
Four broad categories of patient characteristics were identified as contributing to patient safety: attitudes, 
patient understanding, circumstance and autonomy/independence. Patient circumstance related to the 
disease profile and the co-morbidities suffered by this patient population. Other research has also found 
that patient characteristics might possibly contribute to their risk of adverse events. In particular, in 
hospitalised care, the complexities of both the disease and the treatment have been linked to an increased 
risk of adverse drug events (2). This is enhanced in the elderly, who are also more at risk, possibly because 
of the complexity of their care and not necessarily because of age discrimination (293). Being female and 
being 80 or older, are independent risk factors for adverse drug events (294). Ethnicity has also been 
implicated as a risk factor: McDowel et al. (295) found that black patients were at a threefold higher risk 
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of angiodema (an adverse drug reaction to cardiovascular drugs) than non-black patients. In homecare, 
Blais et al. (39) calculated that for each additional comorbid condition, the risk of experiencing an adverse 
event increased by 15%. In addition, they also found that the level of risk increases as the client (patient) 
becomes more dependent (39). 
The Nursing Role Effectiveness model explicitly identified patient structural variables in the quality of 
care, including: medical diagnosis, length of stay, age, gender and education (201). In this research, the 
level of patient understanding was also implicated, and it was hypothesised that the greater the 
understanding, the safer the patient. In the SEIPS model, where the structure of care was replaced by the 
concept of the work system, ‘person’ was a component, comprising elements of education, skill and 
knowledge, motivation and needs, physical characteristics and personal characteristics (199). Carayon et al. 
(199) claimed that the ‘person’ could be the patient. 
Patient attitudes have not explicitly been identified as contributing to safety in the current literature base. 
Similarly, neither has patient autonomy and independence. However, Blais et al. (39) did find that as 
patient dependency increased (autonomy and independence decreased), the risk of adverse events 
increased. In a care environment such as the home, where patients exert more control over their 
healthcare, their attitudes towards health could contribute towards their safety.  
In the CM programme, carers have been identified as being vital to the care of this vulnerable patient 
population. Unsurprisingly then, their characteristics were also identified as potentially contributing to the 
patients’ safety. Similarly to patients, their attitudes to health and their own health were implicated in 
patient safety. The carers and patients of study I all discussed the carer positively. However, CM nurses 
highlighted the possibility that carers, and other family members, could hinder care. 
Research has indicated that informal caregiving to patients with chronic disease impacts the physical and 
mental well-being of the carers (296, 297). This research suggests that the ill-health of carers has 
consequences for patients and could possibly leave them unable to remain independent at home. The 
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burden on caregivers of patients with chronic disease is of growing importance, and research suggests that 
there are multiple factors that predict the breaking-point for caregivers. These include: the amount of 
caregiving time, an impaired sense of own identity, misidentification, clinical fluctuations, and nocturnal 
deterioration (298). Carers form a vital component of the structure of care and it is important to ensure 
that they are also capable, competent and well resourced, just like other components of the structure.  
8.2.4.6: Operational Conditions 
CM nurses highlighted a range of operational conditions that impacted their ability to perform safely. 
Operational conditions were characterised as the physical, social and organisational environment in which 
occupational activities were undertaken. In particular, the CM nurses identified caseload and training. 
Caseload is the demand on the services divided across the CM nurses, and increases if there are 
insufficient staff numbers. Following the Francis Report (12), which implicated insufficient staffing levels 
in the high mortality rate at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, staffing levels became a 
controversial topic in healthcare in England. This relationship is apparent across the healthcare system. 
Aiken et al. (299) found surgical patients experienced higher risk-adjusted 30-day mortality and failure-to-
rescue rates, when patient-to-nurse ratios were high. In addition, high patient-to-nurse ratios facilitated 
nurse job dissatisfaction and job-related burnout. Similar to caseload and staffing levels, the skill mix of 
the nurses has been found to affect the incidence of adverse events. Blegan et al. (300) found that the 
higher the registered nurse skill mix, the lower the incidence of adverse events on inpatient care units. 
Needleman et al. (301) also found that higher nursing care hours were associated with better care for 
hospitalised patients. Workload and education/skills were acknowledged as components of structure in 
the SEIPS model (199) and the Nursing Role Effectiveness model (201). The findings of this study are 
aligned with evidence available in the literature: caseload, staff mix and training are components of 
structure, which have the potential to impact patient safety. 
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8.2.4.7: Staff attitudes 
The CM nurses of study I expressed attitudes and feelings, which they believed hindered their ability to be 
entirely effective. Mostly, these attitudes and beliefs related to the clinical care setting in which they were 
working. More specifically, they believed that healthcare professionals practising in institutionalised 
settings had more control and power to influence patients to conform to behaviours that would result in 
better outcomes. They suggested that delivering care in the community relinquished them of this power, 
which was transferred to the patients, and inhibited their ability to get patients to do what they perceived 
to be best for them. The attitudes of the staff in an organisation in relation to safety is often referred to as 
safety culture (108, 109), and can be assessed with the use of tools that identify the presence of conditions 
that support the identification of adverse events (20). The attitudes expressed by the CM nurses do not 
immediately relate to the ‘safety culture’ as defined here, but this does not render it unimportant.  
8.3: A qualitatively validated model for the design of safety 
measurement systems 
The proposed integrated safety measurement model (ISMM) was developed to inform the design of this 
research. The literature around patient safety measurement was dominated by provider and staff 
involvement. However, the principles of performance measurement dictated that patients, as consumers 
of care, should be involved in the design and implementation of safety measurement. This was further 
corroborated by the growing literature on patient involvement in patient safety. Therefore, patients were 
identified as an additional key stakeholder. The ISMM was presented to a group of CM nurses who 
advised that carers were fundamental in the delivery of care services to this patient group. Although not 
originally recognised by the ISMM, because of their absence in the literature, they were included in the 
research design. 
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The findings of this research confirm the presence of a range of key stakeholders, including those 
identified on the ISMM and the representativeness of the components of the SPO model, as domains of 
the system. This constitutes the qualitative validation of the fundamental components of the model. 
However, limitations have been addressed through the revision of the visual representation of the ISMM, 
and presented in the holistic safety measurement model (HSMM). 
8.3.1: Key Stakeholders 
In the originally proposed ISMM (Chapter 3), three key stakeholders were identified: patients, staff and 
providers. This study indicates that there are a range of individuals who have direct contact with patients 
and who contribute to their immediate safety, all of whom appear to strive to place patients at the centre 
of their activities. These individuals include, but are not limited to: informal carers, extended family and 
friends and health and social care professionals. Similarly, Lang and colleagues (168, 302) found an 
extended and inter-related community of individuals involved in the care of home care patients, which 
adds to the complexity of the safety of this patient group. Beyond those that have direct contact with 
patients, there are a variety of organisations that contribute indirectly to the care of patients. These 
organisations are governed by, and conform to, laws and regulations set at national and international 
levels. This complexity was not apparent in the original ISMM, and thus a revised model has been 
proposed.  The key stakeholders are inter-related and exist in a more complex state. The WHO (186) 
presents the system of healthcare within a nested macro-meso-micro set of systems. This has been applied 
to the CM programme, a representation of which can be seen in Figure 8.1: A nested system for the 
complex care of patients being case managed. 
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Individuals, who have direct contact with the patient, form the micro system: a group of people who 
interact and work with the patient to achieve a shared goal (the health of the patient). The microsystem is 
where care is delivered; quality, safety, reliability, efficiency and innovation are realised; and outcomes are 
achieved. The micro system is nested within the meso system, which incorporates the provider 
organisations of the health and social care staff. Finally, both the meso and micro systems are 
incorporated within the macro system, which includes the relationships and networks of these provider 
organisations within a legislative and regulatory framework.  
This study has been focused on the patient, their carers and the CM nurses, who form the core of the 
microsystem for patients being case managed. As active participants within the micro system, patients and 
carers identified that they had a role to play in ensuring safety, but they did not explicitly acknowledge 
   
Micro System: connectivity 
of individuals striving to 
achieve a shared goal 
 Patient Meso System: the connection of 
multiple micro systems without direct 
contact to the core of the micro system 
Macro System: the connection of 
multiple systems within a legislative and 
regulatory framework 
Family 
Carers 
Health & care 
professionals 
Friends 
micro 
meso 
macro 
Figure 8.1: A nested system for the complex care of patients being case managed. 
Patients are at the centre of the micro system, supported directly by multiple 
individuals including but not limited to, informal carers, family, friends and health and 
social care professionals. The micro system is nested within the meso system through 
non-direct patient contact (at the provider level). Both the micro and meso systems are 
nested within the macro system (national and international level), which is governed by 
legislation and regulation. 
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who was responsible for what and who was responsible for whom. There is evidence to suggest that 
patients believe their role to be of a passive and complicit nature (185). However, patients and carers 
described activities that they undertook that amounted to actively reducing risk. CM nurses, and patients 
and carers expressed risk reduction as a component of safety. These risk reduction activities described by 
patients and carers were both clinical (related to treatment of the patient) and non-clinical (for example, 
improving security and alterations to the physical environment to prevent falls).  It could therefore be 
inferred that patients who describe participating in risk reduction activities are implicitly describing their 
contribution to safety.  
In study I, patients expressed a need to reduce risk. This was achieved through activities not traditionally 
associated with the institutional care setting, which is focussed on the clinical safety of patients. Instead, 
for patients in receipt of CM in this study, safety extended to their ‘living safety’, because the environment 
has to accommodate both care and life. The NHS Constitution insists that it is the NHS’s responsibility  
‘to ensure that services are provided in a clean and safe environment that is fit for purpose, based on national best practice’ 
(150)pg7. It is not clear whether and how this extends to patients being cared for in the home. The patients 
and carers in this study described the importance of maintaining a clean environment, thus taking it upon 
themselves to be responsible. CM nurses, on the other hand, provided examples where the living 
conditions of some patients could pose a risk to their health. If more care is going to be delivered in the 
home, further consideration is required of how the NHS Constitution translates into home healthcare. 
Study I identified a range of key stakeholders who exist in a state of complex nested systems, though it 
was unable ascertain who was perceived to be most responsible for the safety of each of the key 
stakeholders. Three questions on the survey (study II) asked respondents to identify who they believed 
had the greatest responsibility for ensuring the safety of each of the key stakeholders. The most cohesion 
was achieved in identifying who was responsible for NHS staff, with the majority of all stakeholder 
groups selecting NHS organisations. No such consensus was achieved for patients and carers. An issue 
that arises from not being able to determine where responsibilities reside is the subsequent lack of 
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accountability in the face of error or poor outcomes. Prior to the implementation of the CM programme, 
these patients would have received repeated hospitalised care, where responsibility and accountability are 
more clearly defined. The ambiguity of this aspect of the CM programme could leave patients in a 
vulnerable position. Although this research did not intend to determine these responsibilities, it does raise 
questions as to who has accountability for this patient population and its immediate informal carers. 
Responsibility for safety and outcomes when care is delivered in the home setting may never be as clearly 
defined as it is in the hospital setting, for several reasons. Despite the home becoming a clinical care 
setting, it is foremost a home, where patients and their families live. The physical environment cannot 
feasibly be adapted to meet the demands of a full time clinical care environment like a hospital. Instead, 
the environment needs to meet the needs of the household, as well as the clinical needs of the patient. In 
addition, the majority of the clinical care is not provided by a qualified healthcare professional, or in the 
presence of one. Instead, it is conducted by the patient themselves or by their carer. Seemingly, patients 
have far greater responsibility than if receiving care in a hospitalised environment. However, since CM has 
been instigated by the NHS to reduce hospital admissions, it could be argued that responsibility should 
rest with the NHS. 
The NHS Constitution (150) identifies several responsibilities of the patient, stating: ‘Please recognise, that 
you [the patient] can make a significant contribution to your own, and your family’s, good health and wellbeing, and 
take personal responsibility for it’ (150)pg11. However, the NHS Constitution commits to ensuring that the 
environment in which services are delivered is safe and clean (150). Some of the patients participating in 
study I were living in environments in which adaptations could bring about a better quality of life, a safer 
environment and potentially better outcomes. This suggests that the NHS is not successfully ensuring 
services are provided in clean and safe environments that are fit for purpose, when care is delivered in the 
patient’s home. Further work is required to establish the applicability of this constitutional right to care 
delivered in the home. 
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8.3.2: The holistic safety measurement model: a revised model for safety 
measurement design 
The ISMM was predicated on the domains for quality care, namely structure process and outcome. The 
identification of dimensions for each of the domains provides a qualitatively obtained validation of the 
utilisation of SPO model as domains of safety measurement. The dimensions can be found in Table 8.1: 
Dimensions of care in the CM programme. 
In order to accommodate the complex nested system the ISSM has been revised and the holistic safety 
measurement model (HSMM) proposed; see Figure 8.2: The holistic safety measurement model. 
 
Figure 8.2: The holistic safety measurement model
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Table 8.1: Dimensions of care in the CM programme 
Dimensions Description 
Equipment (S)  The provision, availability and use of appropriate equipment that can 
support help patients remain safely independent and prevent harm. 
Environment (S) The condition of the surroundings that the patient resides in and 
conducts healthcare. 
Services (S) The provision, accessibility and utilisation of services that can help 
patients remain safely independent and prevent harm. 
Financial resources (S) The economic means available to support the health, well-being and 
safety of patients. 
Communication 
infrastructure (S) 
The mechanisms used to facilitate the flow of information and 
understanding through the process of communicating. 
Patient characteristics (S) Qualities or features of patients which contribute to the condition of 
safety including: their attitudes, the circumstance their understanding and 
their desire for autonomy and independence. 
Carer characteristics (S) Qualities or features that contribute to the condition of safety including: 
their presence, their health and their attitudes. 
Operating conditions (S) The physical, social and organisational environment in which 
occupational activities are undertaken. 
Case management nurse 
attitudes (S) 
The way the CM nurses think and feel. 
Self-care and management 
(P) 
The activities associated with taking care of one self from brushing teeth 
to taking medication. 
Clinical care processes (P) The specialist activities of a healthcare professional to improve health. 
Communicating (P) The action of information sharing. 
Assessment(P) The action of determining the current state of the system and proceeding 
to intervene when it is insufficient. 
Adverse events (O) An adverse consequence for a patient. 
Psychosocial(O) Consequences that relate to the mental and social well-being. 
Clinical care sensitive 
outcomes (O) 
Consequences that are amendable to clinical care. 
Functional health status (O) The ability to perform typical activities of daily living. 
Health-related QoL life (O) The holistic well-being of a patient as a consequence of his or her disease. 
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8.4: A proposed conceptual framework for safety measurement 
This research has established a new understanding of the concept of safety in the CM programme. A 
conceptual framework for assessing the performance of safety in the CM programme has been proposed. 
A conceptual framework can be defined as ‘a network, or “plane,”  of linked concepts that together provide a 
comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon…not merely collections of concepts, but, rather, constructs in which each 
concept plays an integral role’ (33)pg57. 
8.4.1: Propositions 
The conceptual framework proposes relationships between the structure, process and outcome domains, 
which are exhibited within a nested micro-meso-macro system in order to represent the complex network 
within the CM programme. The major propositions of the framework are: 
1. Structure affects process – The ability of caregivers to safely perform care activities (processes) is 
dependent on the dimensions of structure. For example, patients, who are unable to use a 
traditional bathroom to perform personal hygiene, are subject to the constraints of financial 
resources to supply the appropriate equipment and install a suitable environment in which the 
patient can safely perform self-care. 
2. Structure affects outcome – Particular dimensions of the structure domain are capable of directly 
impacting outcomes. For example, patient characteristics such as the diagnosis of chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), might impact on infection rates, as this patient 
population is more susceptible to infection. 
3. Structure affects structure – Some dimensions within the structure domain influence other 
dimensions. In particular, financial resources could determine the available funds for equipment 
provision, environment adaptations and service provision. 
4. Process affects outcome – Outcomes are a direct result of the care activities (processes) 
undertaken by a variety of caregivers. For example, the prescribing of antibiotics by CM nurses 
prevents patients with COPD who develop chest infections from being admitted to hospital. 
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5. Process affects structure – Some activities of care impact on the dimension of structure. For 
example, when patients are unable to self-care appropriately, they might struggle to keep their 
homes free of hazards.  
6. Outcomes affect structure and process – The outcomes of patients and carers influence their 
ability to perform activities of care and sustain safe dimensions of structure. For instance, if a 
patient’s functional health status declines, he or she is less able to maintain self-care. 
The Nursing Role Effectiveness model proposed the following relationships: effects of structure on 
process; effects of structure on outcomes; and effects of process on outcomes (202). However, the model 
did not determine that dimensions within structure impacted each other, or that outcomes impacted 
structure and process. With respect to the latter, this may be because the conceptual framework for 
evaluating the ACNP role is designed for the acute care setting. In the acute setting, patients contribute 
very little to the conditions of structure or activities of process; these are the responsibility of the provider 
and its staff. Similarly, Kunkel et al. (198), in examining the quality system of a hospital, also found 
structure to influence process and outcome, and process to influence outcome. However, in the home 
healthcare setting, the patient controls the physical environment and the majority of care is undertaken in 
the absence of a healthcare professional. If patient outcomes are poor, this could inhibit the patient’s 
ability to sustain a safe environment and conduct adequate processes of self-care. 
8.4.2: Components 
The framework is comprised of three measurement domains, predicated on the model for the assessment 
of quality care (3). The structure domain is constructed of dimensions that represent the underlying 
conditions of the system, which typically include things such as the adequacy of equipment, the skill and 
knowledge of healthcare professionals, and staffing levels. Traditionally, the organisation or the health 
professional is the unit of assessment (303). However, the findings of this study heavily implicate the 
patient in the assessment of structure, predominantly because:  
1. Patients conduct most of their healthcare in the absence of healthcare professionals, and 
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2. This care takes place in their own home, rather than in an institutionalised setting 
The process domain consists of dimensions that reflect the types of activities undertaken in the CM 
programme that can influence both health outcomes and safety. Process measures traditionally assess the 
activities of the healthcare professionals who deliver care to patients (304). Similar to the structure 
domain, this research has identified activities that only the patients and/or their carers undertake: mostly 
self-care activities. Self-care is important in this type of care to achieve the desired outcomes and to 
prevent adverse events and hospitalisation. Poor self-care can reduce health outcomes, which can inhibit a 
patient’s capacity to self-care and place him or her at risk of harm.  
Chapter 2 discussed the characteristics of current safety measurement methods, most notably, that they 
were dominated by outcome measures (specifically measures of harm). This research has identified a 
range of harms that patients, carers and CM nurses implicated in the safety of the CM programme. It has 
also recognised the value of some of the other measures of harm available in the literature. In addition, 
this research has identified a range of non-traditional measures of safety that serve a purpose in assessing 
the safety of care in the CM programme. Outcomes such as functional health status, clinical care sensitive 
outcomes and health-related quality of life are more commonly associated with the quality of care (147). 
However, in the CM programme, they are also associated with the safety of care. By not meeting these 
outcomes, the patient’s ability to maintain a safe structure and sustain the delivery of essential care 
processes is reduced, which was previously discussed, puts them at risk of hospitalisation and adverse 
events (274).  
Following the critical evaluation of the findings in relation to the literature a conceptual framework is 
proposed in Figure 8.3: A conceptual framework for the assessment of safety in the CM programme. 
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Figure 8.3: A conceptual framework for assessment of safety in the case management programme
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The framework implies that safety outcomes of the CM programme should be more inclusive of generic 
indicators of quality, rather than just harm. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, patients and carers 
originally described safety as the meeting of needs and subsequently identified these needs as desired 
outcomes of care. Having these needs met enables patients to maintain an adequate quality of life and to 
continue to perform self-care and management activities. Without the latter, patients could be at greater 
risk of falls, infection, hospital admissions and other adverse events. Secondly, in a care service that seeks 
to maintain quality of life, rather than to treat an acute illness, not meeting the care needs of patients 
might facilitate an unnecessary deterioration in health status. Therefore, this framework further implies 
that the omission of quality care, which results in unnecessary disease progression, is a symptom of unsafe 
care i.e. care that is ineffective at delivering optimum outcomes in LTCs care is unsafe and can lead to 
unnecessary harm through the worsening of the disease state. Finally, because the framework is focused 
on the delivery of safe care across the system, rather than the avoidance of unsafe care, positive outcomes 
also ought to be monitored. By measuring the requirements for safe care, it is proposed that an issue in 
the system could be detected before an adverse event occurs. 
8.5: Limitations of the research 
8.5.1: Limitations of  study I 
The purpose of study I was to explore and understand the views of the participants in relation to their 
perception of safety. The limitations of study I relate specifically to the design and analysis required to 
achieve this purpose. The case study design is predominantly qualitative. The most prohibitive limitation 
of such research is its inability to generalise the conclusions beyond the sample population. This occurs 
for two reasons: 1) the small sample size and 2) the type of data collected cannot be subjected to statistical 
testing. This limitation is recognised and the findings presented are the cumulative views, experiences and 
perceptions of those participating in the study, interpreted by the researcher.   
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In order to overcome the shortcomings in satisfying the statistical power of analysis in qualitative 
research, Luborsky and Rubinstein (305) prefer the term ‘qualitative clarity’: the aim of making explicit, for 
open discussion, the details of how the sample was assembled, the theoretical assumptions and the pragmatic constraints that 
influenced the sampling process’ (305)pg 109. Chapter 5 makes explicit the details of the sampling method and the 
constraints that were placed upon this method are discussed in detail in section 8.6: Challenges of the 
research, adding to the qualitative clarity. In addition, the case study method has been encompassed into 
an exploratory, sequential mixed methods design to determine whether these findings might be 
extrapolated to a larger population.  
The framework analysis approach to qualitative data analysis has been criticised for lacking a theoretical 
approach, in comparison to other qualitative analysis techniques, which are underpinned by a 
philosophical assumption (306). An advantage of framework analysis is the transparency afforded to the 
approach and the easy retrieval of data due to the charting process (307). Charting allows for easy cross-
reference to the data, post-interpretation. Framework analysis provided a methodical and systematic 
approach to the unstructured and unwieldy data collected during the interviews and focus groups (243). 
As evidence of transparency and the ease by which charting can enable retrieval, an example of a chart is 
available in Appendix 8. Furthermore, data collection and analysis were conducted by the same researcher, 
thus it is argued that the full context of the data was understood and considered during interpretation, 
affording the analysis a level of consistency. 
Qualitative research serves a different purpose than quantitative research: to explore the lived experiences 
of individuals, which cannot be achieved through observation. Subsequently, the criteria by which the 
quality of qualitative research is judged differs from the quantitative concepts of validity and reliability. 
Instead, qualitative research is judged by its credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. 
Credibility refers to the believability of the findings, best judged by the original participants (252). To 
some degree, this was achieved by engaging with the original patient and carer participants to pilot the 
survey for study II. However, it is acknowledged that, as only two patients and two carers were retained, 
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further limitations are placed on the conclusions. Credibility of the findings has also been achieved with 
the deployment of the survey in a fourth organisation. The concept of transferability (to achieve the same 
results twice) is inherently difficult in qualitative research. This is because the very nature of qualitative 
research explores the individual’s lived experiences. Consequently, the individuals might respond 
differently on any given day. In addition, the nature of doctoral research, as an independent piece of 
study, has inhibited the confirmability of the findings with corroborating researchers. 
By meeting the criteria for quality qualitative research, trustworthiness and authenticity have been 
established for study I. However, in recognition of the limitations of qualitative research in drawing 
generalisable conclusions, a quantitative study was conducted within a mixed method approach to 
determine whether another sample of the population was in agreement with the findings. The utility of a 
mixed methods design is that it acts as a form of triangulation (data triangulation and methodological 
triangulation). Methodological triangulation enabled the following: 
 The unknown experiences of participants to be explored and identified using the case study 
approach,  
 The experiences to be extrapolated and examined by an additional sample using the survey 
method, which has been subject to relevant statistical analysis.  
Data triangulation has enabled different sources of data to be obtained to explore convergence or non-
convergence of evidence. 
8.5.2: Limitations of  study II 
Study II was proposed to address some of the issues around sample size and data type in qualitative 
research as part of an exploratory, sequential mixed methods study. However, it introduced its own set of 
limitations, some of which have been incorporated into the discussion to explain the findings. Examples 
are the response order effect and the skill and ability of participants to self-assess their behaviour (section 
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8.2.1: An alternative definition of safety for patient safety in home delivered healthcare). The survey 
method provides a quantitative assessment of people’s beliefs and perceptions. However, the data is still 
susceptible to subjective assessment, which can be affected by the characteristics of the individuals 
participating in the research. Some may not take the questionnaire seriously or give the correct amount of 
thought and consideration to the items; others might want to conceal their true responses (308).   
Another issue in survey research is the representativeness achieved of the total population. This study 
excluded those who could not read English and thus is not representative of the non-English reading 
community. The level of representation can further be inferred by the response rate. Poor response rates 
reduce the statistical power of the study and can introduce bias if those who did not respond, represent a 
different group within the population. The power of the study is of less concern here, because the study 
aimed describe the population and identify differences between stakeholder groups, not to quantify that 
difference. What is of concern in this study is the sampling bias that is introduced as a result of the 4.3% 
patient response rate.  
It is worth pointing out that the 4.3% return rate has been calculated by establishing the percentage of 
responses received from the total number of people invited to participate – all patients on the 
participating organisations caseload. The method of recruitment, which has been dictated by data 
protection laws, inhibited the researcher from establishing which patients on the caseload did and did not 
meet the inclusion criteria. Ordinarily, in such research methods, the response rate represents the 
percentage of responses received from an eligible population. Therefore, if it were feasible to determine 
who was ineligible to participate, they would not have been invited to participate and the response rate 
would have been higher. It is argued that the calculated response rate is inaccurate and would be higher if 
the invited population only reflected the potential participants who met the inclusion criteria. Those who 
would have been ineligible to participate include patients and carers who did not have sufficient 
comprehension of the English language to complete the survey, patients and carers who lacked the 
capacity to consent such as those with a dementia for example, and patients for whom it was 
238 
inappropriate to participate such as those on the end of life pathway (with a life expectancy of two weeks 
or less). Given the nature of the patients targeted by the case management programme, those ineligible to 
participate could have accounted for a significant amount of the population invited to participate. 
Through the sampling method, efforts were made to reduce sampling bias by randomly selecting patients 
in batches of 200 at first, and then by eventually inviting all patients to participate. This study is however, 
subject to self-selection bias, in that participants with particular characteristics are more likely to 
participate. This is examined further in section 8.6: Challenges of the research. Consequently, because of 
the nature of postal questionnaires, it is difficult to appreciate the characteristics of the non-respondents, 
and the actual representativeness of the findings cannot be determined (309). 
8.6: Challenges of the research 
The greatest challenges experienced during this research have mostly related to the characteristics of the 
patient population, in particular to: gaining access to potential patient participants, inadequate recruitment 
and poor representativeness, and poor retention of the elderly patient population. These have 
consequences and contribute to the limitations of the research (see section 8.5: Limitations of the 
research), which have implications on the conclusions one can draw from the findings.  
8.6.1: Access to potential participants 
Gaining access to patients in study I was difficult due to the isolated location of the patient population, 
which prohibited the researcher from even making direct contact without prior patient consent. 
Consequently, patients had to be recruited through the CM nurses, who were asked to take a recruitment 
pack to all patients whom they felt met the selection criteria. However, they declined, due to workload, to 
record how many recruitment packs were delivered. In comparison, in settings of the care provider, where 
patients assemble in a public place (e.g. the hospital, the outpatient clinical or GP surgery), the researcher 
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can more freely approach potential participants, once the required approvals have been granted. The 
recruitment process of patients living in the community is inhibited by ethical conduct and data protection 
laws. Under the Data Protection Act, 1998 (310) , data kept by the NHS (and other compliant 
organisations) must only be ‘used for limited, specifically stated purposes’ (310). It is not stated that patient data 
can be used for research, and, therefore, personal identifiable data cannot be used to recruit patients to for 
research.  
The sampling method of patients is heavily dependent on the ways in which a researcher can gain access, 
and some advice is available on the recruitment of vulnerable or hard-to-reach participants. Faugier and 
Sargeant (311) suggest snowball sampling as an alternative to quantitative sampling frames for hard to 
reach populations, whereby study members refer other members through a perceived network of 
behaviours within the population. However, the isolated nature and poor social visibility of the patient 
and carer populations rendered this method inappropriate. Another possible alternative sampling method 
for recruiting hard-to-reach populations is the venue-based method proposed by Nuhib et al. (312), in 
which the researcher identifies a day and time when the target population gathers at specific venues. The 
delivery of care in the home is the only known shared ‘venue’ and each patient is in his or her own home, 
making it difficult to deploy a venue-based sampling method. Instead a sampling frame was designed in 
which the CM nurses purposively sampled patients who met the selection criteria from the whole 
population. 
8.6.2: Achieving a representative sample 
There is evidence to suggest that the demographics of a sample, particularly age, can differ from the target 
population (313, 314), resulting in an underrepresentation of the elderly (315, 316). Across all ages, 
participation by self-selection results in a healthier study population (317, 318). This is increased in elderly 
populations (319), since they experience higher morbidity and mortality. This has been particularly 
problematic in this research. When designing the protocol for study I, the selection criteria excluded the 
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less well members of the population by only seeking to recruit those who were well enough to participate 
in the interview for an hour. This was determined by the recruiting CM nurse. Therefore, this would have 
biased the sample population to patients who were healthier. In the survey, patients self-selected. Given 
that the criteria for the service of the CM programme selects for those with multiple admissions to 
hospital in the preceding 12 months, co-morbidities and poly-pharmacy, it is reasonable to hypothesise 
that this patient sample has also suffered sampling bias due to the age and morbidity of the patient 
population. 
The self-selection of healthier individuals in the population could explain the poor return rate experienced 
in study II. Given that the elderly are underrepresented in clinical research, it is difficult to know what an 
acceptable return rate is. Although, this does not excuse the limitations of the reduced representativeness 
of the sample, it does provide some credibility as to the methodological validity of the research.  
8.6.3: Retention of  participants 
Although issues of retention were not significantly experienced in this research because neither study was 
longitudinal, it is worth identifying it as a potential limitation for future research. It can also give credit to 
the theory that the morbidity and mortality of this patient population presents recruitment issues and 
sampling bias. When undertaking the pilot for the survey, all patient and carer participants were contacted 
by telephone and invited to partake. However, only two patients and two carers were happy to participate. 
The remaining participants had either passed away or were too unwell. In longitudinal studies, where 
participants are required to remain in a study for an extended period of time, the elderly might be difficult 
to retain for this reason. 
8.6.4: Establishing consistency 
Surveys enable the examination of multiple variables across at least two different cases (248), in this 
survey, three different cases. It is important to achieve consistent answers across consistent questions  
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(249), which demanded that the survey be identical for all three cases. However, given the demographic 
differences between the cases, most significantly, respondent age, this was probably not appropriate. A 
survey which was more visually appealing with an increased font size and more appropriate language 
might have enabled more patients and carers to participate and capture a greater number or perspectives 
of these hard to reach populations. Consequently, this would have reduced the consistency of the survey 
because different cases would have, effectively, been responding to different surveys, making any 
comparisons across groups difficult. However, given that statistical inference was not feasible between the 
cases because of the small sample size, this would have had little bearing on the current output. 
8.7: Conclusion 
This research has proposed and validated a safety measurement design model, which identified patients as 
integral members of the CM programme: a community care service available in England for the 
systematic and targeted care of patients at risk of hospital admissions due to multiple and complex LTCs. 
In Chapter 4, the integrated safety measurement model provided the foundations for the methodological 
design of this research by identifying the key stakeholders of the CM programme from the academic and 
public policy literature. As indicated by the discipline of performance measurement, in order to ascertain 
whether an organisation is meeting the right outputs, corroboration with stakeholders must be achieved. 
This research sought to understand safety in home care as perceived by those that are key in the delivery 
of safe care. Through the exploration of these perspectives, a new understanding of the definition of 
safety and the conditions that support or fail to support the generation of safety in home delivered 
healthcare, has been developed. From this understanding, a conceptual framework has been constructed 
to guide the assessment of safety in home delivered healthcare. The conceptual framework presented, 
proposes an alternative approach to safety performance assessment, to overcome the limitations of 
current methods, which are detailed in Chapter 2. Specifically, the framework conceptualises the 
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components of care within the CM programme to guide the development and/or selection of indicators 
that reflect the contributions made by a variety of stakeholders across a complex nested system. It is 
characterised by the incorporation of the structure, process and outcome model, which ascertains that 
outcomes are a reflection of what precedes them. In addition, the framework delineates the complex 
inter-relationships between structure, process and outcome. In particular, it suggests that structure can 
directly impact outcomes, outcomes can directly influence both processes and structure and processes can 
influence structure. 
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  Chapter 9
Conclusion 
9.1: Introduction 
According to the principles of performance measurement, lagging indicators fail to deliver improvements 
in performance, and consumers should be involved in the design of the measurement system. However, 
current safety measurement methods in healthcare are outcome dependent, restricting their ability to 
improve safety. Moreover, they are neither designed nor implemented in collaboration with key 
stakeholders, like patients and carers. The need to engage patients is becoming increasingly clear, but a 
greater understanding of what contributes to safety is required, particularly in non-institutionalised care 
settings, such as the home. 
This research set out to explore the perspectives of key stakeholders in relation to the safety of the case 
management (CM) programme in order to comprehend the conditions that facilitate or inhibit the 
delivery of safe care. In doing so, this research has: 
1. Validated a model to aid in the design of safety measurement systems, 
2. Proposed an alternative definition of safety for the CM programme that reflects both the key 
stakeholders and the type of care delivered, and 
3. Constructed a conceptual framework for the assessment of safety in the CM programme. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to summarise the contribution to knowledge generated as a result 
of the research conducted and subsequently presented in this thesis. Research is the systematic process of 
generating new knowledge in a way that reduces a variety of biases and recognises the limitations of the 
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work, insofar as they exist. These limitations have been discussed in detail in Chapter 8 but will be 
summarised here. Finally, this chapter will propose future work. 
9.2: A model to inform the process of safety measurement design  
The integrated safety measurement model (ISMM) presented in Chapter 3 was a visual representation of 
high-level relationships that were apparent in the literature regarding the measurement of safety in home 
delivered healthcare. It was developed to inform the design of the research presented in this thesis, which 
amounted to the early phases of the process for designing a safety measurement system.  
The ISMM acknowledged the commonly accepted stakeholders of care providers and their staff, but also 
incorporated the patient as a key stakeholder. Patients are becoming increasingly responsible for engaging 
in healthcare activities through health services like the CM programme (35, 157, 320, 321). Furthermore, 
patients are becoming increasingly involved in research related to understanding (172-176) and improving 
safety (179, 182, 184, 186). Consequently, the research design targeted the recruitment of both patients 
and staff of the CM programme (i.e. CM nurses). Carers did not appear to feature as heavily in the 
literature as patients, but after presenting the ISMM to a group of CM nurses, they identified carers as 
having an integral role in the care of this particular patient population. This was further confirmed when 
some of the patients who had agreed to participate in the study requested that the interviews be held 
jointly with their carer because they did not feel sufficiently confident to participate without them.  
Following the exploration of the concept of safety in home healthcare in study I, the key role carers have 
in the care provision of this patient group became apparent. In addition, many other providers of care 
external to the NHS were identified, each contributing to different, or overlapping, components of care 
provision. The large range of stakeholders identified in study I introduced a level of complexity that was 
not previously considered in the ISMM. The acknowledgement of the simplicity of the key stakeholders 
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of the original ISMM required adaptations to be made to the model that more accurately reflected the 
complexity of care. Instead, a nested model of macro, meso and micro systems has been proposed with 
patients located at the centre of care. The revisions have been made and are presented in the holistic 
safety measurement model (HSMM) (see Figure 8.2: The holistic safety measurement model). This model 
is characterised by the recognition that the components of the system are inextricably linked and only 
explicable in reference to the whole. These components are: 
 Macro - the connection of multiple systems within a legislative and regulatory framework 
 Meso - the connection of multiple micro systems without direct contact to the core of the micro 
system at the provider level 
 Micro - connectivity of individuals striving to achieve a shared goal 
This nested system can now account for multiple provider organisations that sit in the meso level, with 
staff members providing care at the micro level. All of whom, however, are constrained by legislative 
governance at the macro level. 
In adopting a proactive systems approach to safety measurement, the structure, process and outcome 
model of quality care (3) was proposed as a foundation for the domains of safety measurement in the 
homecare setting. It was selected following an examination of the literature, which concluded that its use 
in healthcare quality and safety thus far, evidenced its utility to measure and/or monitor safety. Using 
these domains to guide the qualitative data collection across all participant types, the findings have 
demonstrated, through the identification of dimensions within each domain, that the structure, process 
and outcome framework is capable of describing the underlying factors (structures) and activities 
(processes) that contribute to the outcomes of the patients of the CM programme.  
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9.3: An alternative definition of safety for the case management 
programme 
The exploration of safety from the key stakeholders’ perspectives uncovered an alternative definition of 
safety, one that could be applied specifically to the CM programme. This research has presented evidence 
that a more appropriate definition of safety in CM care could be: 
“the meeting of complex care needs to generate positive clinical, physical, psychological and 
social outcomes and the reduction of risk of negative outcomes. Patients and carers can actively 
participate in efforts to be safe in addition to healthcare provider contributions.” 
Like the definitions found in the literature (4-6, 59), this alternative definition recognises the reduction of 
risk of negative outcomes, or adverse events, as a component of safety. However, unlike the preceding 
definitions, it uses positive language about delivering safe care, rather than negative language that about 
avoiding harm. This is reflective of a whole systems approach, rather than a systems approach specifically 
to safety. This means that it does not de-compartmentalise safety as an independent component of care 
that can be tackled in isolation (in a somewhat reductionist approach), but incorporates it into the whole. 
This is important because of the nature of care being delivered: by not producing optimum outcomes (the 
best outcomes under the circumstances), patients may experience unnecessary harm as their health 
deteriorates more quickly. This research describes a contemporary definition of safety that reflects the 
perceptions of patients and carers who are increasingly active participants in their healthcare.  
It is acknowledged that the alternative definition of safety presented is only representative of the CM 
programme. This is because of limitations relating to the design of the research, specifically, the targeted 
exploration of key stakeholders solely of the CM programme. 
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9.4: A conceptual framework for safety assessment in the case 
management programme 
The literature review identified limitations of the current mechanisms for measuring safety. It also 
highlighted deficiencies in the research community’s understanding of safety in home-delivered 
healthcare, in particular in the CM programme. A conceptual framework, presented in this thesis, defines 
what is meant by safety in home-delivered healthcare. It has been constructed from an understanding 
achieved from multiple methods. Firstly, the patient, carer and CM nurse perspectives’ were explored 
using interviews and focus groups. Components of these perspectives were further examined in a 
quantitative survey to investigate their generalisability. Finally, these perspectives were compared to the 
perspective presented in the literature, and where appropriate, the literature has been incorporated.  
The framework conceptualises the system of safe care within the CM programme, as perceived by the key 
stakeholders. Its purpose is to guide the development and/or selection of indicators in the assessment of 
safety. It is aligned to the alternative definition of safety presented in this thesis and is characterised by the 
delineation of the complex inter-relationships between structure and process and outcome. There are 
three central tenants that are innovative to the proposed framework and can be attributed to the level of 
control afforded to the case managed population: 
1. There are patient dependent dimensions of structure, including: the patient’s living 
environment and therefore, clinical care environment; resources; and the characteristics 
of informal caregivers 
2. There are patient dependent dimensions of process: self-care and management activities 
3. The measurement of non-traditional outcomes that pose a risk to the patient’s ability to 
safely conduct self-care  
248 
The opportunity to identify patients with deteriorating health through a sensitive and responsive 
measurement system could facilitate targeted interventions. These interventions could rescue patients 
from deterioration and reduce their risk of traditional adverse outcomes. This research therefore, also 
supports the measurement of traditional outcomes of safety, such as adverse events. There are tools 
currently available to measure both non-traditional safety outcomes identified in this thesis and the ability 
of patients to perform self-care. The conceptual framework highlights a range of factors across the 
domains of structure, process and outcome that facilitate or hinder the condition of safety, encapsulated 
within a macro-meso-micro nested system. 
9.5: Limitations and challenges of the research 
The limitations and challenges of the research have been addressed in detail in sections 8.6 and 8.7 
respectively and the main issues are reiterated here. The qualitative nature of study I reduced its 
generalisability. However, this was addressed by the mixed method research design, in which a 
quantitative survey was deployed sequentially to determine the generalisaibilty of key findings. 
Unfortunately, the 4.3% return rate for patient surveys reduced the representativeness of the findings. 
Thus the ability to conclude that the findings are generalisable is compromised. The poor 
representativeness of study II is mostly likely a combination of self-selection bias of the invited 
participants and the mechanism of recruitment which forced the researcher to invite individuals who did 
not meet the inclusion criteria. Self-selected study populations tend to attract the healthiest members of 
the population (317, 318); this holds particularly true in elderly populations (319). Those who did not 
meet the inclusion criteria included those who could not read and/or write English and who did not have 
the capacity to consent. However, it is important to recognise the value in achieving an understanding of 
the sample and the implications this has.  
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This research contributes to a body of evidence on the difficulties and challenges of conducting research 
in elderly patient groups. Despite the challenges raised previously and the limitations they impose on the 
research and the implications for the conclusions, it is important to engage this patient population in 
research. As it grows in size, generating a greater burden on healthcare services worldwide, new care 
services, interventions and drug therapies will become available to reduce the burden. Consequently, there 
will be a greater need to undertake research with this patient population, and a greater demand will be 
placed on the patients to participate. Crosby et al. (322) argue that research has a tendency to overvalue 
large sample sizes and undervalue small samples sizes; this could inadvertently direct research interest 
away from studies that involve under-served and difficult to reach populations, such as the isolated elderly 
population targeted here. 
Research in elderly populations is underrepresented in the literature, owing to the specific challenges – 
some of which have been experienced in this research - of engaging with this patient population. 
Although these challenges impose limitations on the research, it is argued that ‘unrepresentative’ research 
that is credible is better than no research at all. This is because, in order to develop solutions to the very 
serious problems identified, further research that reflects the cause of these challenges and how they 
might be overcome is needed.  
9.6: Implications of the research 
Since the inception of this research, the literature has been populated with several articles that enhance the 
implications of this work. Lang has described the complexities of safety in home healthcare, which are 
derived from a series of research undertaken by the Canadian Patient Safety Initiative (CPSI) in 
collaboration with VON Canada. It has been established that the homecare environment is both 
uncontrolled and unregulated. Consequently, safety in this environment is most concerned with mitigating 
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the risks (168). The home is particularly complex because it cannot be easily standardised (40). Lang (323) 
recommended that research: 
 Engage with a range of stakeholders, including: patients/clients, family members and paid and 
unpaid caregivers to develop an understanding of safety in the home 
 Develop a definition of safety specific to home healthcare to contribute to the development of a 
comprehensive framework 
 Explore research designs and methodologies to capture the complexities of safety in home 
healthcare 
The research presented in this thesis has, in some way, responded to the recommendations made by Lang 
(323), thus contributing to the theoretical evidence base on safety in home healthcare. This research 
engaged with patients, their family members (who were unpaid carers) and healthcare professionals of the 
NHS to achieve a novel understanding of safety in the context of case managed care in England. A 
definition of safety is now available that reflects key stakeholders at the micro level, as well as the type of 
care provided in the unique setting of patients’ homes. This understanding has been collated into a 
descriptive framework that can be used to inform the assessment of safety performance. Furthermore, the 
HSMM can be used to inform the design of future work to capture the complexities of safety in home 
healthcare in a range of care services. Firstly, this can be achieved by advising the research of the complex 
nested system, to ensure consideration is given to the large network of key stakeholders. Secondly, this 
can be achieved by proposing the system is broken down into its component parts, namely, structure, 
process and outcomes.  
In addition to the theoretical and possible methodological implications, this research could have practical 
implications too. The application of the conceptual safety assessment framework presented here, could be 
applied in practice and stimulate safety improvement. Several research activities that would facilitate this 
have been proposed in 9.7: Future work. 
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More recently than Lang and colleagues, Vincent et al. (148) (first presented in 2.6: A recent proposal for 
progress), proposed a five-dimension framework that reflects the information thought to be required to 
generate a comprehensive and rounded picture of safety. The research presented in this thesis, which was 
devised and conducted prior to the publication of the Vincent et al. (148) framework, is inadvertently 
aligned. This alignment is described in more detail in Table 9.1: Alignment of research with recent 
thinking. 
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Table 9.1: Alignment research with recent thinking 
Current thinking – five dimension for safety 
measurement (adapted from (148)) 
Alignment of proposed framework 
Measures of harm, both 
psychological and physical. 
This research supports the current use of physical and clinical adverse event measures, as well as those that are 
psychological and social in nature. 
Measures of reliability, which 
encompass behaviours, process and 
systems 
This research has proposed the use of both structure and process measures (originally described by Donabedian) in order 
to encompass measures of behaviours and the underlying system. 
The information and capacity to 
monitor safety on an hourly basis 
This research has not proposed specific indicators. However, the framework has been constructed and dimensions that 
imply the need for sensitivity have been included. For example, the framework indicates the measurement of functional 
health status as an outcome of safety in order to detect patient deterioration and promote rescue to prevent worse 
outcomes. The development of indicators for the framework has been discussed in 9.7: Future work.  
The ability to anticipate problems and 
be prepared 
Through continuous or frequent monitoring of structures and processes, patterns that lead to poor outcomes can be 
established. In recognising these, limits or standards can be devised to prevent a breach of optimum conditions that lead 
to harm.  
Integration and learning from safety 
information 
The conceptual framework proposed is a central component of the process of assessment and its use should become 
integrated into the process of care. Assessment should always facilitate interventions to improve care and provide evidence 
of good practice. 
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Vincent et al. (148) claim that their framework can assist in the progress of safety measurement and 
monitoring; the alignment of the framework proposed in this thesis can also contribute to this progress. 
9.7: Future work 
Despite the number of implications, the findings have raised additional questions worth further 
examination. These newly identified research questions relate to one of three things: 
1. Further development of the conceptual framework in its current setting in order to: 
a. Quantify the strength of the relationships between the dimensions of the framework 
b. Validate the application of the framework in a safety improvement capacity 
2. Development of the conceptual framework in alternative settings using the same methodology 
informed by the holistic safety measurement model 
3. Examination of some of the intricate findings of the research  
This project set out to begin the process of designing a measurement system. In the early phases of 
measurement design, stakeholders need to be engaged in order to understand their expectations and their 
contributions. This project has had to develop a fundamental understanding of safety in healthcare that is 
delivered in the home. It has not sought, however, to quantify the relationships between the dimensions 
of the framework, validate the framework as a method for improving safety or make it applicable to other 
settings. Nevertheless, all of these provide opportunities to conduct further work, which can be done by 
either building on the current application with the intent to prove it viable in the improvement of safety, 
or by applying the theory to another setting. Furthermore, some of the details of the findings raised 
questions that warrant further investigation. Three pathways for future work are depicted in Figure 9.1: 
Opportunities for further work. 
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This research has developed a conceptual framework, predicated on the structure, process, outcome 
model, which identifies components of a system that generate the condition of safety. This has primarily 
been derived from the perspectives of key stakeholders, namely patients, carers and CM nurses in studies 
I and II. The literature perspective has been considered in Chapter 8 and incorporated into the 
framework, where relevant. 
Further research could be undertaken to test the significance of the relationships between each of the 
dimensions. This could be achieved using structural equation modelling. Kunkel et al. (198) used a cross 
sectional design in which they delivered a questionnaire derived from an interview study that asked basic 
yes or no questions on each of the three domains of quality. A progressive, systematic procedure of 
statistical analyses was conducted on the survey data including, in order of application: exploratory factor 
analysis, confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling. These enabled Kunkel et al. (198) 
to establish significant relationships between the three, as depicted in Figure 3.6. Presented in Chapter 3 
(Figure 3.7), the Nursing Role Effectiveness model was also subject to structural equation modelling using 
a cross sectional design questionnaire, which demonstrated it to be a well-defined conceptual framework 
in which the relationships were, for the most part, supported by empirical testing (201). Similar to Kunkel 
et al. (198) and Doran et al. (201), a cross sectional study could be deployed to collect data on each of the 
dimensions identified from this study using a questionnaire. 
The next phase in the development of a safety measurement system would entail the identification of 
indicators relevant to the dimensions identified in the framework. The indicators to be used would need 
to be agreed upon in a preliminary study, which could be achieved through a method such as a Delphi 
Consensus (324). Then, the data could be collected over a period of time, and the relationships could be 
tested using structural equation modelling. Once the relationships have been established, indicators of the 
linked dimensions can be selected. When a full measurement system is developed, a randomised control 
trial (RCT) could be implemented to test whether the presence of the measurement system actually leads 
to more improvements, than a control group. An RCT randomly assigns participants to either the 
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intervention or control group, which reduces the risk of error and softens the impact of other variables 
that might contribute to the outcomes, enabling a cause and effect relationship to be established (325).  
Alternatively, the work conducted here could be transferred to a different, untested setting. This could be 
done in two ways: by testing the HSMM model as a method and developing a specific framework for the 
new setting and compare the findings to those achieved in this project, or by taking the measurement 
framework proposed here, and directly applying it to a different setting in much the same way as 
described previously.  
In addition to continuing to make progress in the development of a safety measurement system, as 
described previously, further research could be undertaken to investigate some of the more intricate 
questions that stem from the findings of this research. In particular, CM nurses raised the possibility of 
extended care hours, but CM nurse agreement was not achieved. However, patients and carers did agree 
that a 24-hour CM service would improve safety. Further investigation could be undertaken to examine 
whether there is any association between the restricted hours service provision of the CM programme and 
out-of-hours hospital admissions. A retrospective record review could compare the number of hospital 
admissions for the case managed population during the hours that the service is available and unavailable. 
9.8: Contribution to knowledge 
This research provides contributions to knowledge in the domains of both the conceptual and 
methodological. Furthermore, coupled with further research, it has potential to contribute to the practical 
and to policy.  
Following an extensive literature review, a model was devised that described the key stakeholders of safety 
and proposed the use of the structure, process and outcome (SPO) components of care as measurement 
domains in a systems approach to safety measurement. This model was used to inform the design of the 
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research as far as it pertained to the participation of multiple key stakeholders (discussions with whom 
were guided by the SPO model). Although the original visual representation of the model has been 
revised to better reflect the system of care, the fundamental principles upon which the original was built 
have been qualitatively validated; specifically, that there are multiple key stakeholders of safety including 
patients, front line staff and provider organisations, and that the SPO domains sufficiently categorised the 
contributory factors of safety. In addition, carers have been identified as key stakeholders. A range of 
provider organisations and their front line staff have also been identified, in addition to the NHS, within a 
complex nested system.  
Methodologically, the model provides an opportunity to support the design of other measurement 
systems by helping users engage with key stakeholders such as patients, their carers and front line staff. 
Using this model, a methodological contribution has been made to the general body of knowledge. 
Through the newly acquired understanding of safety, a definition of safety in home healthcare has been 
described as: 
“the meeting of complex care needs to generate positive clinical, physical, psychological and 
social outcomes and the reduction of risk of negative outcomes. Patients and carers can actively 
participate in efforts to be safe in addition to healthcare provider contributions”. 
This definition of safety reflects the patient-dominated care provided by the CM programme. In 
particular, failing to meet patients’ needs could result in disease progression and unnecessary harm. The 
importance of the patient contribution is further recognised in the conceptual framework. Non-traditional 
outcomes of safety are proposed, such as functional health status, because of the influence they have on 
the patient’s ability to sustain patient-dominated structures and processes of care, which in turn influence 
traditional measures of harm. The conceptual framework specifies a range of factors within the domains 
of structure and process that are contributory to the outcomes of care. This framework provides a holistic 
overview of the system to guide the assessment of safety.  
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Although not tested in this research, the project could potentially provide a contribution to practice. The 
use of the framework in healthcare organisations could in the future assist in monitoring and measuring 
the safety of a system. Future work has been proposed in detail in Chapter 9 to support this progress. 
This research has queried the transferability of hospital-derived models of patient safety to the community 
setting and provided evidence that the patient-controlled environment renders these models limited in 
their application as healthcare professionals have less influence over the structures and processes of care. 
The need to better understand this care environment and the complex, dynamic relationships between 
patients and healthcare professionals could be identified as a policy priority as these services grow in 
demand in line with an ageing population. 
9.9: Conclusion 
The research presented within this thesis, has led to a novel understanding of safety in the setting of home 
care. The research has shown the importance of recognising the change in care delivery setting and the 
distinct difference in contribution made by the different stakeholders upon traditional methods of 
operating within health care, specifically examining the effect of this change upon safety in the CM 
programme. 
By bringing patients from the hospital setting to their own homes (the CM programme), the 
considerations for safe healthcare must be re-appraised. The setting becomes highly varied and under the 
control of the individuals receiving the care, rather than under the control of professionals. These 
individuals have different expectations of safe care than to those receiving care in the hospital setting. 
These expectations have been examined in this research, and an alternative definition of safety is 
proposed that reflects both the key stakeholders investigated and the type of care delivered to this patient 
population.  
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The patients receiving care within the CM programme are characterised by the effects of their long term 
condition, and an important aspect of their safety is the avoidance of the unnecessary progression of their 
disease. A necessity of the CM programme is its reliance on patient self-care; whereby, the patient is 
expected to take responsibility for aspects of his or her own care. Anything that inhibits a patient’s ability 
to self-care leads to a reduction in safety.  
Through critical examination of the state of the art of safety measurement, it has been possible to 
elucidate the inappropriateness of isolated outcome measurement use, which, since the inception of this 
research, is becoming increasingly recognised. Consequently, this research has sought to identify factors 
contributing to the condition of safety that have been incorporated into a safety measurement framework. 
From this framework it is possible to identify new factors for measurement, which could potentially lead 
to the improved safety of patients within the CM programme.  
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Appendix 12: Thematic framework 
A priori theme Theme Sub-theme Micro-theme 
1: Definition of 
safety 
1.1: Case management 
nurse 
1.1.1: Unattainable 
nature of safety 
 
  1.1.2: Compliance with 
best practice 
 
 1.2: Patients and carers 1.1.3/1.2.1: Reduction 
of risk 
 
  1.2.2: Meeting of needs  
  1.2.3: Contribution of 
patients and carers 
 
2: Multiple key 
stakeholders 
2.1: Patients   
 2.2: Informal carers   
 2.3: Organisations and 
their staff 
  
3: Structure 3.1: Equipment   
 3.2: Service   
 3.3: Environment   
 3.4: Financial Resources   
 3.5: Communication 
infrastructure 
  
 3.6: Patient 
characteristics 
  
 3.7: Carer characteristics   
 3.8: Operational 
conditions 
  
 3.9: Staff attitudes   
4: Process 4.1: Self-care and 
management 
4.1.1: Medicating 4.1.1.1: Storage 
   4.1.1.2: Prescription 
management 
   4.1.1.3: Self-
medicating 
   4.1.1.4: Carer 
administration 
  4.1.2: Adjusting to LTC 4.1.2.1: Reducing 
activities 
   4.1.2.2: Changing 
role 
   4.1.2.3: Changing 
behaviour 
  4.1.3: Personal care  
  4.1.4: Home care  
  4.1.5: Diet management  
  4.1.6: Functional  
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mobility 
  4.1.7: Exercise  
 4.2: Clinical care of case 
manager  
  
 4.3: Communicating   
5: Outcomes 5.1: Adverse events   
 5.2: Clinical care sensitive 
outcomes  
  
 5.3: Functional health 
status 
  
 5.4: Psychosocial 
outcomes 
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Appendix 13: Evidence of processes of self-care and 
management sub-themes 
Sub-theme Patient and carer quotes 
Medicating “Well, first and foremost I suppose is making sure that she takes all her medication.” (CC001) 
“I am managing all of my medication, I’ve got a lot of medication that I take.” (DP005) 
Adjusting to 
LTC 
“Yes, yes. Erm, I do like to try and keep things clean, you know. Erm, and bless him, I mean 
*husband* does a lot, you know, but obviously it’s not as you always want it is it?  But no, I’ve had 
to let that go over my head now because there’s nothing I can do about it, you know. And he does it, 
you know.” (CC001) 
“The quality of life I have now is I can't work, which I did ... I did used to err like being a ... you 
know, bringing money into the house, being a breadwinner if you like.  I found that important, but 
that's probably because of my age, I'm a bit old-fashioned like, you know what I mean. Like I say, 
I've never had pressure put on me off DC003 anyway, so.” (DP003) 
“It stays … it has to adjust because if you cannot adjust you’ll be like the dinosaur, die out very 
quickly. So I adjust to what’s around me, namely my computer which I can use. I can walk a few 
steps, but not unaided.  And err, otherwise mobility is the big problem. Not, my hearing, mobility.”  
(NP005) 
 
Personal 
care 
“If he’s well, I still have to go up with him now, but when he’s really, really, really bad, he can’t get in 
and out the bath so I have to help him in and out you know.” (DC003) 
“So when I wash him and he turns round he has to hold onto a wall, because he couldn’t just stand up 
on his own.” (DC001) 
“She never asks me, umm there are times when she wants a little bit of adjustment with her earring, 
nonsensical things, but not for a woman. She wants to put her earrings on and that; she has difficulty 
fastening them etc.  In fact I've had to do them this morning before she went out. But she's pretty 
independent and err she likes to do things herself.  The same as she has a shower.” (NC001) 
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Home care “He, [CC001] erm, he does all the cooking, the cleaning.” (CC001) 
“I mean DP002 goes round with a duster but I wash, I cook, I make the bed, err – well, everything.” 
(DC002) 
“I don't want anybody in to clean, I can clean myself.  But in my own way.” (NP001) 
Diet 
management 
“Yes. As, as on the ball with the diabetes they can eat so much  and you know, five a day and this 
that and the other, but her has these books from, from British Heart thing and they tell you what, err, 
what they can eat or whatever, what to keep off.” (DC002) 
“I've got into that now with this err, my chest being like it is, I probably have an interest because 
otherwise I've got to keep mucking about, but you know, recipes, oh look at this DC003, these are 
low calore recipes, a low fat recipe, things like that.” 
(DP003) 
Functional 
mobility 
“Well sometimes with his breath, he can’t go to the toilet and everything and I have to go to the 
toilet and help him and things like that.” (DC003) 
“That is fairly recent since my wife died, and that’s come from er, probably Social Services, and 
that’s a help to me because needing a stick to walk around the house, it was difficult to carry 
anything, but with that trolley, come table, I can cope with carrying numerous at one time.” (DP005) 
“Oh she most certainly does.  Well I think ... I think she's depressed. In fact she said the other day, 
it's strange you bring that up, umm; she says I'm just absolutely fed up with being stuck in the 
house.” (NC001) 
Exercise “I did have one of them [trampoline] in the COPD classes and it was brilliant, you know, erm, I 
don’t go on it, you go on it more than I do, don’t you?  But erm, I do try and do some exercises on 
it, but obviously I can’t go mad on it, I can’t go jumping up very high.” (CP001) 
“Well I’ve said to her, err, if we go to, not to shop, I says if, err, we go to, err, err, Merry Hill, we 
can walk round Merry Hill inside. I says and you can walk and exercise.”  (DC002) 
“And I did like to go swimming, but I don't go very often now. Yeah, I just forget these things. As 
I've got progressively worse, swimming got fired out, but I did have a thing off the government, the 
Labour government, so as I could go swimming for nothing.”  (DP003) 
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Appendix 14: CM nurse transcript – service knowledge 
There’s something sort of... as well with perceptions, isn’t it?  Because, um, and that can also be 
linked with care providers as well, perception that everyone out there in the ethos knows where 
services are and how to access services and how to use them, um, you know, because again, you’ll 
have a situation where a daughter is looking after her father, struggling really on her knees and then 
trying to get services for the safety of both, both the patient but also for the carer, and yet the 
service providers are just handing out paper, so therefore, you know, to me it’s... I don’t want to say 
no, yes, but if you have money, oh, that means we can give you a paper, you can go and go out 
there and do your shopping yourself, but you have to know what you’re going to shop, where you 
need to go and shop.  It’s not like you’re going to go to Tesco and Sainsbury’s, this is something 
completely different.  So you give me a list and says ‘here a shopping list, you can go and shop for 
many of these things’, and from what I was getting from the carer is ‘yes, I’m having these, I’m 
intelligent enough and able to read and understand, but how do I balance which is the best and 
which is the, you know, which is going to be suitable for me, how do I, I’ve never had this 
experience before so how do I gauge the service I’m going to receive from going outside to a 
private compared to a statutory organisation that used to provide a service?’  So here’s an element 
again one could say, I mean decisions and choice, how does someone way up who hasn’t got that 
background getting in because if we’re actually going to send papers out to patients and say here 
you are, these are all the patients, these are all you can look and you can get from here and there, 
and they go and make the wrong choices, the impact on that carer, on, on that person who’s 
receiving the care can be quite significant because it could be deemed as I’ve failed to provide 
something that’s suitable, to the point where they could actually become financially stripped 
because they’re paying out for something they’re not quite sure if this is the right amount or not.  
So again, it’s, you know what I mean, providing care and supporting an individual who needs to be 
supported is looking at the whole picture, it’s not just looking at one aspect, it’s looking at the 
whole, the global picture, so with this situation is looking at the carer but it’s also looking at the 
patient self as well and other extended family who seems to keep their distance cos sometime that 
has, you know what I mean, significant knock-on effect on the, um, the vision of care.  And whose 
responsibilities, whose responsibility is it to actually help the carer who’s a novice one would say in 
accessing care and the patient who is dependent on somebody to actually provide that service. 
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Appendix 15: Results for questions relating to structure (questions 11-21).   
Question Stakeholder Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
know 
11. The greater the number of patients that a 
single case manager is responsible for, the 
greater the risk to patients. 
patient 3% 6% 9% 44% 32% 6% 
carer 0% 0% 5% 37% 53% 5% 
CM nurse 0% 8% 21% 33% 33% 4.% 
12. Patients who are self-funded are at greater 
risk of harm than those who are state-funded. 
patient 9% 27% 15% 15% 9% 24% 
carer 6% 33% 0% 28% 17% 17% 
CM nurse 13% 25% 38% 13% 4% 8% 
13. Adequate equipment provision reduces 
patient risk and improves safety (equipment 
such as such as zimmer frames, hand rails etc. 
patient 0% 6% 6% 44% 29% 15% 
carer 0% 0% 0% 32% 68% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 4% 8% 54% 33% 0% 
14. The availability of services is important for 
patient safety. For example the ambulance 
patient 0% 0% 0% 37% 57% 6% 
carer 0% 0% 0% 37% 63% 0% 
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service, self-care classes and hospital clinics. CM nurse 0% 0% 4% 67% 29% 0% 
15. A 24 hour case management service would 
improve patient safety. 
patient 0% 6% 6% 44% 29% 15% 
carer 0% 5% 5% 37% 42% 11% 
CM nurse 13% 57% 9% 13 4% 4% 
16. Specifically trained staff reduce risk to 
patients and increase positive patient 
outcomes. 
patient 0% 3% 0 47% 47% 3% 
carer 0% 0% 0% 477% 53% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 4% 4% 41% 46% 4% 
17. Knowledge of available services is 
important for correct and suitable utilisation 
of services. 
patient 0% 0% 6% 46% 46% 3% 
carer 0% 0% 0% 26% 68.% 5% 
CM nurse 0% 0% 0% 38% 63% 0% 
18. Having a less cluttered and tidy 
environment reduces patient risk and 
improves safety. 
patient 0% 0% 3% 49% 46% 3% 
carer 0% 0% 5.26% 26% 68% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 4% 0% 50% 46% 0% 
19. An environment in which communication 
between key stakeholders is encouraged can 
patient 0% 0% 6% 51% 4% 3% 
carer 0% 0% 5% 37% 58% 0% 
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support patient safety. CM nurse 0% 0% 4% 33% 63% 0% 
20. Uncooperative carers and family members 
can negatively influence patient care, putting 
them at risk of poor outcomes. 
patient 0% 3% 6% 41% 50% 0% 
carer 0% 0% 5% 32% 63% 0% 
CM nurse 4% 0% 0% 58% 38% 0% 
21. Communication equipment such as care 
lines can reduce risk and improve patient 
safety. 
patient 0% 0% 8.57% 40% 43% 9% 
carer 0% 5% 0% 26% 68% 0% 
CM nurse 0% 8% 4% 42% 42% 4% 
 
